Tamir Nizri | Searcharxiv

arXiv2026

An Actionable Diagnosis of Multilingual, Multi-Agent Planning Failures

Multilingual multi-agent systems exhibit substantial degradation beyond English, yet prior work rarely identifies how task-critical information is lost when user requests are converted into executable plans. We study the planner in a multi-agent system as the request-to-action interface and derive an actionable taxonomy of planning-grounding failures from failed real-world task executions. LLM-based analysis shows that these failures constitute an increasing share of unsuccessful executions as language-resource availability declines, with the strongest effects in low-resource languages. To test whether the taxonomy supports mitigation, we introduce TART, Taxonomy-Guided Actionable Representation, that makes the taxonomy's key aspects explicit to the planner and downstream sub-agents. Across multiple languages, three LLM backbones, two datasets, and two agentic configurations, TART consistently improves performance. On multilingual GAIA, it raises a state-of-the-art system's accuracy by 5.6 percentage points averaged across eleven languages spanning low- to high-resource settings.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2026

When Scanners Lie: Evaluator Instability in LLM Red-Teaming

Automated LLM vulnerability scanners are increasingly used to assess security risks by measuring different attack type success rates (ASR). Yet the validity of these measurements hinges on an often-overlooked component: the evaluator who determines whether an attack has succeeded. In this study, we demonstrate that commonly used open-source scanners exhibit measurement instability that depends on the evaluator component. Consequently, changing the evaluator while keeping the attacks and model outputs constant can significantly alter the reported ASR. To tackle this problem, we present a two-phase, reliability-aware evaluation framework. In the first phase, we quantify evaluator disagreement to identify attack categories where ASR reliability cannot be assumed. In the second phase, we propose a verification-based evaluation method where evaluators are validated by an independent verifier, enabling reliability assessment without relying on extensive human annotation. Applied to the widely used Garak scanner, we observe that 22 of 25 attack categories exhibit evaluator instability, reflected in high disagreement among evaluators. Our approach raises evaluator accuracy from 72% to 89% while enabling selective deployment to control cost and computational overhead. We further quantify evaluator uncertainty in ASR estimates, showing that reported vulnerability scores can vary by up to 33% depending on the evaluator. Our results indicate that the outputs of vulnerability scanners are highly sensitive to the choice of evaluators. Our framework offers a practical approach to quantify unreliable evaluations and enhance the reliability of measurements in automated LLM security assessments.

cs.CR↗