arXiv subjects

Taylor A. Kessinger

Publications and source records attributed to Taylor A. Kessinger.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

A model of local and global reciprocity

We often decide how to treat friends based on observations of their past behavior, whereas actions toward strangers are typically guided by their public reputations. These two kinds of information underlie two classical mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation$\unicode{x2014}$direct and indirect reciprocity$\unicode{x2014}$which have largely been studied in isolation. They are not interchangeable: we can recall the past actions of only a small circle of close contacts, whereas for the far larger pool of strangers we must rely on public reputations. Here we develop a mathematical framework built on this distinction. Each individual engages in direct reciprocity in local games within a finite neighborhood of friends, whose actions they observe directly, and in indirect reciprocity in global games with a large population of strangers, known only by reputation. Separating local and global interactions allows us to address two questions. First, can cooperation persist under a cognitively simple norm of judgment? We show that combining direct and indirect reciprocity resolves the scoring dilemma: conditional cooperators resist invasion by both unconditional cooperators and unconditional defectors, where indirect reciprocity alone would fail. Second, how should one treat a friend whose past behavior conflicts with their public reputation? We find that the strategies that maximize cooperation are forgiving$\unicode{x2014}$overlooking whichever piece of information is unfavorable$\unicode{x2014}$and that these forgiving strategies can often remain robust to invasion. By distinguishing between local and global scales of interaction and integrating information across them, our framework offers a more cognitively realistic account of how reciprocity sustains cooperation.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2024

Institutions of public judgment established by social contract and taxation

Indirect reciprocity is a plausible mechanism for sustaining cooperation: people cooperate with those who have a good reputation, which can be acquired by helping others. However, this mechanism requires the population to agree on who has good or bad moral standing. Consensus can be provided by a central institution that monitors and broadcasts reputations. But how might such an institution be maintained, and how can a population ensure that it is effective and incorruptible? Here we explore a simple mechanism to sustain an institution of reputational judgment: a compulsory contribution from each member of the population, i.e., a tax. We analyze the maximum possible tax rate that individuals will rationally pay to sustain an institution of judgment, which provides a public good in the form of information, and we derive necessary conditions for individuals to resist the temptation to evade their tax payment. We also consider the possibility that institution members may be corrupt and subject to bribery, and we analyze how often an institution must be audited to prevent bribery. Our analysis has implications for the establishment of robust public institutions that provide social information to support cooperation in large populations--and the potential negative consequences associated with wealth or income inequality.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2023

A mechanistic model of gossip, reputations, and cooperation

Social reputations facilitate cooperation: those who help others gain a good reputation, making them more likely to receive help themselves. But when people hold private views of one another, this cycle of indirect reciprocity breaks down, as disagreements lead to the perception of unjustified behavior that ultimately undermines cooperation. Theoretical studies often assume population-wide agreement about reputations, invoking rapid gossip as an endogenous mechanism for reaching consensus. However, the theory of indirect reciprocity lacks a mechanistic description of how gossip actually generates consensus. Here we develop a mechanistic model of gossip-based indirect reciprocity that incorporates two alternative forms of gossip: exchanging information with randomly selected peers or consulting a single gossip source. We show that these two forms of gossip are mathematically equivalent under an appropriate transformation of parameters. We derive an analytical expression for the minimum amount of gossip required to reach sufficient consensus and stabilize cooperation. We analyze how the amount of gossip necessary for cooperation depends on the benefits and costs of cooperation, the assessment rule (social norm), and errors in reputation assessment, strategy execution, and gossip transmission. Finally, we show that biased gossip can either facilitate or hinder cooperation, depending on the direction and magnitude of the bias. Our results contribute to the growing literature on cooperation facilitated by communication, and they highlight the need to study strategic interactions coupled with the spread of social information.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2022

Evolution of social norms for moral judgment

Reputations provide a powerful mechanism to sustain cooperation, as individuals cooperate with those of good social standing. But how should moral reputations be updated as we observe social behavior, and when will a population converge on a common norm of moral assessment? Here we develop a mathematical model of cooperation conditioned on reputations, for a population that is stratified into groups. Each group may subscribe to a different social norm for assessing reputations, and so norms compete as individuals choose to move from one group to another. We show that a group initially comprising a minority of the population may nonetheless overtake the entire population--especially if it adopts the Stern Judging norm, which assigns a bad reputation to individuals who cooperate with those of bad standing. When individuals do not change group membership, stratifying reputation information into groups tends to destabilize cooperation, unless individuals are strongly insular and favor in-group social interactions. We discuss the implications of our results for the structure of information flow in a population and the evolution of social norms of moral judgment.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2013

Inferring HIV escape rates from multi-locus genotype data

Cytotoxic T-lymphocytes (CTLs) recognize viral protein fragments displayed by major histocompatibility complex (MHC) molecules on the surface of virally infected cells and generate an anti-viral response that can kill the infected cells. Virus variants whose protein fragments are not efficiently presented on infected cells or whose fragments are presented but not recognized by CTLs therefore have a competitive advantage and spread rapidly through the population. We present a method that allows a more robust estimation of these escape rates from serially sampled sequence data. The proposed method accounts for competition between multiple escapes by explicitly modeling the accumulation of escape mutations and the stochastic effects of rare multiple mutants. Applying our method to serially sampled HIV sequence data, we estimate rates of HIV escape that are substantially larger than those previously reported. The method can be extended to complex escapes that require compensatory mutations. We expect our method to be applicable in other contexts such as cancer evolution where time series data is also available.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2013

Coalescence, genetic diversity in sexual populations under selection

In sexual populations, selection operates neither on the whole genome, which is repeatedly taken apart and reassembled by recombination, nor on individual alleles that are tightly linked to the chromosomal neighborhood. The resulting interference between linked alleles reduces the efficiency of selection and distorts patterns of genetic diversity. Inference of evolutionary history from diversity shaped by linked selection requires an understanding of these patterns. Here, we present a simple but powerful scaling analysis identifying the unit of selection as the genomic "linkage block" with a characteristic length determined in a self-consistent manner by the condition that the rate of recombination within the block is comparable to the fitness differences between different alleles of the block. We find that an asexual model with the strength of selection tuned to that of the linkage block provides an excellent description of genetic diversity and the site frequency spectra when compared to computer simulations. This linkage block approximation is accurate for the entire spectrum of strength of selection and is particularly powerful in scenarios with many weakly selected loci. The latter limit allows us to characterize coalescence, genetic diversity, and the speed of adaptation in the infinitesimal model of quantitative genetics.

q-bio.PE↗