arXiv subjects

Takunori Ishihara

Publications and source records attributed to Takunori Ishihara.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Rebate versus Matching, Again: How Opt-in Reshapes the Effectiveness of Price-Equivalent Subsidies

Traditional theory predicts equivalent effects of matching and rebate subsidies at equal prices, yet experiments favor matching. Refinements narrow this gap but retain compulsory assignment; take-up is voluntary in practice. We test this implementation margin in a nationwide, incentivized donation experiment with 2,400 Japanese adults, crossing subsidy type and assignment rule. After equalizing budget constraints and accounting for comprehension, total giving is indistinguishable under compulsory assignment. Under opt-in, the matching advantage re-emerges and nearly quadruples because rebate loses effectiveness. LATE estimates suggest advantageous selection into matching but disadvantageous selection into rebate. Self-selection can reshape the policy ranking of price-equivalent instruments.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2025

Scaling Charitable Incentives: Policy Selection, Beliefs, and Evidence from a Field Experiment

Why are interventions with weak evidence still adopted? We study charitable incentives for physical activity in Japan using three linked methods, including a randomized field experiment (N=808), a stakeholder belief survey (local government officials and private-sector employees, N=2,400), and a conjoint experiment on policy choice. Financial incentives increase daily steps by about 1,000, whereas charitable incentives deliver a precisely estimated null. Nonetheless, stakeholders greatly overpredict charitable incentives' effects on walking, participation, and prosociality. Conjoint choices show policymakers value step gains as well as other outcomes, shaping policy choice. Adoption thus reflects multidimensional beliefs and objectives, highlighting policy selection as a scaling challenge.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2021

Paternalism, Autonomy, or Both? Experimental Evidence from Energy Saving Programs

Identifying who should be treated is a central question in economics. There are two competing approaches to targeting - paternalistic and autonomous. In the paternalistic approach, policymakers optimally target the policy given observable individual characteristics. In contrast, the autonomous approach acknowledges that individuals may possess key unobservable information on heterogeneous policy impacts, and allows them to self-select into treatment. In this paper, we propose a new approach that mixes paternalistic assignment and autonomous choice. Our approach uses individual characteristics and empirical welfare maximization to identify who should be treated, untreated, and decide whether to be treated themselves. We apply this method to design a targeting policy for an energy saving programs using data collected in a randomized field experiment. We show that optimally mixing paternalistic assignments and autonomous choice significantly improves the social welfare gain of the policy. Exploiting random variation generated by the field experiment, we develop a method to estimate average treatment effects for each subgroup of individuals who would make the same autonomous treatment choice. Our estimates confirm that the estimated assignment policy optimally allocates individuals to be treated, untreated, or choose themselves based on the relative merits of paternalistic assignments and autonomous choice for individuals types.

econ.GN↗