Screening with Product Mismatch
A monopolist sells a product line whose variants are horizontally differentiated from the buyers' perspective but ordered by production cost. Buyers privately know their ideal product, and willingness to pay may be correlated with horizontal need. The seller screens buyers through product mismatch, and what she must screen determines whether mismatch creates or reduces information rent. When buyers differ only in horizontal need, mismatch creates rent: the seller induces less mismatch, assigning served buyers products closer to their ideals than under the first best. When willingness to pay is correlated with horizontal need, mismatch instead reduces rent: the seller induces more mismatch, sells the basic product to buyers whose efficient products are advanced variants while excluding buyers better matched to it, and stronger horizontal differentiation can expand coverage and raise profit. Because mismatch is type-specific, optimal allocations are determined by individual rationality rather than by incentive compatibility alone.