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Tegawendé F. Bissyandé

Publications and source records attributed to Tegawendé F. Bissyandé.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources
arXiv2026

Metacognitive Reasoning in Energy Based Models using Instance Based Learning Theory

Metacognition involves reasoning about cognitive processes themselves. An example is in resource allocation where we choose how much time and effort to put into a reasoning task before we begin based on our confidence. Current Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems that rely on Large Language Models (LLMs) cannot estimate their uncertainty about an output without first responding, and cannot dynamically allocate resources to producing an output, making this type of metacognitive process difficult. A recently proposed alternative to classic transformer architectures that addresses these two concerns is the Energy Based Model (EBM) which allows for interpretable uncertainty modeling and dynamic allocation of compute resources. While EBMs can allow for control of these two processes, the actual metacognitive task of determining compute allocation based on uncertainty is not directly addressed. Instance-Based Learning Theory (IBLT) provides an approach to modeling human-like decisions from experience that has previously been applied to predicting human metacognitive reasoning. In this paper we introduce a framework for MEtacognitive Reasoning with Instance-based Learning Theory and Energy Dynamics (MERITED). Grounded in IBLT, this framework allows for control of the computational effort allocated in an EBM to allow for metacognitive control over reasoning effort based on uncertainty while remaining computationally efficient. This work has two main contributions, the training and open weight sharing of a 191M parameter reasoning EBM, and an implementation of the MERITED framework for dynamic compute allocation using an IBL model.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2026

Trajectory-Level Security Debt in LLM Coding Agents

LLM coding agents can traverse hundreds of intermediate code states before submitting a solution. Evaluating only the final artifact leaves the evolution of security findings unmeasured. We introduce the Security Debt Line Integral (SDLI), which accumulates static-analysis risk when an agent reaches a new best test pass ratio. We instantiate it with four static application security testing (SAST) tools and study artifacts from 830 passing SWE-bench runs, 712 ProgramBench final workspaces, and 13 public MirrorCode trajectories. The two large populations use the final-state special case of SDLI. Two-tool Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) class agreement occurs in 3.9% of SWE-bench runs and 26.2% of the 80 ProgramBench runs passing at least 90% of official tests. These are scanner findings, not validated vulnerability rates. Excluding three advisory-heavy classes reduces the latter rate to 6.2%. Same-task runs differ in their measured scores, while one reconstructed ProgramBench run exposes persistent findings from its first implementation write. A repair case study reduces the scanner signal while preserving tested behavior, but also reveals sensitivity to equivalent API rewrites. SDLI offers a way to study progress and security findings together. Its value for steering agents and confirming exploitable vulnerabilities remains to be established.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

BMA: Backchain Memory Attacks Create Unauthorized Control Paths in LLM Agents

Persistent memory enables LLM agents to reuse prior experience, but creates a new security boundary: what an agent may remember is not what it should act on. We expose an unauthorized control path where edited low-trust evidence is consolidated into persistent memory, retrieved on a clean task, and used to drive a protected action. Crucially, the adversary neither writes memory nor alters the task. We introduce Backchain Memory Attack (BMA), a grey-box, LLM-driven inverse-planning attack that reasons backward from the target action to the memory that would trigger it, then to the evidence edit that would form it. BMA has two phases: preparation uses resettable trials to localize the first failed link and build experience; execution uses the frozen experience to rank and commit candidate edits without feedback. We introduce the Pathway-Certified Attack Success Rate (Path-CASR) to separate memory-mediated from coincidental hits: registered memory must form, be retrieved, drive the target behavior, and pass matched-intervention checks. Across four substrates and three decision backbones, BMA achieves 18.8% Macro Path-CASR, compared with 13.4% for the strongest access-matched baseline. Of BMA's behavioral hits, 60.3% pass all registered pathway and intervention checks versus 36.7% for the baseline. Frozen BMA edits retain 78.0% of their certified effect on average across four held-out consolidation policies. Representative memory-side controls leave 11.0% Path-CASR, whereas provenance-bound authorization reduces it to 2.0% while preserving 92.1% legitimate-action success.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

From Rookie to Pro: Social Engineering LLMs for Automated Vulnerability Exploitation in Enterprise Software

LLMs democratize software engineering by enabling non-programmers to create applications, but this same accessibility fundamentally undermines security assumptions that have guided software engineering for decades. We show in this work how publicly available LLMs can be socially engineered to transform novices into capable attackers, challenging the foundational principle that exploitation requires technical expertise. To that end, we propose RSA (Role-assignment, Scenario-pretexting, and Action-solicitation), a pretexting strategy that manipulates LLMs into generating functional exploits despite their safety mechanisms. Testing against Odoo---a widely used ERP platform, we evaluated five mainstream LLMs (GPT-4o, Gemini, Claude, Microsoft Copilot, and DeepSeek) and successfully exploited every tested CVE: at least one LLM produced a functional exploit for each within 3-5 prompting rounds. While prior work [13] found LLM-assisted attacks difficult and requiring manual effort, we demonstrate that this overhead can be eliminated entirely. Our findings invalidate core software engineering security principles: the distinction between technical and non-technical actors no longer provides valid threat models; technical complexity of vulnerability descriptions offers no protection when LLMs can abstract it away; and traditional security boundaries dissolve when the same tools that build software can be manipulated to break it. This represents a paradigm shift in software engineering---we must redesign security practices for an era where exploitation requires only the ability to craft prompts, not understand code. Artifacts available at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/From-Rookie-to-Attacker-D8B3.

cs.SE↗
arXiv2026

A Survey of LLM-based Automated Program Repair: Taxonomies, Design Paradigms, and Applications

Large language models (LLMs) are reshaping automated program repair. We present a reproducible hierarchical taxonomy that organizes 66 LLM-based repair systems according to where repair capability and control logic principally reside: task-adapted parameters, prompt and context design, designer-specified workflows, or LLM-directed runtime control. Adaptation, generation pattern, runtime control, and auxiliary evidence are preserved as separate coded dimensions. This representation exposes control distinctions hidden by utilization labels and supports cross-paradigm analysis of system design and evaluation evidence. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first publicly available LLM-based software repair survey to operationalize Fine-Tuning, Prompting, Procedural, and Agentic as one corpus-wide primary classification. Our hierarchy complements prior surveys through one corpus-wide primary decision rule, while the result-level protocol audit bounds which reported results are defensibly comparable. To analyze how repair systems use benchmarks, we record benchmark variants, metrics, base models, and fault-localization assumptions for each system's primary reported result, identifying protocol-aligned comparison windows and benchmark-family fragments. We clarify paradigm trade-offs in task alignment, deployment cost, controllability, and multi-hunk or cross-file repair. We outline open challenges and research directions. Our artifacts and scripted survey pipeline are publicly available at https://github.com/GLEAM-Lab/ProgramRepair.

cs.SE↗
arXiv2026

Do Not Copy/Paste: Soft Barriers for Copying in AI-Assisted Programming

Copying a function from a chat window into an editor takes less than a second. For many uses of AI coding tools, that speed is the point; in settings such as programming education, code review, and security-sensitive development, it can also be the problem. This paper frames copy-paste as an \emph{AI code handoff problem}: the moment model-generated text crosses from a conversational context into executable or committed software is a design boundary that current tools leave largely unmanaged. We argue that AI coding assistants should not only be evaluated by the code they generate, but also by how they mediate the transfer of that code into software artifacts. We propose \emph{soft barriers} as one class of handoff-aware mechanisms. Soft barriers preserve access to AI assistance while making unexamined transfer less frictionless. As an initial technical probe, we instantiate this idea using Unicode output perturbations that preserve visual readability but disrupt naive copy-paste execution. We introduce Copy-Paste Resistance (CPR), the fraction of functionally correct clean solutions that become syntactically invalid after perturbation. Across HumanEval and MBPP with four LLMs and four perturbation families, we find that output-level barriers can achieve high copy-paste resistance, but their effectiveness is highly model- and task-dependent. An exploratory pilot with 18 participants provides early evidence that soft barriers can shift users from direct transfer toward editing and reconstruction. We do not present Unicode perturbations as a deployment-ready solution; rather, we use them as a minimal probe for a broader research agenda on practical, transparent, and policy-aware AI code handoff.

cs.SE↗
arXiv2026

Evaluating Inference-Time Defenses Against Package Hallucination in LLM-Generated Code

LLMs are increasingly used for code generation, yet they frequently hallucinate non-existent software packages, creating exploitable entry points into the software supply chain. We make four contributions to this problem. First, we show that prior evaluation methodologies systematically inflate hallucination rates by misclassifying standard-library modules as hallucinations in some languages. For Python, the overestimation reaches 9.4 percentage points. Second, we evaluate seven inference-time defenses for mitigating package hallucinations, including five guided decoding strategies (Greedy, Contrastive, DoLa, Nudging, and Active Layer-Contrastive Decoding), an iterative self-refinement approach (Self-Refine), and a Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG)-based defense.. Across eight models spanning five families and four programming languages (Python, JavaScript, Ruby, Rust), RAG reduces the package hallucination rate (PHR) in 18 of 32 model--language configurations. Third, we introduce Package Utility (PU) to assess whether defenses preserve valid and task-relevant recommendations. Among strategies evaluated, Greedy decoding provides the strongest average mitigation--utility trade-off. Fourth, we stress-test all strategies under adversarial prompts seeded with fabricated package names and find that PHR surges by up to 45 percentage points relative to standard prompts, with Ruby consistently the most vulnerable language (80.9--95.2\%). Under adversarial conditions, RAG and Self-Refine outperform all decoding-only strategies, indicating that robust defense requires either external grounding or iterative self-verification when prompts are actively hostile. Our results recast package hallucination as both a measurement problem and a decoding-time control problem, and they demonstrate that the choice of defense must be matched to the threat model and recommendation utility.

cs.SE↗
arXiv2026

Semantic Drift in Bug Resolution: How Behavioral Signals Propagate from Reports to Tests and Patches

Desc2Fix is a framework for measuring semantic alignment between bug reports, triggering tests, and developer-written fixes. Alignment is operationalized through structured behavioral anchors (e.g., reproduction steps, API/exception cues, expected vs. actual behavior), deterministic similarity metrics (ROUGE, SBERT, CodeBERT, OpenAI embeddings), and LLM-based judgments grounded in coverage, correctness, and specificity. Our analysis covers 2,857 report-test-patch triplets from Defects4J and SWT-Bench using two widely adopted instruction-tuned LLMs from distinct model families. LLMs reliably extract structured signals (up to 90% completeness) and exhibit strong cross-model consistency, yielding a stable semantic input contract for downstream reasoning. However, alignment is highly representation-sensitive: lexical similarity alone is insufficient, full diffs provide the most stable basis for judging report-patch correspondence, and structured summaries trade surface overlap for stronger correspondence at the level of individual actions and entities. Across more than 182,000 LLM-based alignment judgments, both models exhibit systematic optimism relative to humans (1-2 points on 5-point scales) and only modest rank agreement, motivating bias-aware evaluation. Behavioral alignment is measurable but not reducible to similarity, and structured anchors combined with embedding-based proxies provide reproducible signals for ranking and filtering tests and patches. Desc2Fix could support more reliable test generation, fault localization, patch ranking, and bug report authoring.

cs.SE↗
arXiv2026

Memorization Diagnostics for Code LLMs Should be Scale-Aware

The extent to which large language models for code rely on memorization over genuine understanding remains highly debated. While current literature frequently reports widespread memorization, evaluating the underlying probing techniques across dense architectures reveals a severe breakdown in their utility at scale. Traditional encoder-style probes using perturbations such as synonym fuzzing or dead-code insertion struggle to expose memorization in scaled models, even on known-contaminated benchmarks, and decoder-style probes that rely on log probabilities show similar performance degradation. The specific mode of failure for these probes, particularly why such techniques disrupt smaller models but fail to impact larger ones, motivates us to untangle representation load from memorization rather than treating them as a single phenomenon. By applying invertible mathematical transforms to numeric problems, we isolate these two factors and reveal that scaled encoders successfully absorb substantial representation load while still converging on the correct family of solutions. In practical software engineering, this ability to adapt to varying surface forms is what truly matters for usability and generalizability in LLM and agentic applications. Whether a specific solution was seen during training becomes a much less pressing question because although memorization inflates scores on contaminated benchmarks, factoring out representation load makes it debatable how much we should truly care if a functional answer was originally memorized. Future evaluations must therefore be built around separating these phenomena rather than relying on methodologies that quietly entangle them.

cs.SE↗
arXiv2026

GapFuzz: Cross-Plane Divergence Fuzzing for Distributed SDN Controllers

Distributed Software-Defined Networking (SDN) clusters replicate flow state asynchronously between a master node and its backups, leaving a window during which two backup nodes can each commit a contradictory rule, the master can serialize both into the data plane, and the kernel datapath can latch onto an action that no node believes authoritative. Existing SDN fuzzers miss this fault: they confine their oracle to the control plane, target a single controller, or do not steer concurrency to provoke replication races. We present GapFuzz, a stateful concurrency fuzzer for distributed SDN clusters. GapFuzz injects pairs of contradictory Northbound requests on two non-master nodes with controlled inter-injection delay $Δt$, and reconstructs the global cross-plane state by querying every replica and the kernel-datapath action through ovs-appctl ofproto/trace. A two-phase timing search detects whether a divergence exists, then doubles and bisects on $Δt$ to bound the injection-time window; a lifetime probe labels each verdict transient or persistent and assigns it to one of four cross-plane state classes derived from the ONOS 2.7 source. On a three-node ONOS 2.7 cluster, GapFuzz produces a divergent verdict in 81.7% of attempts ($N=50$, Wilson 95% CI $[77.3, 85.4]$%); every divergence sits between the cluster's authoritative state and the kernel datapath. Phase 2 separates a 5 ms race window for one template from a doubling-cap regime ($Δt_{\max}=10.24$ s) for six others, and 99.4% of divergences persist past 30 s. Replacing the kernel-datapath probe with the OpenFlow user-space probe used by prior fuzzers drops detection by 26.6 percentage points overall and by 46.5 points after excluding canonicalization-forced verdicts.

cs.SE↗
arXiv2026

On the Diffusion of Test Smells in LLM-Generated Unit Tests

LLMs promise to transform unit test generation from a manual burden into an automated solution. Yet, beyond metrics such as compilability or coverage, little is known about the quality of LLM-generated tests, particularly their susceptibility to test smells, design flaws that undermine readability and maintainability. This paper presents the first multi-benchmark, large-scale analysis of test smell diffusion in LLM-generated unit tests. We contrast LLM outputs with human-written suites (as the reference for real-world practices) and SBST-generated tests from EvoSuite (as the automated baseline), disentangling whether LLMs reproduce human-like flaws or artifacts of synthetic generation. Our study draws on 20,505 class-level suites from four LLMs (GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Mistral 7B, Mixtral 8x7B), 972 method-level cases from TestBench, 14,469 EvoSuite tests, and 779,585 human-written tests from 34,635 open-source Java projects. Using two complementary detection tools (TsDetect and JNose), we analyze prevalence, co-occurrence, and correlations with software attributes and generation parameters. Results show that LLM-generated tests consistently manifest smells such as Assertion Roulette and Magic Number Test, with patterns strongly influenced by prompting strategy, context length, and model scale. Comparisons reveal overlaps with human-written tests, raising concerns of potential data leakage from training corpora while EvoSuite exhibits distinct, generator-specific flaws. These findings highlight both the promise and the risks of LLM-based test generation, and call for the design of smell-aware generation frameworks, prompt engineering strategies, and enhanced detection tools to ensure maintainable, high-quality test code.

cs.SE↗
arXiv2026

Have I Seen You? Embedding Behavior Signals Synthetic Face Dataset Membership

Synthetic face datasets are increasingly used to reduce privacy exposure and data access constraints in biometric recognition. Yet the generators that produce these datasets are trained on real faces, so synthetic data may still reveal their real source data. We study this risk through a dataset-level membership inference attack that first identifies the synthetic dataset used to train a face recognizer and then infers the real dataset used to train the generator. Across 11 face recognition models, 11 synthetic datasets, and 7 real datasets, the attack recovers the synthetic training dataset in 100% of cases and identifies the generator's source dataset in 54.5% of cases. These results show that synthetic data can retain dataset-level traces of real training data and that privacy-preserving deployment requires stronger leakage mitigation.

cs.CV↗
arXiv2026

Defusing the Trigger: Tail-Risk-Informed Attention Rebalancing for LLM Backdoor Mitigation

Backdoored large language models (LLMs) exhibit attacker-specified behavior at inference time while retaining normal performance on benign inputs. Existing mitigations often require parameter updates and trusted clean data, or rely on auxiliary generation and repeated model execution, complicating deployment. Across diverse backdoor mechanisms, successful activations exhibit stronger tail concentration in attention over semantic-content tokens than benign inputs and unsuccessful trigger activations. This pattern provides a sample-internal control signal to selectively regulate suspicious attention dynamics. We propose TIARA, a tail-risk-informed attention rebalancing approach for inference-time LLM backdoor mitigation. TIARA filters structural attention sinks, aggregates sparse high-concentration events across rows and heads, and converts the risk signal into selective content-domain power smoothing and adaptive attention-mass reallocation. A constrained reconstruction writes valid attention distributions back before value aggregation. TIARA requires no parameter updates, auxiliary generation, additional target-model passes, or deployment-time clean reference sets. We evaluate TIARA across four backdoor paradigms on dense, reasoning-oriented, and sparse mixture-of-experts LLMs. Across three model families, TIARA reduces average macro ASR to 11.5%, outperforming the strongest no-update inference-time baseline by 7.2 percentage points while limiting clean-task degradation to at most 3.8 percentage points. Under standardized profiling, TIARA adds 12.9% end-to-end latency over a matched eager-attention baseline; the current unfused path is 23.3% slower than fused SDPA. Overall, TIARA establishes sample-conditional attention rebalancing as a practical inference-time control layer for mitigating attention-concentrated LLM backdoors.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

Old Tricks, New Models: How Simple Image Transformations Break Modern AI-based Content Moderation

While automated content-moderation systems have become essential for screening harmful content at scale, conventional task-specific classifiers often provide limited policy cov- erage and contextual understanding. Recently, commercial multimodal moderation APIs built on large foundation models have been introduced with the promise of providing broader and more capable safety filters. In this work, we analyze whether this shift also yields more robust image moderation. We conduct a large-scale black-box evaluation on three established commercial image-moderation services and compare their robustness. By evaluating seven simple, model-agnostic image transformations across multiple providers, datasets, harm categories, perceptual-similarity constraints, and transformation intensities, we find that: (1) all three commercial services can be bypassed using inexpensive image transformations that require no gradients, surrogate models, or knowledge of the target system; (2) even fixed transformations such as color inversion and grayscale conversion induce unsafe-to-safe decision changes while preserving content that remains recognizable to humans; (3) their robustness varies substantially across datasets and harm categories, with multimodal content and self-harm exhibiting pronounced vulnerabilities. This yields the conclusion that replacing conventional moderation classifiers with foundation-model-based APIs does not, by itself, provide a reliable security boundary. Such systems must be evaluated under realistic transformations and deployed as one component of a layered moderation pipeline rather than as standalone safety filters.

cs.AI↗
arXiv2026

LuxInstruct: A Cross-Lingual Instruction Tuning Dataset For Luxembourgish

Instruction tuning has become a key technique for enhancing the performance of large language models, enabling them to better follow human prompts. However, low-resource languages such as Luxembourgish face severe limitations due to the lack of high-quality instruction datasets. Traditional reliance on machine translation often introduces semantic misalignment and cultural inaccuracies. In this work, we address these challenges by creating a cross-lingual instruction tuning dataset for Luxembourgish, without resorting to machine-generated translations into it. Instead, by leveraging aligned data from English, French, and German, we build a high-quality dataset that preserves linguistic and cultural nuances. We provide evidence that cross-lingual instruction tuning not only improves representational alignment across languages but also the model's generative capabilities in Luxembourgish. This highlights how cross-lingual data curation can avoid the common pitfalls of machine-translated data and directly benefit low-resource language development.

cs.CL↗
arXiv2026

Benchmarking Face Recognition without Real Faces

Synthetic face datasets have become effective enough to train face recognition models with accuracy rivaling that of models trained on real photographs. This progress sidesteps the ethical and legal burdens of collecting real biometric data, yet evaluation has not kept pace. Even studies that train entirely on synthetic images still rely on real-face benchmarks to measure performance, leaving the privacy problem only half solved. We ask whether synthetic datasets can replace real benchmarks for face recognition evaluation. We test 12 synthetic datasets against 7 established real benchmarks using 24 pre-trained models that span both convolutional and transformer architectures. Our evaluation covers biometric verification metrics, similarity score distributions, cross-model ranking consistency, and the underlying distributional properties of each dataset. Benchmarking fidelity varies widely across the synthetic candidates, but the two strongest, MorphFace and Vec2Face, reproduce the relative behavior of real benchmarks and reach agreement levels that fall within the natural disagreement already observed among the real benchmarks themselves. These results establish that well-constructed synthetic datasets can support reliable comparative evaluation for face recognition, moving the field closer to a fully synthetic and privacy-preserving pipeline for both training and benchmarking.

cs.CV↗
arXiv2026

Software Security in Software-Defined Networking: A Systematic Literature Review

Software-defined networking (SDN) separates the control plane from the data plane and exposes the network through software applications and open APIs. The same programmability that drove its adoption also turned the network into a large body of software, and that software can be vulnerable. Knowing where and how SDN software fails is a prerequisite for defending it, yet the literature offers no consolidated account of the problem. We address this gap with a systematic literature review of 113 primary studies published between 2012 and 2025 on the security of the software that makes up SDN. We study how each software component becomes vulnerable, how attackers exploit it, which testing and analysis techniques expose its defects, and how the field has evolved. The review yields a taxonomy of vulnerabilities and attack vectors organized by SDN software component, a synthesis of the methods used to find software defects in each component, and a set of open problems that mark the most promising directions for future work. Earlier surveys treat SDN security as a networking problem; ours is, to our knowledge, the first to treat SDN components as software artifacts whose code, logic, and interactions can be defective. Our artifacts are available at https://github.com/mad975/SDNSoftwareSecurity_SLR.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

A Framework for Using and Evaluating LLMs as Surrogate Experts in Security Surveys: Reliability, Bias, and Implications

Expert surveys are widely used in security research to study practitioner workows and decision-making, yet recruiting domain experts - especially in Security Operations Centres (SOCs), where analysts face high workload, burnout and confidentiality constraints - is difficult and often results in small samples. Large language models (LLMs) oer an appealing alternative by generating synthetic responses at scale, but little guidance exists on when such surrogate participants are reliable. We present a methodological framework for evaluating LLMs as substitutes or supplements to expert survey respondents. Using responses from SOC professionals, we compare persona-based and aggregate LLM-generated answers across multiple models and prompting settings. We measure stability, inter-model agreement and alignment with human responses. Our results show that although LLMs produce internally consistent answers, they systematically diverge from experts, exhibiting reduced variance, central tendency bias and homogenised opinions. This work contributes methodological evidence and practical guidance to the security research community on the appropriate use and limitations of LLM-generated survey responses. We conclude that LLMs are useful for piloting and hypothesis generation but not for replacing expert elicitation, and we discuss implications for researchers using LLM-augmented surveys.

cs.CY↗