arXiv subjects

Thomas A. Johnstone

Publications and source records attributed to Thomas A. Johnstone.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Class choice and the surprising weakness of Kelley-Morse set theory

Kelley-Morse set theory KM is weaker than generally supposed and fails to prove several principles that may be desirable in a foundational second-order set theory. Even though KM includes the global choice principle, for example, (i) KM does not prove the class choice scheme, asserting that whenever every set $x$ admits a class $X$ with $φ(x,X)$, then there is a class $Z\subseteq V\times V$ for which $φ(x,Z_x)$ on every section. This scheme can fail with KM even in low-complexity first-order instances $φ$ and even when only a set of indices $x$ are relevant. For closely related reasons, (ii) the theory KM does not prove the Łoś theorem scheme for internal second-order ultrapowers, even for large cardinal ultrapowers, such as the ultrapower by a normal measure on a measurable cardinal. Indeed, the theory KM itself is not generally preserved by internal ultrapowers. Finally, (iii) KM does not prove that the $Σ^1_n$ logical complexity is invariant under first-order quantifiers, even bounded first-order quantifiers. For example, $\forall α{<}δ ψ(α,X)$ is not always provably equivalent to a $Σ^1_1$ assertion when $ψ$ is. Nevertheless, these various weaknesses in KM are addressed by augmenting it with the class choice scheme, thereby forming the theory KM+, which we propose as a robust KM alternative for the foundations of second-order set theory.

math.LO↗

arXiv2015

What is the theory ZFC without power set?

We show that the theory ZFC-, consisting of the usual axioms of ZFC but with the power set axiom removed-specifically axiomatized by extensionality, foundation, pairing, union, infinity, separation, replacement and the assertion that every set can be well-ordered-is weaker than commonly supposed and is inadequate to establish several basic facts often desired in its context. For example, there are models of ZFC- in which $ω_1$ is singular, in which every set of reals is countable, yet $ω_1$ exists, in which there are sets of reals of every size $\aleph_n$, but none of size $\aleph_ω$, and therefore, in which the collection axiom sceme fails; there are models of ZFC- for which the Los theorem fails, even when the ultrapower is well-founded and the measure exists inside the model; there are models of ZFC- for which the Gaifman theorem fails, in that there is an embedding $j:M\to N$ of ZFC- models that is $Σ_1$-elementary and cofinal, but not elementary; there are elementary embeddings $j:M\to N$ of ZFC- models whose cofinal restriction $j:M\to \bigcup j``M$ is not elementary. Moreover, the collection of formulas that are provably equivalent in ZFC- to a $Σ_1$-formula or a $Π_1$-formula is not closed under bounded quantification. Nevertheless, these deficits of ZFC- are completely repaired by strengthening it to the theory $ZFC^-$, obtained by using collection rather than replacement in the axiomatization above. These results extend prior work of Zarach.

math.LO↗

arXiv2014

Strongly uplifting cardinals and the boldface resurrection axioms

We introduce the strongly uplifting cardinals, which are equivalently characterized, we prove, as the superstrongly unfoldable cardinals and also as the almost hugely unfoldable cardinals, and we show that their existence is equiconsistent over ZFC with natural instances of the boldface resurrection axiom, such as the boldface resurrection axiom for proper forcing.

math.LO↗

arXiv2014

Resurrection axioms and uplifting cardinals

We introduce the resurrection axioms, a new class of forcing axioms, and the uplifting cardinals, a new large cardinal notion, and prove that various instances of the resurrection axioms are equiconsistent over ZFC with the existence of an uplifting cardinal.

math.LO↗

arXiv2013

On ground model definability

Laver, and Woodin independently, showed that models of ${\rm ZFC}$ are uniformly definable in their set-forcing extensions, using a ground model parameter. We investigate ground model definability for models of fragments of ${\rm ZFC}$, particularly of ${\rm ZF}+{\rm DC}_δ$ and of ${\rm ZFC}^-$, and we obtain both positive and negative results. Generalizing the results of Laver and Woodin, we show that models of ${\rm ZF}+{\rm DC}_δ$ are uniformly definable in their set-forcing extensions by posets admitting a gap at $δ$, using a ground model parameter. In particular, this means that models of ${\rm ZF}+{\rm DC}_δ$ are uniformly definable in their forcing extensions by posets of size less than $δ$. We also show that it is consistent for ground model definability to fail for models of ${\rm ZFC}^-$ of the form $H_{κ^+}$. Using forcing, we produce a ${\rm ZFC}$ universe in which there is a cardinal $κ>\!>ω$ such that $H_{κ^+}$ is not definable in its Cohen forcing extension. As a corollary, we show that there is always a countable transitive model of ${\rm ZFC}^-$ violating ground model definability. These results turn out to have a bearing on ground model definability for models of ${\rm ZFC}$. It follows from our proof methods that the hereditary size of the parameter that Woodin used to define a ${\rm ZFC}$ model in its set-forcing extension is best possible.

math.LO↗