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Tamay Besiroglu

Publications and source records attributed to Tamay Besiroglu.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources
arXiv2025

GATE: An Integrated Assessment Model for AI Automation

Assessing the economic impacts of artificial intelligence requires integrating insights from both computer science and economics. We present the Growth and AI Transition Endogenous model (GATE), a dynamic integrated assessment model that simulates the economic effects of AI automation. GATE combines three key ingredients that have not been brought together in previous work: (1) a compute-based model of AI development, (2) an AI automation framework, and (3) a semi-endogenous growth model featuring endogenous investment and adjustment costs. The model allows users to simulate the economic effects of the transition to advanced AI across a range of potential scenarios. GATE captures the interactions between economic variables, including investment, automation, innovation, and growth, as well as AI-related inputs such as compute and algorithms. This paper explains the model's structure and functionality, emphasizing AI development for economists and economic modeling for the AI community. The model is implemented in an interactive sandbox, enabling users to explore the impact of AI under different parameter choices and policy interventions. The modeling sandbox is available at: www.epoch.ai/GATE.

econ.GN↗
arXiv2025

International AI Safety Report

The first International AI Safety Report comprehensively synthesizes the current evidence on the capabilities, risks, and safety of advanced AI systems. The report was mandated by the nations attending the AI Safety Summit in Bletchley, UK. Thirty nations, the UN, the OECD, and the EU each nominated a representative to the report's Expert Advisory Panel. A total of 100 AI experts contributed, representing diverse perspectives and disciplines. Led by the report's Chair, these independent experts collectively had full discretion over the report's content.

cs.CY↗
arXiv2024

FrontierMath: A Benchmark for Evaluating Advanced Mathematical Reasoning in AI

We introduce FrontierMath, a benchmark of hundreds of original, exceptionally challenging mathematics problems crafted and vetted by expert mathematicians. The questions cover most major branches of modern mathematics -- from computationally intensive problems in number theory and real analysis to abstract questions in algebraic geometry and category theory. Solving a typical problem requires multiple hours of effort from a researcher in the relevant branch of mathematics, and for the upper end questions, multiple days. FrontierMath uses new, unpublished problems and automated verification to reliably evaluate models while minimizing risk of data contamination. Current state-of-the-art AI models solve under 2% of problems, revealing a vast gap between AI capabilities and the prowess of the mathematical community. As AI systems advance toward expert-level mathematical abilities, FrontierMath offers a rigorous testbed that quantifies their progress.

cs.AI↗
arXiv2024

International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI (Interim Report)

This is the interim publication of the first International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI. The report synthesises the scientific understanding of general-purpose AI -- AI that can perform a wide variety of tasks -- with a focus on understanding and managing its risks. A diverse group of 75 AI experts contributed to this report, including an international Expert Advisory Panel nominated by 30 countries, the EU, and the UN. Led by the Chair, these independent experts collectively had full discretion over the report's content. The final report is available at arXiv:2501.17805

cs.CY↗
arXiv2024

The rising costs of training frontier AI models

The costs of training frontier AI models have grown dramatically in recent years, but there is limited public data on the magnitude and growth of these expenses. This paper develops a detailed cost model to address this gap, estimating training costs using three approaches that account for hardware, energy, cloud rental, and staff expenses. The analysis reveals that the amortized cost to train the most compute-intensive models has grown precipitously at a rate of 2.4x per year since 2016 (90% CI: 2.0x to 2.9x). For key frontier models, such as GPT-4 and Gemini, the most significant expenses are AI accelerator chips and staff costs, each costing tens of millions of dollars. Other notable costs include server components (15-22%), cluster-level interconnect (9-13%), and energy consumption (2-6%). If the trend of growing development costs continues, the largest training runs will cost more than a billion dollars by 2027, meaning that only the most well-funded organizations will be able to finance frontier AI models.

cs.CY↗
arXiv2024

Estimating Idea Production: A Methodological Survey

Accurately modeling the production of new ideas is crucial for innovation theory and endogenous growth models. This paper provides a comprehensive methodological survey of strategies for estimating idea production functions. We explore various methods, including naive approaches, linear regression, maximum likelihood estimation, and Bayesian inference, each suited to different data availability settings. Through case studies ranging from total factor productivity to software R&D, we show how to apply these methodologies in practice. Our synthesis provides researchers with guidance on strategies for characterizing idea production functions and highlights obstacles that must be addressed through further empirical validation.

econ.GN↗
arXiv2024

Assessing Human Judgment Forecasts in the Rapid Spread of the Mpox Outbreak: Insights and Challenges for Pandemic Preparedness

In May 2022, mpox (formerly monkeypox) spread to non-endemic countries rapidly. Human judgment is a forecasting approach that has been sparsely evaluated during the beginning of an outbreak. We collected -- between May 19, 2022 and July 31, 2022 -- 1275 forecasts from 442 individuals of six questions about the mpox outbreak where ground truth data are now available. Individual human judgment forecasts and an equally weighted ensemble were evaluated, as well as compared to a random walk, autoregressive, and doubling time model. We found (1) individual human judgment forecasts underestimated outbreak size, (2) the ensemble forecast median moved closer to the ground truth over time but uncertainty around the median did not appreciably decrease, and (3) compared to computational models, for 2-8 week ahead forecasts, the human judgment ensemble outperformed all three models when using median absolute error and weighted interval score; for one week ahead forecasts a random walk outperformed human judgment. We propose two possible explanations: at the time a forecast was submitted, the mode was correlated with the most recent (and smaller) observation that would eventually determine ground truth. Several forecasts were solicited on a logarithmic scale which may have caused humans to generate forecasts with unintended, large uncertainty intervals. To aide in outbreak preparedness, platforms that solicit human judgment forecasts may wish to assess whether specifying a forecast on logarithmic scale matches an individual's intended forecast, support human judgment by finding cues that are typically used to build forecasts, and, to improve performance, tailor their platform to allow forecasters to assign zero probability to events.

q-bio.PE↗
arXiv2024

Chinchilla Scaling: A replication attempt

Hoffmann et al. (2022) propose three methods for estimating a compute-optimal scaling law. We attempt to replicate their third estimation procedure, which involves fitting a parametric loss function to a reconstruction of data from their plots. We find that the reported estimates are inconsistent with their first two estimation methods, fail at fitting the extracted data, and report implausibly narrow confidence intervals--intervals this narrow would require over 600,000 experiments, while they likely only ran fewer than 500. In contrast, our rederivation of the scaling law using the third approach yields results that are compatible with the findings from the first two estimation procedures described by Hoffmann et al.

cs.AI↗
arXiv2024

Algorithmic progress in language models

We investigate the rate at which algorithms for pre-training language models have improved since the advent of deep learning. Using a dataset of over 200 language model evaluations on Wikitext and Penn Treebank spanning 2012-2023, we find that the compute required to reach a set performance threshold has halved approximately every 8 months, with a 95% confidence interval of around 5 to 14 months, substantially faster than hardware gains per Moore's Law. We estimate augmented scaling laws, which enable us to quantify algorithmic progress and determine the relative contributions of scaling models versus innovations in training algorithms. Despite the rapid pace of algorithmic progress and the development of new architectures such as the transformer, our analysis reveals that the increase in compute made an even larger contribution to overall performance improvements over this time period. Though limited by noisy benchmark data, our analysis quantifies the rapid progress in language modeling, shedding light on the relative contributions from compute and algorithms.

cs.CL↗
arXiv2024

The Compute Divide in Machine Learning: A Threat to Academic Contribution and Scrutiny?

There are pronounced differences in the extent to which industrial and academic AI labs use computing resources. We provide a data-driven survey of the role of the compute divide in shaping machine learning research. We show that a compute divide has coincided with a reduced representation of academic-only research teams in compute intensive research topics, especially foundation models. We argue that, academia will likely play a smaller role in advancing the associated techniques, providing critical evaluation and scrutiny, and in the diffusion of such models. Concurrent with this change in research focus, there is a noticeable shift in academic research towards embracing open source, pre-trained models developed within the industry. To address the challenges arising from this trend, especially reduced scrutiny of influential models, we recommend approaches aimed at thoughtfully expanding academic insights. Nationally-sponsored computing infrastructure coupled with open science initiatives could judiciously boost academic compute access, prioritizing research on interpretability, safety and security. Structured access programs and third-party auditing may also allow measured external evaluation of industry systems.

cs.CY↗
arXiv2023

Limits to the Energy Efficiency of CMOS Microprocessors

CMOS microprocessors have achieved massive energy efficiency gains but may reach limits soon. This paper presents an approach to estimating the limits on the maximum floating point operations per Joule (FLOP/J) for CMOS microprocessors. We analyze the three primary sources of energy dissipation: transistor switching, interconnect capacitances and leakage power. Using first-principles calculations of minimum energy costs based on Landauer's principle, prior estimates of relevant parameters, and empirical data on hardware, we derive the energy cost per FLOP for each component. Combining these yields a geometric mean estimate of 4.7e15 FP4/J for the maximum CMOS energy efficiency, roughly two hundred-fold more efficient than current microprocessors.

cs.ET↗
arXiv2023

Who is leading in AI? An analysis of industry AI research

AI research is increasingly industry-driven, making it crucial to understand company contributions to this field. We compare leading AI companies by research publications, citations, size of training runs, and contributions to algorithmic innovations. Our analysis reveals the substantial role played by Google, OpenAI and Meta. We find that these three companies have been responsible for some of the largest training runs, developed a large fraction of the algorithmic innovations that underpin large language models, and led in various metrics of citation impact. In contrast, leading Chinese companies such as Tencent and Baidu had a lower impact on many of these metrics compared to US counterparts. We observe many industry labs are pursuing large training runs, and that training runs from relative newcomers -- such as OpenAI and Anthropic -- have matched or surpassed those of long-standing incumbents such as Google. The data reveals a diverse ecosystem of companies steering AI progress, though US labs such as Google, OpenAI and Meta lead across critical metrics.

cs.CY↗
arXiv2023

Explosive growth from AI automation: A review of the arguments

We examine whether substantial AI automation could accelerate global economic growth by about an order of magnitude, akin to the economic growth effects of the Industrial Revolution. We identify three primary drivers for such growth: 1) the scalability of an AI "labor force" restoring a regime of increasing returns to scale, 2) the rapid expansion of an AI labor force, and 3) a massive increase in output from rapid automation occurring over a brief period of time. Against this backdrop, we evaluate nine counterarguments, including regulatory hurdles, production bottlenecks, alignment issues, and the pace of automation. We tentatively assess these arguments, finding most are unlikely deciders. We conclude that explosive growth seems plausible with AI capable of broadly substituting for human labor, but high confidence in this claim seems currently unwarranted. Key questions remain about the intensity of regulatory responses to AI, physical bottlenecks in production, the economic value of superhuman abilities, and the rate at which AI automation could occur.

econ.GN↗
arXiv2023

Economic impacts of AI-augmented R&D

Since its emergence around 2010, deep learning has rapidly become the most important technique in Artificial Intelligence (AI), producing an array of scientific firsts in areas as diverse as protein folding, drug discovery, integrated chip design, and weather prediction. As more scientists and engineers adopt deep learning, it is important to consider what effect widespread deployment would have on scientific progress and, ultimately, economic growth. We assess this impact by estimating the idea production function for AI in two computer vision tasks that are considered key test-beds for deep learning and show that AI idea production is notably more capital-intensive than traditional R&D. Because increasing the capital-intensity of R&D accelerates the investments that make scientists and engineers more productive, our work suggests that AI-augmented R&D has the potential to speed up technological change and economic growth.

econ.GN↗
arXiv2022

Algorithmic progress in computer vision

We investigate algorithmic progress in image classification on ImageNet, perhaps the most well-known test bed for computer vision. We estimate a model, informed by work on neural scaling laws, and infer a decomposition of progress into the scaling of compute, data, and algorithms. Using Shapley values to attribute performance improvements, we find that algorithmic improvements have been roughly as important as the scaling of compute for progress computer vision. Our estimates indicate that algorithmic innovations mostly take the form of compute-augmenting algorithmic advances (which enable researchers to get better performance from less compute), not data-augmenting algorithmic advances. We find that compute-augmenting algorithmic advances are made at a pace more than twice as fast as the rate usually associated with Moore's law. In particular, we estimate that compute-augmenting innovations halve compute requirements every nine months (95\% confidence interval: 4 to 25 months).

cs.CV↗
arXiv2022

Will we run out of data? Limits of LLM scaling based on human-generated data

We investigate the potential constraints on LLM scaling posed by the availability of public human-generated text data. We forecast the growing demand for training data based on current trends and estimate the total stock of public human text data. Our findings indicate that if current LLM development trends continue, models will be trained on datasets roughly equal in size to the available stock of public human text data between 2026 and 2032, or slightly earlier if models are overtrained. We explore how progress in language modeling can continue when human-generated text datasets cannot be scaled any further. We argue that synthetic data generation, transfer learning from data-rich domains, and data efficiency improvements might support further progress.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2022

Machine Learning Model Sizes and the Parameter Gap

We study trends in model size of notable machine learning systems over time using a curated dataset. From 1950 to 2018, model size in language models increased steadily by seven orders of magnitude. The trend then accelerated, with model size increasing by another five orders of magnitude in just 4 years from 2018 to 2022. Vision models grew at a more constant pace, totaling 7 orders of magnitude of growth between 1950 and 2022. We also identify that, since 2020, there have been many language models below 20B parameters, many models above 70B parameters, but a scarcity of models in the 20-70B parameter range. We refer to that scarcity as the parameter gap. We provide some stylized facts about the parameter gap and propose a few hypotheses to explain it. The explanations we favor are: (a) increasing model size beyond 20B parameters requires adopting different parallelism techniques, which makes mid-sized models less cost-effective, (b) GPT-3 was one order of magnitude larger than previous language models, and researchers afterwards primarily experimented with bigger models to outperform it. While these dynamics likely exist, and we believe they play some role in generating the gap, we don't have high confidence that there are no other, more important dynamics at play.

cs.LG↗