arXiv subjects

Thomas Brihaye

Publications and source records attributed to Thomas Brihaye.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2018

Constrained existence problem for weak subgame perfect equilibria with omega-regular Boolean objectives (full version)

We study multiplayer turn-based games played on a finite directed graph such that each player aims at satisfying an omega-regular Boolean objective. Instead of the well-known notions of Nash equilibrium (NE) and subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), we focus on the recent notion of weak subgame perfect equilibrium (weak SPE), a refinement of SPE. In this setting, players who deviate can only use the subclass of strategies that differ from the original one on a finite number of histories. We are interested in the constrained existence problem for weak SPEs. We provide a complete characterization of the computational complexity of this problem: it is P-complete for Explicit Muller objectives, NP-complete for Co-Büchi, Parity, Muller, Rabin, and Streett objectives, and PSPACE-complete for Reachability and Safety objectives (we only prove NP-membership for Büchi objectives). We also show that the constrained existence problem is fixed parameter tractable and is polynomial when the number of players is fixed. All these results are based on a fine analysis of a fixpoint algorithm that computes the set of possible payoff profiles underlying weak SPEs.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2018

When are Stochastic Transition Systems Tameable?

A decade ago, Abdulla, Ben Henda and Mayr introduced the elegant concept of decisiveness for denumerable Markov chains [1]. Roughly speaking, decisiveness allows one to lift most good properties from finite Markov chains to denumerable ones, and therefore to adapt existing verification algorithms to infinite-state models. Decisive Markov chains however do not encompass stochastic real-time systems, and general stochastic transition systems (STSs for short) are needed. In this article, we provide a framework to perform both the qualitative and the quantitative analysis of STSs. First, we define various notions of decisiveness (inherited from [1]), notions of fairness and of attractors for STSs, and make explicit the relationships between them. Then, we define a notion of abstraction, together with natural concepts of soundness and completeness, and we give general transfer properties, which will be central to several verification algorithms on STSs. We further design a generic construction which will be useful for the analysis of ω-regular properties, when a finite attractor exists, either in the system (if it is denumerable), or in a sound denumerable abstraction of the system. We next provide algorithms for qualitative model-checking, and generic approximation procedures for quantitative model-checking. Finally, we instantiate our framework with stochastic timed automata (STA), generalized semi-Markov processes (GSMPs) and stochastic time Petri nets (STPNs), three models combining dense-time and probabilities. This allows us to derive decidability and approximability results for the verification of these models. Some of these results were known from the literature, but our generic approach permits to view them in a unified framework, and to obtain them with less effort. We also derive interesting new approximability results for STA, GSMPs and STPNs.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2017

Dynamics and Coalitions in Sequential Games

We consider N-player non-zero sum games played on finite trees (i.e., sequential games), in which the players have the right to repeatedly update their respective strategies (for instance, to improve the outcome wrt to the current strategy profile). This generates a dynamics in the game which may eventually stabilise to a Nash Equilibrium (as with Kukushkin's lazy improvement), and we argue that it is interesting to study the conditions that guarantee such a dynamics to terminate. We build on the works of Le Roux and Pauly who have studied extensively one such dynamics, namely the Lazy Improvement Dynamics. We extend these works by first defining a turn-based dynamics, proving that it terminates on subgame perfect equilibria, and showing that several variants do not terminate. Second, we define a variant of Kukushkin's lazy improvement where the players may now form coalitions to change strategies. We show how properties of the players' preferences on the outcomes affect the termination of this dynamics, and we thereby characterise classes of games where it always terminates (in particular two-player games).

cs.GT↗

arXiv2016

Efficient Energy Distribution in a Smart Grid using Multi-Player Games

Algorithms and models based on game theory have nowadays become prominent techniques for the design of digital controllers for critical systems. Indeed, such techniques enable automatic synthesis: given a model of the environment and a property that the controller must enforce, those techniques automatically produce a correct controller, when it exists. In the present paper, we consider a class of concurrent, weighted, multi-player games that are well-suited to model and study the interactions of several agents who are competing for some measurable resources like energy. We prove that a subclass of those games always admit a Nash equilibrium, i.e. a situation in which all players play in such a way that they have no incentive to deviate. Moreover, the strategies yielding those Nash equilibria have a special structure: when one of the agents deviate from the equilibrium, all the others form a coalition that will enforce a retaliation mechanism that punishes the deviant agent. We apply those results to a real-life case study in which several smart houses that produce their own energy with solar panels, and can share this energy among them in micro-grid, must distribute the use of this energy along the day in order to avoid consuming electricity that must be bought from the global grid. We demonstrate that our theory allows one to synthesise an efficient controller for these houses: using penalties to be paid in the utility bill as an incentive, we force the houses to follow a pre-computed schedule that maximises the proportion of the locally produced energy that is consumed.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2016

Proceedings Cassting Workshop on Games for the Synthesis of Complex Systems and 3rd International Workshop on Synthesis of Complex Parameters

This volume contains the joint proceedings of the Workshop on Games for the Synthesis of Complex Systems (CASSTING'16) and of the 3rd International Workshop on Synthesis of Complex Parameters (SynCoP'16). The workshops were held in Eindhoven, The Netherlands, as satellite events of the 19th European Joint Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software (ETAPS'16). Both workshops are closely related in their topics as well as target audience and they shared a joint invited talk given by Giorgio Delzanno.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2016

Real-Time Synthesis is Hard!

We study the reactive synthesis problem (RS) for specifications given in Metric Interval Temporal Logic (MITL). RS is known to be undecidable in a very general setting, but on infinite words only; and only the very restrictive BRRS subcase is known to be decidable (see D'Souza et al. and Bouyer et al.). In this paper, we precise the decidability border of MITL synthesis. We show RS is undecidable on finite words too, and present a landscape of restrictions (both on the logic and on the possible controllers) that are still undecidable. On the positive side, we revisit BRRS and introduce an efficient on-the-fly algorithm to solve it.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2015

Simple Priced Timed Games Are Not That Simple

Priced timed games are two-player zero-sum games played on priced timed automata (whose locations and transitions are labeled by weights modeling the costs of spending time in a state and executing an action, respectively). The goals of the players are to minimise and maximise the cost to reach a target location, respectively. We consider priced timed games with one clock and arbitrary (positive and negative) weights and show that, for an important subclass of theirs (the so-called simple priced timed games), one can compute, in exponential time, the optimal values that the players can achieve, with their associated optimal strategies. As side results, we also show that one-clock priced timed games are determined and that we can use our result on simple priced timed games to solve the more general class of so-called reset-acyclic priced timed games (with arbitrary weights and one-clock).

cs.GT↗

arXiv2015

Quantitative Games under Failures

We study a generalisation of sabotage games, a model of dynamic network games introduced by van Benthem. The original definition of the game is inherently finite and therefore does not allow one to model infinite processes. We propose an extension of the sabotage games in which the first player (Runner) traverses an arena with dynamic weights determined by the second player (Saboteur). In our model of quantitative sabotage games, Saboteur is now given a budget that he can distribute amongst the edges of the graph, whilst Runner attempts to minimise the quantity of budget witnessed while completing his task. We show that, on the one hand, for most of the classical cost functions considered in the literature, the problem of determining if Runner has a strategy to ensure a cost below some threshold is EXPTIME-complete. On the other hand, if the budget of Saboteur is fixed a priori, then the problem is in PTIME for most cost functions. Finally, we show that restricting the dynamics of the game also leads to better complexity.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2015

To Reach or not to Reach? Efficient Algorithms for Total-Payoff Games

Quantitative games are two-player zero-sum games played on directed weighted graphs. Total-payoff games (that can be seen as a refinement of the well-studied mean-payoff games) are the variant where the payoff of a play is computed as the sum of the weights. Our aim is to describe the first pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for total-payoff games in the presence of arbitrary weights. It consists of a non-trivial application of the value iteration paradigm. Indeed, it requires to study, as a milestone, a refinement of these games, called min-cost reachability games, where we add a reachability objective to one of the players. For these games, we give an efficient value iteration algorithm to compute the values and optimal strategies (when they exist), that runs in pseudo-polynomial time. We also propose heuristics allowing one to possibly speed up the computations in both cases.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2015

Weak Subgame Perfect Equilibria and their Application to Quantitative Reachability

We study $n$-player turn-based games played on a finite directed graph. For each play, the players have to pay a cost that they want to minimize. Instead of the well-known notion of Nash equilibrium (NE), we focus on the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), a refinement of NE well-suited in the framework of games played on graphs. We also study natural variants of SPE, named weak (resp. very weak) SPE, where players who deviate cannot use the full class of strategies but only a subclass with a finite number of (resp. a unique) deviation step(s). Our results are threefold. Firstly, we characterize in the form of a Folk theorem the set of all plays that are the outcome of a weak SPE. Secondly, for the class of quantitative reachability games, we prove the existence of a finite-memory SPE and provide an algorithm for computing it (only existence was known with no information regarding the memory). Moreover, we show that the existence of a constrained SPE, i.e. an SPE such that each player pays a cost less than a given constant, can be decided. The proofs rely on our Folk theorem for weak SPEs (which coincide with SPEs in the case of quantitative reachability games) and on the decidability of MSO logic on infinite words. Finally with similar techniques, we provide a second general class of games for which the existence of a (constrained) weak SPE is decidable.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2014

Stochastic Timed Automata

A stochastic timed automaton is a purely stochastic process defined on a timed automaton, in which both delays and discrete choices are made randomly. We study the almost-sure model-checking problem for this model, that is, given a stochastic timed automaton A and a property $Φ$, we want to decide whether A satisfies $Φ$ with probability 1. In this paper, we identify several classes of automata and of properties for which this can be decided. The proof relies on the construction of a finite abstraction, called the thick graph, that we interpret as a finite Markov chain, and for which we can decide the almost-sure model-checking problem. Correctness of the abstraction holds when automata are almost-surely fair, which we show, is the case for two large classes of systems, single- clock automata and so-called weak-reactive automata. Techniques employed in this article gather tools from real-time verification and probabilistic verification, as well as topological games played on timed automata.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2014

On MITL and alternating timed automata over infinite words

One clock alternating timed automata (OCATA) have been introduced as natural extension of (one clock) timed automata to express the semantics of MTL. In this paper, we consider the application of OCATA to the problems of model-checking and satisfiability for MITL (a syntactic fragment of MTL), interpreted over infinite words. Our approach is based on the interval semantics (recently introduced in [BEG13] in the case of finite words) extended to infinite words. We propose region-based and zone-based algorithms, based on this semantics, for MITL model-checking and satisfiability. We report on the performance of a prototype tool implementing those algorithms.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2013

Emptiness and Universality Problems in Timed Automata with Positive Frequency

The languages of infinite timed words accepted by timed automata are traditionally defined using Buchi-like conditions. These acceptance conditions focus on the set of locations visited infinitely often along a run, but completely ignore quantitative timing aspects. In this paper we propose a natural quantitative semantics for timed automata based on the so-called frequency, which measures the proportion of time spent in the accepting locations. We study various properties of timed languages accepted with positive frequency, and in particular the emptiness and universality problems.

cs.FL↗

arXiv2013

Simple strategies for Banach-Mazur games and fairly correct systems

In 2006, Varacca and Völzer proved that on finite graphs, omega-regular large sets coincide with omega-regular sets of probability 1, by using the existence of positional strategies in the related Banach-Mazur games. Motivated by this result, we try to understand relations between sets of probability 1 and various notions of simple strategies (including those introduced in a recent paper of Grädel and Lessenich). Then, we introduce a generalisation of the classical Banach-Mazur game and in particular, a probabilistic version whose goal is to characterise sets of probability 1 (as classical Banach-Mazur games characterise large sets). We obtain a determinacy result for these games, when the winning set is a countable intersection of open sets.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2013

On MITL and alternating timed automata

One clock alternating timed automata OCATA have been recently introduced as natural extension of (one clock) timed automata to express the semantics of MTL (Ouaknine, Worrell 2005). We consider the application of OCATA to problem of model-checking MITL formulas (a syntactic fragment of MTL) against timed automata. We introduce a new semantics for OCATA where, intuitively, clock valuations are intervals instead of single real values. Thanks to this new semantics, we show that we can bound the number of clock copies that are necessary to allow an OCATA to recognise the models of an MITL formula. Equipped with this technique, we propose a new algorithm to translate an MITL formula into a timed automaton, and we sketch several ideas to define new model checking algorithms for MITL.

cs.FL↗

arXiv2013

On (Subgame Perfect) Secure Equilibrium in Quantitative Reachability Games

We study turn-based quantitative multiplayer non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with reachability objectives. In such games, each player aims at reaching his own goal set of states as soon as possible. A previous work on this model showed that Nash equilibria (resp. secure equilibria) are guaranteed to exist in the multiplayer (resp. two-player) case. The existence of secure equilibria in the multiplayer case remained and is still an open problem. In this paper, we focus our study on the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium well-suited in the framework of games played on graphs. We also introduce the new concept of subgame perfect secure equilibrium. We prove the existence of subgame perfect equilibria (resp. subgame perfect secure equilibria) in multiplayer (resp. two-player) quantitative reachability games. Moreover, we provide an algorithm deciding the existence of secure equilibria in the multiplayer case.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2012

Time-bounded Reachability for Hybrid Automata: Complexity and Fixpoints

In this paper, we study thetime-bounded reachability problem for rectangular hybrid automata with non-negative rates (RHA+). This problem was recently shown to be decidable [Brihaye et al, ICALP11] (even though the unbounded reachability problem for even very simple classes of hybrid automata is well-known to be undecidable). However, [Brihaye et al, ICALP11] does not provide a precise characterisation of the complexity of the time-bounded reachability problem. The contribution of the present paper is threefold. First, we provide a new NExpTime algorithm to solve the timed-bounded reachability problem on RHA+. This algorithm improves on the one of [Brihaye et al, ICALP11] by at least one exponential. Second, we show that this new algorithm is optimal, by establishing a matching lower bound: time-bounded reachability for RHA+ is therefore NExpTime-complete. Third, we extend these results in a practical direction, by showing that we can effectively compute fixpoints that characterise the sets of states that are reachable (resp. co-reachable) within T time units from a given starting state.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2012

Multiplayer Cost Games with Simple Nash Equilibria

Multiplayer games with selfish agents naturally occur in the design of distributed and embedded systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum games. We study such games and show that a large class of these games, including games where the individual objectives are mean- or discounted-payoff, or quantitative reachability, and show that they do not only have a solution, but a simple solution. We establish the existence of Nash equilibria that are composed of k memoryless strategies for each agent in a setting with k agents, one main and k-1 minor strategies. The main strategy describes what happens when all agents comply, whereas the minor strategies ensure that all other agents immediately start to co-operate against the agent who first deviates from the plan. This simplicity is important, as rational agents are an idealisation. Realistically, agents have to decide on their moves with very limited resources, and complicated strategies that require exponential--or even non-elementary--implementations cannot realistically be implemented. The existence of simple strategies that we prove in this paper therefore holds a promise of implementability.

cs.GT↗