arXiv subjects

Thilo Klein

Publications and source records attributed to Thilo Klein.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Experimental School Choice with Parents

We conduct the first laboratory school choice experiment in which parents-the relevant decision makers in the field-are the experimental subjects. We compare Deferred Acceptance (DA) with two manipulable but potentially more efficient alternatives: Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance (EADA) and the Rank-Minimizing mechanism (RM). We find that all mechanisms are frequently manipulated, with no significant differences in truth-telling rates. Parents and students manipulate at similar rates, supporting the external validity of student-based experiments, though students make significantly more obvious errors, suggesting parents' deviations are more deliberate. Despite widespread manipulation, the predicted welfare-stability tradeoff largely survives: DA never produces Pareto-efficient allocations yet generates little justified envy; whereas RM delivers substantial efficiency gains at a meaningful stability cost. EADA occupies a middle ground: its efficiency gains over DA are modest and imprecisely estimated yet double justified envy. Higher cognitive ability is associated with more deviations, and under EADA with worse outcomes. While DA does not induce truth-telling, it is the only mechanism in which manipulation never pays off and rarely changes outcomes.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2022

The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice

We compare the outcomes of the most prominent strategy-proof and stable algorithm (Deferred Acceptance, DA) and the most prominent strategy-proof and Pareto optimal algorithm (Top Trading Cycles, TTC) to the allocation generated by the rank-minimizing mechanism (RM). While one would expect that RM improves upon both DA and TTC in terms of rank efficiency, the size of the improvement is nonetheless surprising. Moreover, while it is not explicitly designed to do so, RM also significantly improves the placement of the worst-off student. Furthermore, RM generates less justified envy than TTC. We corroborate our findings using data on school admissions in Budapest.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2020

School choice with independent versus consolidated districts

This paper studies the welfare effects of school district consolidation. Using incomplete rank-ordered lists (ROLs) submitted for admission to the Hungarian secondary school system, we estimate complete ROLs assuming that parents do not use dominated strategies and that the matching outcome is stable. These estimates aid in constructing a counterfactual district-based assignment and discerning the factors driving parents' preferences over schools. We find that district consolidation leads to large welfare gains in Budapest, equivalent to students attending a school five kilometres closer to their residences. These gains offset the additional travel distances incurred in the consolidated assignment. 73\% of matched students benefit from district consolidation, while fewer than 3\% are assigned to a less preferred school. Students from smaller and less under-demanded districts benefit relatively more, as well as those with high academic ability. Using reported preferences instead of estimated ones also yields large gains from district consolidation.

econ.GN↗