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Tahir Abbas Syed

Publications and source records attributed to Tahir Abbas Syed.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

EAGLE: Early Identification of Information Propagation Sources through Generalized Bayesian Inference in Large-scale Social Networks

In the era of infodemics, rapidly pinpointing information propagation sources is essential for mitigating negative impacts and enhancing societal resilience. This study presents EAGLE (Early identificAtion of propagation sources through GeneraLized Bayesian infErence), a novel and effective framework for early source identification in large-scale social networks, which integrates evolutionary computation to strategically deploy sparse observers with generalized Bayesian inference to aggregate observational data of varying credibility. Unlike existing approaches, our method relies on limited input from human observers and explicitly incorporates the uncertainty and noise of the data. Comprehensive evaluations across diverse networks and propagation scenarios demonstrate that our approach consistently surpasses state-of-the-art models, without relying on assumptions about propagation characteristics or user attributes. Utilizing real-world datasets with empirical propagation paths from Twitter, our method is among the first capable of identifying potential sources in large-scale networks using limited observers, demonstrating its broad applicability. These findings highlight the effectiveness of generalized Bayesian inference in uncovering propagation dynamics and equip organizations and policymakers with critical tools to proactively address threats to digital trust and security.

cs.SI↗

Sweet Little Lies: Strategic Deception in AI Emotional Support Chatbots

The paper examines the strategic behavior of Gen AI chatbots used for emotional support. Using a Bayesian Persuasion, we model interactions between chatbots that send signals about users' emotional states and users who decide whether to engage based on these signals. We demonstrate that chatbots face economic incentives to occasionally misrepresent users' emotional conditions to maximize engagement metrics. Our equilibrium analysis reveals that the optimal strategy for chatbots involves truthfully reporting when users genuinely need support, but strategically misreporting emotional need when users are in good emotional states. Interestingly, this deception increases chatbot engagement without reducing users' expected payoff. More skeptical users receive more honest assessments, as chatbots cannot afford to lie to users with higher engagement thresholds. While our model suggests that deception can occur without payoff reduction, it raises significant ethical and regulatory concerns.

cs.AI↗