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Tanya Prasad

Publications and source records attributed to Tanya Prasad.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

RegTrack: Uncovering Global Disparities in Third-party Advertising and Tracking

Third party advertising and tracking (A&T) are pervasive across the web, yet user exposure varies significantly with browser choice, browsing location, and hosting jurisdiction. We systematically study how these three factors shape tracking by conducting synchronized crawls of 743 popular websites from 8 geographic vantage points using 4 browsers and 2 consent states. Our analysis reveals that browser choice, user location, and hosting jurisdiction each shape tracking exposure in distinct ways. Privacy focused browsers block more third party trackers, reducing observed A&T domains by up to 30% in permissive regulatory environments, but offer smaller relative gains in stricter regions. User location influences the tracking volume, the prevalence of consent banners, and the extent of cross border tracking: GDPR regulated locations exhibit about 80% fewer third party A&T domains before consent and keep 89-91% of A&T requests within the EEA or adequacy countries. Hosting jurisdiction plays a smaller role; tracking exposure varies most strongly with inferred user location rather than where sites are hosted. These findings underscore both the power and limitations of user agency, informing the design of privacy tools, regulatory enforcement strategies, and future measurement methodologies.

cs.NI

SafeBPF: Hardware-assisted Defense-in-depth for eBPF Kernel Extensions

The eBPF framework enables execution of user-provided code in the Linux kernel. In the last few years, a large ecosystem of cloud services has leveraged eBPF to enhance container security, system observability, and network management. Meanwhile, incessant discoveries of memory safety vulnerabilities have left the systems community with no choice but to disallow unprivileged eBPF programs, which unfortunately limits eBPF use to only privileged users. To improve run-time safety of the framework, we introduce SafeBPF, a general design that isolates eBPF programs from the rest of the kernel to prevent memory safety vulnerabilities from being exploited. We present a pure software implementation using a Software-based Fault Isolation (SFI) approach and a hardware-assisted implementation that leverages ARM's Memory Tagging Extension (MTE). We show that SafeBPF incurs up to 4% overhead on macrobenchmarks while achieving desired security properties.

cs.CR