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The Anh Han

Publications and source records attributed to The Anh Han.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

A Multi-Agent Framework for Medical AI: Leveraging Fine-Tuned GPT, LLaMA, and DeepSeek R1 for Evidence-Based and Bias-Aware Clinical Query Processing

Large language models (LLMs) show promise for healthcare question answering, but clinical use is limited by weak verification, insufficient evidence grounding, and unreliable confidence signalling. We propose a multi-agent medical QA framework that combines complementary LLMs with evidence retrieval, uncertainty estimation, and bias checks to improve answer reliability. Our approach has two phases. First, we fine-tune three representative LLM families (GPT, LLaMA, and DeepSeek R1) on MedQuAD-derived medical QA data (20k+ question-answer pairs across multiple NIH domains) and benchmark generation quality. DeepSeek R1 achieves the strongest scores (ROUGE-1 0.536 +- 0.04; ROUGE-2 0.226 +-0.03; BLEU 0.098 -+ 0.018) and substantially outperforms the specialised biomedical baseline BioGPT in zero-shot evaluation. Second, we implement a modular multi-agent pipeline in which a Clinical Reasoning agent (fine-tuned LLaMA) produces structured explanations, an Evidence Retrieval agent queries PubMed to ground responses in recent literature, and a Refinement agent (DeepSeek R1) improves clarity and factual consistency; an optional human validation path is triggered for high-risk or high-uncertainty cases. Safety mechanisms include Monte Carlo dropout and perplexity-based uncertainty scoring, plus lexical and sentiment-based bias detection supported by LIME/SHAP-based analyses. In evaluation, the full system achieves 87% accuracy with relevance around 0.80, and evidence augmentation reduces uncertainty (perplexity 4.13) compared to base responses, with mean end-to-end latency of 36.5 seconds under the reported configuration. Overall, the results indicate that agent specialisation and verification layers can mitigate key single-model limitations and provide a practical, extensible design for evidence-based and bias-aware medical AI.

cs.CL↗

Evolution of fairness in hybrid populations with specialised AI agents

Fairness in hybrid societies hinges on a simple choice: should AI be a generous host or a strict gatekeeper? Moving beyond symmetric models, we show that asymmetric social structures--like those in hiring, regulation, and negotiation--AI that guards fairness outperforms AI that gifts it. We bridge this gap with a bipartite hybrid population model of the Ultimatum Game, separating humans and AI into distinct proposer and receiver groups. We first introduce Samaritan AI agents, which act as either unconditional fair proposers or strict receivers. Our results reveal a striking asymmetry: Samaritan AI receivers drive population-wide fairness far more effectively than Samaritan AI proposers. To overcome the limitations of the Samaritan AI proposer, we design the Discriminatory AI proposer, which predicts co-players' expectations and only offers fair portions to those with high acceptance thresholds. Our results demonstrate that this Discriminatory AI outperforms both types of Samaritan AI, especially in strong selection scenarios. It not only sustains fairness across both populations but also significantly lowers the critical mass of agents required to reach an equitable steady state. By transitioning from unconditional modelling to strategic enforcement, our work provides a pivotal framework for deploying asymmetric AIs in the increasingly hybrid society.

cs.MA↗

Social welfare optimisation in well-mixed and structured populations

Research on promoting cooperation among autonomous, self-regarding agents has often focused on the bi-objective optimisation problem: minimising the total incentive cost while maximising the frequency of cooperation. However, the optimal value of social welfare under such constraints remains largely unexplored. In this work, we hypothesise that achieving maximal social welfare is not guaranteed at the minimal incentive cost required to drive agents to a desired cooperative state. To address this gap, we adopt to a single-objective approach focused on maximising social welfare, building upon foundational evolutionary game theory models that examined cost efficiency in finite populations, in both well-mixed and structured population settings. Our analytical model and agent-based simulations show how different interference strategies, including rewarding local versus global behavioural patterns, affect social welfare and dynamics of cooperation. Our results reveal a significant gap in the per-individual incentive cost between optimising for pure cost efficiency or cooperation frequency and optimising for maximal social welfare. Overall, our findings indicate that incentive design, policy, and benchmarking in multi-agent systems and human societies should prioritise welfare-centric objectives over proxy targets of cost or cooperation frequency.

physics.soc-ph↗

Understanding LLM Agent Behaviours via Game Theory: Strategy Recognition, Biases and Multi-Agent Dynamics

As Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly operate as autonomous decision-makers in interactive and multi-agent systems and human societies, understanding their strategic behaviour has profound implications for safety, coordination, and the design of AI-driven social and economic infrastructures. Assessing such behaviour requires methods that capture not only what LLMs output, but the underlying intentions that guide their decisions. In this work, we extend the FAIRGAME framework to systematically evaluate LLM behaviour in repeated social dilemmas through two complementary advances: a payoff-scaled Prisoners Dilemma isolating sensitivity to incentive magnitude, and an integrated multi-agent Public Goods Game with dynamic payoffs and multi-agent histories. These environments reveal consistent behavioural signatures across models and languages, including incentive-sensitive cooperation, cross-linguistic divergence and end-game alignment toward defection. To interpret these patterns, we train traditional supervised classification models on canonical repeated-game strategies and apply them to FAIRGAME trajectories, showing that LLMs exhibit systematic, model- and language-dependent behavioural intentions, with linguistic framing at times exerting effects as strong as architectural differences. Together, these findings provide a unified methodological foundation for auditing LLMs as strategic agents and reveal systematic cooperation biases with direct implications for AI governance, collective decision-making, and the design of safe multi-agent systems.

cs.MA↗

Strategic Communication and Language Bias in Multi-Agent LLM Coordination

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent scenarios where coordination is crucial but not always assured. Research shows that the way strategic scenarios are framed linguistically can affect cooperation. This paper explores whether allowing agents to communicate amplifies these language-driven effects. Leveraging FAIRGAME, we simulate one-shot and repeated games across different languages and models, both with and without communication. Our experiments, conducted with two advanced LLMs-GPT-4o and Llama 4 Maverick-reveal that communication significantly influences agent behavior, though its impact varies by language, personality, and game structure. These findings underscore the dual role of communication in fostering coordination and reinforcing biases.

cs.MA↗

Evolution of Coordination Through Institutional Incentives: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach

There is a broad recognition that commitment-based mechanisms can promote coordination and cooperative behaviours in both biological populations and self-organised multi-agent systems by making individuals' intentions explicit prior to engagement. Yet their effectiveness depends on sustained compliance supported by institutions, especially in one-off interactions. Despite advances in quantitative studies of cooperation and commitment, most applied analyses and policy debates remain largely qualitative, with limited attention to the allocation of scarce institutional resources between enhancing participation and ensuring commitment compliance. Herein, we develop an evolutionary game-theoretic model that explicitly examines the strategic distribution of a limited budget for institutional incentives, namely rewards or punishments, aimed at these two critical objectives within pre-commitment frameworks. Our findings reveal that a reward-based incentive approach consistently yields greater coordination success than a punishment-based approach, with optimal outcomes arising when resources are appropriately distributed between participation promotion and compliance assurance. These findings offer novel insights for designing institutional incentives to promote broad, coordinated adoption of new technologies.

cs.GT↗

Predicting Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) in Campylobacter, a Foodborne Pathogen, and Cost Burden Analysis Using Machine Learning

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) poses a significant public health and economic challenge, increasing treatment costs and reducing antibiotic effectiveness. This study employs machine learning to analyze genomic and epidemiological data from the public databases for molecular typing and microbial genome diversity (PubMLST), incorporating data from UK government-supported AMR surveillance by the Food Standards Agency and Food Standards Scotland. We identify AMR patterns in Campylobacter jejuni and Campylobacter coli isolates collected in the UK from 2001 to 2017. The research integrates whole-genome sequencing (WGS) data, epidemiological metadata, and economic projections to identify key resistance determinants and forecast future resistance trends and healthcare costs. We investigate gyrA mutations for fluoroquinolone resistance and the tet(O) gene for tetracycline resistance, training a Random Forest model validated with bootstrap resampling (1,000 samples, 95% confidence intervals), achieving 74% accuracy in predicting AMR phenotypes. Time-series forecasting models (SARIMA, SIR, and Prophet) predict a rise in campylobacteriosis cases, potentially exceeding 130 cases per 100,000 people by 2050, with an economic burden projected to surpass 1.9 billion GBP annually if left unchecked. An enhanced Random Forest system, analyzing 6,683 isolates, refines predictions by incorporating temporal patterns, uncertainty estimation, and resistance trend modeling, indicating sustained high beta-lactam resistance, increasing fluoroquinolone resistance, and fluctuating tetracycline resistance.

q-bio.QM↗

Can Media Act as a Soft Regulator of Safe AI Development? A Game Theoretical Analysis

When developers of artificial intelligence (AI) products need to decide between profit and safety for the users, they likely choose profit. Untrustworthy AI technology must come packaged with tangible negative consequences. Here, we envisage those consequences as the loss of reputation caused by media coverage of their misdeeds, disseminated to the public. We explore whether media coverage has the potential to push AI creators into the production of safe products, enabling widespread adoption of AI technology. We created artificial populations of self-interested creators and users and studied them through the lens of evolutionary game theory. Our results reveal that media is indeed able to foster cooperation between creators and users, but not always. Cooperation does not evolve if the quality of the information provided by the media is not reliable enough, or if the costs of either accessing media or ensuring safety are too high. By shaping public perception and holding developers accountable, media emerges as a powerful soft regulator -- guiding AI safety even in the absence of formal government oversight.

cs.AI↗

Emergence of Cooperation and Commitment in Optional Prisoner's Dilemma

Commitment is a well-established mechanism for fostering cooperation in human society and multi-agent systems. However, existing research has predominantly focused on the commitment that neglects the freedom of players to abstain from an interaction, limiting their applicability to many real-world scenarios where participation is often voluntary. In this paper, we present a two-stage game model to investigate the evolution of commitment-based behaviours and cooperation within the framework of the optional Prisoner's Dilemma game. In the pre-game stage, players decide whether to accept a mutual commitment. Once in the game, they choose among cooperation, defection, or exiting, depending on the formation of a pre-game commitment. We find that optional participation boosts commitment acceptance but fails to foster cooperation, leading instead to widespread exit behaviour. To address this, we then introduce and compare two institutional incentive approaches: i) a strict one (STRICT-COM) that rewards only committed players who cooperate in the game, and ii) a flexible one (FLEXIBLE-COM) that rewards any committed players who do not defect in the game. The results reveal that, while the strict approach is demonstrably better for promoting cooperation as the flexible rule creates a loophole for an opportunistic exit after committing, the flexible rule offers an efficient alternative for enhancing social welfare when such opportunistic behaviour results in a high gain. This study highlights the limitations of relying solely on voluntary participation and commitment to resolving social dilemmas, emphasising the importance of well-designed institutional incentives to promote cooperation and social welfare effectively.

cs.GT↗

Non-participant externalities reshape the evolution of altruistic punishment

While voluntary participation is a key mechanism that enables altruistic punishment to emerge, its explanatory power typically rests on the common assumption that non-participants have no impact on the public good. Yet, given the decentralized nature of voluntary participation, opting out does not necessarily preclude individuals from influencing the public good. Here, we revisit the role of voluntary participation by allowing non-participants to exert either positive or negative impacts on the public good. Using evolutionary analysis in a well-mixed finite population, we find that positive externalities from non-participants lower the synergy threshold required for altruistic punishment to dominate. In contrast, negative externalities raise this threshold, making altruistic punishment harder to sustain. Notably, when non-participants have positive impacts, altruistic punishment thrives only if non-participation is incentivized, whereas under negative impacts, it can persist even when non-participation is discouraged. Our findings reveal that efforts to promote altruistic punishment must account for the active role of non-participants, whose influence can make or break collective outcomes.

physics.soc-ph↗

Can LLMs effectively provide game-theoretic-based scenarios for cybersecurity?

Game theory has long served as a foundational tool in cybersecurity to test, predict, and design strategic interactions between attackers and defenders. The recent advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) offers new tools and challenges for the security of computer systems; In this work, we investigate whether classical game-theoretic frameworks can effectively capture the behaviours of LLM-driven actors and bots. Using a reproducible framework for game-theoretic LLM agents, we investigate two canonical scenarios -- the one-shot zero-sum game and the dynamic Prisoner's Dilemma -- and we test whether LLMs converge to expected outcomes or exhibit deviations due to embedded biases. Our experiments involve four state-of-the-art LLMs and span five natural languages, English, French, Arabic, Vietnamese, and Mandarin Chinese, to assess linguistic sensitivity. For both games, we observe that the final payoffs are influenced by agents characteristics such as personality traits or knowledge of repeated rounds. Moreover, we uncover an unexpected sensitivity of the final payoffs to the choice of languages, which should warn against indiscriminate application of LLMs in cybersecurity applications and call for in-depth studies, as LLMs may behave differently when deployed in different countries. We also employ quantitative metrics to evaluate the internal consistency and cross-language stability of LLM agents, to help guide the selection of the most stable LLMs and optimising models for secure applications.

cs.CR↗

Network reciprocity turns cheap talk into a force for cooperation

Non-binding communication is common in daily life and crucial for fostering cooperation, even though it has no direct payoff consequences. However, despite robust empirical evidence, its evolutionary basis remains poorly understood. Here, we develop a game-theoretic model in which individuals can signal an intention to cooperate before playing a Donation game. Strategies differ in how they respond to these signals, ranging from unconditional to conditional types, with the latter incurring a cognitive cost for deliberation. Through evolutionary analysis, we show that non-binding communication alone cannot sustain cooperation in well-mixed, anonymous populations, consistent with empirical observations. In contrast, structured populations support the emergence of cooperation, with conditional cooperators acting as catalysts that protect unconditional cooperators through context-dependent patterns of cyclic dominance. These findings offer an evolutionary explanation for how non-binding communication promotes cooperation and provide a modelling framework for exploring its effects in diverse social settings.

physics.soc-ph↗

Co-evolutionary Dynamics of Attack and Defence in Cybersecurity

In the evolving digital landscape, it is crucial to study the dynamics of cyberattacks and defences. This study uses an Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) framework to investigate the evolutionary dynamics of attacks and defences in cyberspace. We develop a two-population asymmetric game between attacker and defender to capture the essential factors of costs, potential benefits, and the probability of successful defences. Through mathematical analysis and numerical simulations, we find that systems with high defence intensities show stability with minimal attack frequencies, whereas low-defence environments show instability, and are vulnerable to attacks. Furthermore, we find five equilibria, where the strategy pair always defend and attack emerged as the most likely stable state as cyber domain is characterised by a continuous battle between defenders and attackers. Our theoretical findings align with real-world data from past cyber incidents, demonstrating the interdisciplinary impact, such as fraud detection, risk management and cybersecurity decision-making. Overall, our analysis suggests that adaptive cybersecurity strategies based on EGT can improve resource allocation, enhance system resilience, and reduce the overall risk of cyberattacks. By incorporating real-world data, this study demonstrates the applicability of EGT in addressing the evolving nature of cyber threats and the need for secure digital ecosystems through strategic planning and proactive defence measures.

cs.GT↗

The evolutionary advantage of guilt: co-evolution of social and non-social guilt in structured populations

Building ethical machines may involve bestowing upon them the emotional capacity to self-evaluate and repent on their actions. While apologies represent potential strategic interactions, the explicit evolution of guilt as a behavioural trait remains poorly understood. Our study delves into the co-evolution of two forms of emotional guilt: social guilt entails a cost, requiring agents to exert efforts to understand others' internal states and behaviours; and non-social guilt, which only involves awareness of one's own state, incurs no social cost. Resorting to methods from evolutionary game theory, we study analytically, and through extensive numerical and agent-based simulations, whether and how guilt can evolve and deploy, depending on the underlying structure of the systems of agents. Our findings reveal that in lattice and scale-free networks, strategies favouring emotional guilt dominate a broader range of guilt and social costs compared to non-structured well-mixed populations, so leading to higher levels of cooperation. In structured populations, both social and non-social guilt can thrive through clustering with emotionally inclined strategies, thereby providing protection against exploiters, particularly for less costly non-social strategies. These insights shed light on the complex interplay of guilt and cooperation, enhancing our understanding of ethical artificial intelligence.

cs.MA↗

KERAIA: An Adaptive and Explainable Framework for Dynamic Knowledge Representation and Reasoning

In this paper, we introduce KERAIA, a novel framework and software platform for symbolic knowledge engineering designed to address the persistent challenges of representing, reasoning with, and executing knowledge in dynamic, complex, and context-sensitive environments. The central research question that motivates this work is: How can unstructured, often tacit, human expertise be effectively transformed into computationally tractable algorithms that AI systems can efficiently utilise? KERAIA seeks to bridge this gap by building on foundational concepts such as Minsky's frame-based reasoning and K-lines, while introducing significant innovations. These include Clouds of Knowledge for dynamic aggregation, Dynamic Relations (DRels) for context-sensitive inheritance, explicit Lines of Thought (LoTs) for traceable reasoning, and Cloud Elaboration for adaptive knowledge transformation. This approach moves beyond the limitations of traditional, often static, knowledge representation paradigms. KERAIA is designed with Explainable AI (XAI) as a core principle, ensuring transparency and interpretability, particularly through the use of LoTs. The paper details the framework's architecture, the KSYNTH representation language, and the General Purpose Paradigm Builder (GPPB) to integrate diverse inference methods within a unified structure. We validate KERAIA's versatility, expressiveness, and practical applicability through detailed analysis of multiple case studies spanning naval warfare simulation, industrial diagnostics in water treatment plants, and strategic decision-making in the game of RISK. Furthermore, we provide a comparative analysis against established knowledge representation paradigms (including ontologies, rule-based systems, and knowledge graphs) and discuss the implementation aspects and computational considerations of the KERAIA platform.

cs.AI↗

Do LLMs trust AI regulation? Emerging behaviour of game-theoretic LLM agents

There is general agreement that fostering trust and cooperation within the AI development ecosystem is essential to promote the adoption of trustworthy AI systems. By embedding Large Language Model (LLM) agents within an evolutionary game-theoretic framework, this paper investigates the complex interplay between AI developers, regulators and users, modelling their strategic choices under different regulatory scenarios. Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is used to quantitatively model the dilemmas faced by each actor, and LLMs provide additional degrees of complexity and nuances and enable repeated games and incorporation of personality traits. Our research identifies emerging behaviours of strategic AI agents, which tend to adopt more "pessimistic" (not trusting and defective) stances than pure game-theoretic agents. We observe that, in case of full trust by users, incentives are effective to promote effective regulation; however, conditional trust may deteriorate the "social pact". Establishing a virtuous feedback between users' trust and regulators' reputation thus appears to be key to nudge developers towards creating safe AI. However, the level at which this trust emerges may depend on the specific LLM used for testing. Our results thus provide guidance for AI regulation systems, and help predict the outcome of strategic LLM agents, should they be used to aid regulation itself.

cs.AI↗

Replicator-mutator dynamics for public goods games with institutional incentives

Understanding the emergence and stability of cooperation in public goods games is important due to its applications in fields such as biology, economics, and social science. However, a gap remains in comprehending how mutations, both additive and multiplicative, as well as institutional incentives, influence these dynamics. In this paper, we study the replicator-mutator dynamics, with combined additive and multiplicative mutations, for public goods games both in the absence or presence of institutional incentives. For each model, we identify the possible number of (stable) equilibria, demonstrate their attainability, as well as analyse their stability properties. We also characterise the dependence of these equilibria on the model's parameters via bifurcation analysis and asymptotic behaviour. Our results offer rigorous and quantitative insights into the role of institutional incentives and the effect of combined additive and multiplicative mutations on the evolution of cooperation in the context of public goods games.

math.DS↗

Media and responsible AI governance: a game-theoretic and LLM analysis

This paper investigates the complex interplay between AI developers, regulators, users, and the media in fostering trustworthy AI systems. Using evolutionary game theory and large language models (LLMs), we model the strategic interactions among these actors under different regulatory regimes. The research explores two key mechanisms for achieving responsible governance, safe AI development and adoption of safe AI: incentivising effective regulation through media reporting, and conditioning user trust on commentariats' recommendation. The findings highlight the crucial role of the media in providing information to users, potentially acting as a form of "soft" regulation by investigating developers or regulators, as a substitute to institutional AI regulation (which is still absent in many regions). Both game-theoretic analysis and LLM-based simulations reveal conditions under which effective regulation and trustworthy AI development emerge, emphasising the importance of considering the influence of different regulatory regimes from an evolutionary game-theoretic perspective. The study concludes that effective governance requires managing incentives and costs for high quality commentaries.

cs.AI↗