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Theo Diamandis

Publications and source records attributed to Theo Diamandis.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

GeNIOS: an (almost) second-order operator-splitting solver for large-scale convex optimization

We introduce the GEneralized Newton Inexact Operator Splitting solver (GeNIOS) for large-scale convex optimization. GeNIOS speeds up ADMM by approximately solving approximate subproblems: it uses a second-order approximation to the most challenging ADMM subproblem and solves it inexactly with a fast randomized solver. Despite these approximations, GeNIOS retains the convergence rate of classic ADMM and can detect primal and dual infeasibility from the algorithm iterates. At each iteration, the algorithm solves a positive-definite linear system that arises from a second-order approximation of the first subproblem and computes an approximate proximal operator. GeNIOS solves the linear system using an indirect solver with a randomized preconditioner, making it particularly useful for large-scale problems with dense data. Our high-performance open-source implementation in Julia allows users to specify convex optimization problems directly (with or without conic reformulation) and allows extensive customization. We illustrate GeNIOS's performance on a variety of problem types. Notably, GeNIOS is up to ten times faster than existing solvers on large-scale, dense problems.

math.OC

On the (linear) convergence of Generalized Newton Inexact ADMM

This paper presents GeNI-ADMM, a framework for large-scale composite convex optimization that facilitates theoretical analysis of both existing and new approximate ADMM schemes. GeNI-ADMM encompasses any ADMM algorithm that solves a first- or second-order approximation to the ADMM subproblem inexactly. GeNI-ADMM exhibits the usual $\mathcal{O} (1/t)$-convergence rate under standard hypotheses and converges linearly under additional hypotheses such as strong convexity. Further, the GeNI-ADMM framework provides explicit convergence rates for ADMM variants accelerated with randomized linear algebra, such as NysADMM and sketch-and-solve ADMM, resolving an important open question on the convergence of these methods. This analysis quantifies the benefit of improved approximations and can aid in the design of new ADMM variants with faster convergence.

math.OC

Perpetual Demand Lending Pools

Decentralized perpetuals protocols have collectively reached billions of dollars of daily trading volume, yet are still not serious competitors on the basis of trading volume with centralized venues such as Binance. One of the main reasons for this is the high cost of capital for market makers and sophisticated traders in decentralized settings. Recently, numerous decentralized finance protocols have been used to improve borrowing costs for perpetual futures traders. We formalize this class of mechanisms utilized by protocols such as Jupiter, Hyperliquid, and GMX, which we term~\emph{Perpetual Demand Lending Pools} (PDLPs). We then formalize a general target weight mechanism that generalizes what GMX and Jupiter are using in practice. We explicitly describe pool arbitrage and expected payoffs for arbitrageurs and liquidity providers within these mechanisms. Using this framework, we show that under general conditions, PDLPs are easy to delta hedge, partially explaining the proliferation of live hedged PDLP strategies. Our results suggest directions to improve capital efficiency in PDLPs via dynamic parametrization.

cs.GT

Market Clearing with Semi-fungible Assets

As markets have digitized, the number of tradable products has skyrocketed. Algorithmically constructed portfolios of these assets now dominate public and private markets, resulting in a combinatorial explosion of tradable assets. In this paper, we provide a simple means to compute market clearing prices for semi-fungible assets which have a partial ordering between them. Such assets are increasingly found in traditional markets (bonds, commodities, ETFs), private markets (private credit, compute markets), and in decentralized finance. We formulate the market clearing problem as an optimization problem over a directed acyclic graph that represents participant preferences. Subsequently, we use convex duality to efficiently estimate market clearing prices, which correspond to particular dual variables. We then describe dominant strategy incentive compatible payment and allocation rules for clearing these markets. We conclude with examples of how this framework can construct prices for a variety of algorithmically constructed, semi-fungible portfolios of practical importance.

cs.GT

The Convex Geometry of Network Flows

In this paper, we derive a number of interesting properties and extensions of the convex flow problem from the perspective of convex geometry. We show that the sets of allowable flows always can be imbued with a downward closure property, which leads to a useful `calculus' of flows, allowing easy combination and splitting of edges. We then derive a conic form for the convex flow problem, which we show is equivalent to the original problem and almost self-dual. Using this conic form, we consider the nonconvex flow problem with fixed costs on the edges, i.e., where there is some fixed cost to send any nonzero flow over an edge. We show that this problem has almost integral solutions by a Shapley--Folkman argument, and we describe a rounding scheme that works well in practice. Additionally, we provide a heuristic for this nonconvex problem which is a simple modification of our original algorithm. We conclude by discussing a number of interesting avenues for future work.

math.OC

Solving the Convex Flow Problem

In this paper, we introduce the solver ConvexFlows for the convex flow problem first defined in the authors' previous work. In this problem, we aim to optimize a concave utility function depending on the flows over a graph. However, unlike the classic network flows literature, we also allow for a concave relationship between the input and output flows of edges. This nonlinear gain describes many physical phenomena, including losses in power network transmission lines. We outline an efficient algorithm for solving this problem which parallelizes over the graph edges. We provide an open source implementation of this algorithm in the Julia programming language package ConvexFlows.jl. This package includes an interface to easily specify these flow problems. We conclude by walking through an example of solving for an optimal power flow using ConvexFlows.

math.OC

Multidimensional Blockchain Fees are (Essentially) Optimal

In this paper we show that, using only mild assumptions, previously proposed multidimensional blockchain fee markets are essentially optimal, even against worst-case adversaries. In particular, we show that the average welfare gap between the following two scenarios is at most $O(1/\sqrt{T})$, where $T$ is the length of the time horizon considered. In the first scenario, the designer knows all future actions by users and is allowed to fix the optimal prices of resources ahead of time, based on the designer's oracular knowledge of those actions. In the second, the prices are updated by a very simple algorithm that does not have this oracular knowledge, a special case of which is similar to EIP-1559, the base fee mechanism used by the Ethereum blockchain. Roughly speaking, this means that, on average, over a reasonable timescale, there is no difference in welfare between 'correctly' fixing the prices, with oracular knowledge of the future, when compared to the proposed algorithm. We show a matching lower bound of $Ω(1/\sqrt{T})$ for any implementable algorithm and also separately consider the case where the adversary is known to be stochastic.

cs.GT

Convex Network Flows

We introduce a general framework for flow problems over hypergraphs. In our problem formulation, which we call the convex flow problem, we have a concave utility function for the net flow at every node and a concave utility function for each edge flow. The objective is to maximize the sum of these utilities, subject to constraints on the flows allowed at each edge, which we only assume to be a convex set. This framework not only includes many classic problems in network optimization, such as max flow, min-cost flow, and multi-commodity flows, but also generalizes these problems to allow, for example, concave edge gain functions. In addition, our framework includes applications spanning a number of fields: optimal power flow over lossy networks, routing and resource allocation in ad-hoc wireless networks, Arrow-Debreu Nash bargaining, and order routing through financial exchanges, among others. We show that the convex flow problem has a dual with a number of interesting interpretations, and that this dual decomposes over the edges of the hypergraph. Using this decomposition, we propose a fast solution algorithm that parallelizes over the edges and admits a clean problem interface. We provide an open source implementation of this algorithm in the Julia programming language, which we show is significantly faster than the state-of-the-art commercial convex solver Mosek.

math.OC

An Analysis of Intent-Based Markets

Mechanisms for decentralized finance on blockchains suffer from various problems, including suboptimal price execution for users, latency, and a worse user experience compared to their centralized counterparts. Recently, off-chain marketplaces, colloquially called `intent markets,' have been proposed as a solution to these problems. In these markets, agents called \emph{solvers} compete to satisfy user orders, which may include complicated user-specified conditions. We provide two formal models of solvers' strategic behavior: one probabilistic and another deterministic. In our first model, solvers initially pay upfront costs to enter a Dutch auction to fill the user's order and then exert congestive, costly effort to search for prices for the user. Our results show that the costs incurred by solvers result in restricted entry in the market. Further, in the presence of costly effort and congestion, our results counter-intuitively show that a planner who aims to maximize user welfare may actually prefer to restrict entry, resulting in limited oligopoly. We then introduce an alternative, optimization-based deterministic model which corroborates these results. We conclude with extensions of our model to other auctions within blockchains and non-cryptocurrency applications, such as the US SEC's Proposal 615.

cs.GT

The Specter (and Spectra) of Miner Extractable Value

Miner extractable value (MEV) refers to any excess value that a transaction validator can realize by manipulating the ordering of transactions. In this work, we introduce a simple theoretical definition of the 'cost of MEV', prove some basic properties, and show that the definition is useful via a number of examples. In a variety of settings, this definition is related to the 'smoothness' of a function over the symmetric group. From this definition and some basic observations, we recover a number of results from the literature.

math.OC

A Note on the Welfare Gap in Fair Ordering

Public blockchains group submitted transactions into batches, called blocks. A natural question is how to determine which transactions are included in these batches. In this note, we show a gap between the welfare of so-called `fair' ordering, namely first-in-first-out (an ideal that a number of blockchain protocols strive to achieve), where the first transactions to arrive are the ones put into the block, and the welfare of `optimal' inclusion that is, at least approximately, welfare-maximizing, such as choosing which transactions are included in a block via an auction. We show this gap is positive under a simple model with mild assumptions where we assume transactions are, roughly speaking, uniformly drawn from a reasonable distribution. Our results formalize a performance metric for blockchain inclusion rules and consequently provide a framework to help design and compare these rules. The results can be directly extended to ordering mechanisms as well.

math.OC

The Geometry of Constant Function Market Makers

Constant function market makers (CFMMs) are the most popular type of decentralized trading venue for cryptocurrency tokens. In this paper, we give a very general geometric framework (or 'axioms') which encompass and generalize many of the known results for CFMMs in the literature, without requiring strong conditions such as differentiability or homogeneity. One particular consequence of this framework is that every CFMM has a (unique) canonical trading function that is nondecreasing, concave, and homogeneous, showing that many results known only for homogeneous trading functions are actually fully general. We also show that CFMMs satisfy a number of intuitive and geometric composition rules, and give a new proof, via conic duality, of the equivalence of the portfolio value function and the trading function. Many results are extended to the general setting where the CFMM is not assumed to be path-independent, but only one trade is allowed. Finally, we show that all 'path-independent' CFMMs have a simple geometric description that does not depend on any notion of a 'trading history'.

math.OC

Bounds on Efficiency Metrics in Photonics

In this paper, we present a method for computing bounds for a variety of efficiency metrics in photonics, such as the focusing efficiency or the mode purity. We focus on the special case where the objective function can be written as the ratio of two quadratic functions of the field and show that there exists a simple semidefinite programming relaxation for this problem. We provide a numerical example of bounding the maximal mode conversion purity for a device of given size. This paper is accompanied by an open source Julia package for basic simulations and bounds.

math.OC

Towards a Theory of Maximal Extractable Value I: Constant Function Market Makers

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) refers to excess value captured by miners (or validators) from users in a cryptocurrency network. This excess value often comes from reordering users' transactions to maximize fees or from inserting new transactions that front-run users' transactions. One of the most common types of MEV involves a `sandwich attack' against a user trading on a constant function market maker (CFMM), which is a popular class of automated market maker. We analyze game theoretic properties of MEV in CFMMs that we call \textit{routing} and \textit{reordering} MEV. In the case of routing, we present examples where the existence of MEV both degrades and, counterintuitively, \emph{improves} the quality of routing. We construct an analogue of the price of anarchy for this setting and demonstrate that if the impact of a sandwich attack is localized in a suitable sense, then the price of anarchy is constant. In the case of reordering, we show conditions when the maximum price impact caused by the reordering of sandwich attacks in a sequence of trades, relative to the average price, impact is $O(\log n)$ in the number of user trades. Combined, our results suggest methods that both MEV searchers and CFMM designers can utilize for estimating costs and profits of MEV.

cs.GT

An Efficient Algorithm for Optimal Routing Through Constant Function Market Makers

Constant function market makers (CFMMs) such as Uniswap have facilitated trillions of dollars of digital asset trades and have billions of dollars of liquidity. One natural question is how to optimally route trades across a network of CFMMs in order to ensure the largest possible utility (as specified by a user). We present an efficient algorithm, based on a decomposition method, to solve the problem of optimally executing an order across a network of decentralized exchanges. The decomposition method, as a side effect, makes it simple to incorporate more complicated CFMMs, or even include 'aggregate CFMMs' (such as Uniswap v3), into the routing problem. Numerical results show significant performance improvements of this method, tested on realistic networks of CFMMs, when compared against an off-the-shelf commercial solver.

math.OC

Concave Pro-rata Games

In this paper, we introduce a family of games called concave pro-rata games. In such a game, players place their assets into a pool, and the pool pays out some concave function of all assets placed into it. Each player then receives a pro-rata share of the payout; i.e., each player receives an amount proportional to how much they placed in the pool. Such games appear in a number of practical scenarios, including as a simplified version of batched decentralized exchanges, such as those proposed by Penumbra. We show that this game has a number of interesting properties, including a symmetric pure equilibrium that is the unique equilibrium of this game, and we prove that its price of anarchy is $Ω(n)$ in the number of players. We also show some numerical results in the iterated setting which suggest that players quickly converge to an equilibrium in iterated play.

cs.GT

Dynamic Pricing for Non-fungible Resources: Designing Multidimensional Blockchain Fee Markets

Public blockchains implement a fee mechanism to allocate scarce computational resources across competing transactions. Most existing fee market designs utilize a joint, fungible unit of account (e.g., gas in Ethereum) to price otherwise non-fungible resources such as bandwidth, computation, and storage, by hardcoding their relative prices. Fixing the relative price of each resource in this way inhibits granular price discovery, limiting scalability and opening up the possibility of denial-of-service attacks. As a result, many prominent networks such as Ethereum and Solana have proposed multi-dimensional fee markets. In this paper, we provide a principled way to design fee markets that efficiently price multiple non-fungible resources. Starting from a loss function specified by the network designer, we show how to compute dynamic prices that align the network's incentives (to minimize the loss) with those of the users and miners (to maximize their welfare), even as demand for these resources changes. Our pricing mechanism follows from a natural decomposition of the network designer's problem into two parts that are related to each other via the resource prices. These results can be used to efficiently set fees in order to improve network performance.

math.OC

A Wasserstein Minimax Framework for Mixed Linear Regression

Multi-modal distributions are commonly used to model clustered data in statistical learning tasks. In this paper, we consider the Mixed Linear Regression (MLR) problem. We propose an optimal transport-based framework for MLR problems, Wasserstein Mixed Linear Regression (WMLR), which minimizes the Wasserstein distance between the learned and target mixture regression models. Through a model-based duality analysis, WMLR reduces the underlying MLR task to a nonconvex-concave minimax optimization problem, which can be provably solved to find a minimax stationary point by the Gradient Descent Ascent (GDA) algorithm. In the special case of mixtures of two linear regression models, we show that WMLR enjoys global convergence and generalization guarantees. We prove that WMLR's sample complexity grows linearly with the dimension of data. Finally, we discuss the application of WMLR to the federated learning task where the training samples are collected by multiple agents in a network. Unlike the Expectation Maximization algorithm, WMLR directly extends to the distributed, federated learning setting. We support our theoretical results through several numerical experiments, which highlight our framework's ability to handle the federated learning setting with mixture models.

stat.ML