arXiv subjects

Thomas Kesselheim

Publications and source records attributed to Thomas Kesselheim.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Online Multi-Agent Contracts

We introduce and study an online variant of the multi-agent contract model. In our model, agents arrive one-by-one and are active with a certain probability. Upon arrival of agent $i$, the principal offers a linear contract $\alpha_i$, specifying the fraction of the principal's reward transferred to agent $i$. Agents can either exert effort or not, incurring a cost if they do. The set of agents that exert effort determines the principal's expected reward through a reward function $f$. After all agents have arrived, the agents form a (pure) Nash equilibrium. As our main result we design an $O(1)$-competitive policy for submodular rewards, compared to the offline optimum. We also show that this result is tight in two ways. First, if we require that agents make decisions on the spot, then for submodular rewards any policy is $\Omega((\log n)/(\log \log n)^2)$-competitive. Second, for the broader class of XOS (a.k.a., fractionally subadditive) rewards, any online policy is $\Omega((\log \log n)/(\log \log \log n))$-competitive. The latter result reveals a surprising separation between submodular and XOS rewards: unlike related settings such as offline contract design and prophet inequalities, where constant-factor guarantees for submodular rewards extend to XOS rewards, the online contract setting separates the two classes.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Online Algorithms via Minimax and Posterior Matching

Competitive analysis is central to the study of online algorithms, but upper bounds are often highly problem-specific. We develop a more unifying methodology via the minimax viewpoint. Guided by Yao's principle, we reduce worst-case competitive analysis to Bayesian online design under an arbitrary correlated prior over arrival sequences. For such a prior, let $X^*$ be the hindsight-optimal fractional solution for the realized instance, and let $X^{(t)}=\mathbb E[X^*\mid \mathcal F_t]$ be its posterior process. Our guiding rule is posterior matching: at each time $t$, choose the feasible online action that tracks the current posterior $X^{(t)}$ as closely as the online constraints permit. We show that this single principle yields optimal or near-optimal guarantees for several classical online fractional problems, including set cover, load balancing, matching and more general resource-allocation problems, recovering or improving state-of-the-art bounds in these settings with norm/concave objectives. Via known rounding reductions, it also yields randomized integral guarantees for weighted paging, MTS on star metrics, and ski-rental. At a technical level, our analysis reduces competitive guarantees to key probabilistic inequalities for the vector martingales generated by the posterior of the offline optimum. The resulting framework gives a reusable route from Bayesian online design under arbitrary correlated priors to information-theoretic worst-case competitive guarantees.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Black-Box Lifting and Robustness Theorems for Multi-Agent Contracts

Multi-agent contract design has largely evaluated contracts through the lens of pure Nash equilibria (PNE). This focus, however, is not without loss: In general, the principal can strictly gain by recommending a complex, possibly correlated, distribution over actions, while preserving incentive compatibility. In this work, we extend the analysis of multi-agent contracts beyond pure Nash equilibria to encompass more general equilibrium notions, including mixed Nash equilibria as well as (coarse-)correlated equilibria (CCE). The latter, in particular, captures the limiting outcome of agents engaged in learning dynamics. Our main result shows that for submodular and, more generally, XOS rewards, such complex recommendations yield at most a constant-factor gain: there exists a contract and a PNE whose utility is within a constant factor of the best CCE achievable by any contract. This provides a black-box lifting: results established against the best PNE automatically apply with respect to the best CCE, with only a constant factor loss. For submodular rewards, we further show how to transform a contract and a PNE of that contract into a new contract such that any of its CCEs gives a constant approximation to the PNE. This yields black-box robustness: up to constant factors, guarantees established for a specific contract and PNE automatically extend to the modified contract and any of its CCEs. We thus expand prior guarantees for multi-agent contracts and lower the barrier to new ones. As an important corollary, we obtain poly-time algorithms for submodular rewards that achieve constant approximations in any CCE, against the best CCE under the best contract. Such worst-case guarantees are provably unattainable for XOS rewards. Finally, we bound the gap between different equilibrium notions for subadditive, supermodular, and general rewards.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

An Efficient Algorithm for Minimizing Ordered Norms in Fractional Load Balancing

We study the problem of minimizing an ordered norm of a load vector (indexed by a set of $d$ resources), where a finite number $n$ of customers $c$ contribute to the load of each resource by choosing a solution $x_c$ in a convex set $X_c \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d_{\geq 0}$; so we minimize $||\sum_{c}x_c||$ for some fixed ordered norm $||\cdot||$. We devise a randomized algorithm that computes a $(1+\varepsilon)$-approximate solution to this problem and makes, with high probability, $\mathcal{O}\left((n+d) (\varepsilon^{-2}+\log\log d)\log (n+d)\right)$ calls to oracles that minimize linear functions (with non-negative coefficients) over $X_c$. While this has been known for the $\ell_{\infty}$ norm via the multiplicative weights update method, existing proof techniques do not extend to arbitrary ordered norms. Our algorithm uses a resource price mechanism that is motivated by the follow-the-regularized-leader paradigm, and is expressed by smooth approximations of ordered norms. We need and show that these have non-trivial stability properties, which may be of independent interest. For each customer, we define dynamic cost budgets, which evolve throughout the algorithm, to determine the allowed step sizes. This leads to non-uniform updates and may even reject certain oracle solutions. Using non-uniform sampling together with a martingale argument, we can guarantee sufficient expected progress in each iteration, and thus bound the total number of oracle calls with high probability.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2025

Prophet and Secretary at the Same Time

Many online problems are studied in stochastic settings for which inputs are samples from a known distribution, given in advance, or from an unknown distribution. Such distributions model both beyond-worst-case inputs and, when given, partial foreknowledge for the online algorithm. But how robust can such algorithms be to misspecification of the given distribution? When is this detectable, and when does it matter? When can algorithms give good competitive ratios both when the input distribution is as specified, and when it is not? We consider these questions in the setting of optimal stopping, where the cases of known and unknown distributions correspond to the well-known prophet inequality and to the secretary problem, respectively. Here we ask: Can a stopping rule be competitive for the i.i.d. prophet inequality problem and the secretary problem at the same time? We constrain the Pareto frontier of simultaneous approximation ratios $(\alpha, \beta)$ that a stopping rule can attain. We introduce a family of algorithms that give nontrivial joint guarantees and are optimal for the extremal i.i.d. prophet and secretary problems. We also prove impossibilities, identifying $(\alpha, \beta)$ unattainable by any adaptive stopping rule. Our results hold for both $n$ fixed arrivals and for arrivals from a Poisson process with rate $n$. We work primarily in the Poisson setting, and provide reductions between the Poisson and $n$-arrival settings that may be of broader interest.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2025

Integral Online Algorithms for Set Cover and Load Balancing with Convex Objectives

Online Set Cover and Load Balancing are central problems in online optimization, and there is a long line of work on developing algorithms for these problems with convex objectives. Although we know optimal online algorithms with $\ell_p$-norm objectives, recent developments for general norms and convex objectives that rely on the online primal-dual framework apply only to fractional settings due to large integrality gaps. Our work focuses on directly designing integral online algorithms for Set Cover and Load Balancing with convex objectives, bypassing the convex-relaxation and the primal-dual technique. Some of the main implications are: 1. For Online Set Cover, we can extend the results of Azar et. al. (2016) for convex objectives and of Kesselheim, Molinaro, and Singla (2024) for symmetric norms from fractional to integral settings. 2. Our results for convex objectives and symmetric norms even apply to the online generalized scheduling problem, which generalizes both Set Cover and Load Balancing. Previous works could only handle the offline version of this problem with norm objectives (Deng, Li, and Rabani 2023). 3. Our methods easily extend to settings with disjoint-composition of norms. This allows us to recover or improve the norm-composition results of Nagarajan and Shen (2020), and Kesselheim, Molinaro, and Singla (2024), and to extend our results to a large class of norms beyond symmetric. Our approach is to first reduce these problems to online packing problems, and then to design good approximation algorithms for the latter. To solve these packing problems, we use two key ideas. First, we decouple the global packing problem into a series of local packing problems on different machines. Next, we choose random activation thresholds for machines such that conditional on a machine being activated, the expected number of jobs it covers is high compared to its cost.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2025

Contextual Learning for Stochastic Optimization

Motivated by stochastic optimization, we introduce the problem of learning from samples of contextual value distributions. A contextual value distribution can be understood as a family of real-valued distributions, where each sample consists of a context $x$ and a random variable drawn from the corresponding real-valued distribution $D_x$. By minimizing a convex surrogate loss, we learn an empirical distribution $D'_x$ for each context, ensuring a small L\'evy distance to $D_x$. We apply this result to obtain the sample complexity bounds for the learning of an $\epsilon$-optimal policy for stochastic optimization problems defined on an unknown contextual value distribution. The sample complexity is shown to be polynomial for the general case of strongly monotone and stable optimization problems, including Single-item Revenue Maximization, Pandora's Box and Optimal Stopping.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Online Combinatorial Allocations and Auctions with Few Samples

In online combinatorial allocations/auctions, n bidders sequentially arrive, each with a combinatorial valuation (such as submodular/XOS) over subsets of m indivisible items. The aim is to immediately allocate a subset of the remaining items to maximize the total welfare, defined as the sum of bidder valuations. A long line of work has studied this problem when the bidder valuations come from known independent distributions. In particular, for submodular/XOS valuations, we know 2-competitive algorithms/mechanisms that set a fixed price for each item and the arriving bidders take their favorite subset of the remaining items given these prices. However, these algorithms traditionally presume the availability of the underlying distributions as part of the input to the algorithm. Contrary to this assumption, practical scenarios often require the learning of distributions, a task complicated by limited sample availability. This paper investigates the feasibility of achieving O(1)-competitive algorithms under the realistic constraint of having access to only a limited number of samples from the underlying bidder distributions. Our first main contribution shows that a mere single sample from each bidder distribution is sufficient to yield an O(1)-competitive algorithm for submodular/XOS valuations. This result leverages a novel extension of the secretary-style analysis, employing the sample to have the algorithm compete against itself. Although online, this first approach does not provide an online truthful mechanism. Our second main contribution shows that a polynomial number of samples suffices to yield a $(2+\epsilon)$-competitive online truthful mechanism for submodular/XOS valuations and any constant $\epsilon>0$. This result is based on a generalization of the median-based algorithm for the single-item prophet inequality problem to combinatorial settings with multiple items.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Supermodular Approximation of Norms and Applications

Many classical problems in theoretical computer science involve norm, even if implicitly; for example, both XOS functions and downward-closed sets are equivalent to some norms. The last decade has seen a lot of interest in designing algorithms beyond the standard $\ell_p$ norms $\|\cdot \|_p$. Despite notable advancements, many existing methods remain tailored to specific problems, leaving a broader applicability to general norms less understood. This paper investigates the intrinsic properties of $\ell_p$ norms that facilitate their widespread use and seeks to abstract these qualities to a more general setting. We identify supermodularity -- often reserved for combinatorial set functions and characterized by monotone gradients -- as a defining feature beneficial for $ \|\cdot\|_p^p$. We introduce the notion of $p$-supermodularity for norms, asserting that a norm is $p$-supermodular if its $p^{th}$ power function exhibits supermodularity. The association of supermodularity with norms offers a new lens through which to view and construct algorithms. Our work demonstrates that for a large class of problems $p$-supermodularity is a sufficient criterion for developing good algorithms. This is either by reframing existing algorithms for problems like Online Load-Balancing and Bandits with Knapsacks through a supermodular lens, or by introducing novel analyses for problems such as Online Covering, Online Packing, and Stochastic Probing. Moreover, we prove that every symmetric norm can be approximated by a $p$-supermodular norm. Together, these recover and extend several results from the literature, and support $p$-supermodularity as a unified theoretical framework for optimization challenges centered around norm-related problems.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2024

Approximating Optimum Online for Capacitated Resource Allocation

We study online capacitated resource allocation, a natural generalization of online stochastic max-weight bipartite matching. This problem is motivated by ride-sharing and Internet advertising applications, where online arrivals may have the capacity to serve multiple offline users. Our main result is a polynomial-time online algorithm which is $(1/2 + \kappa)$-approximate to the optimal online algorithm for $\kappa = 0.0115$. This can be contrasted to the (tight) $1/2$-competitive algorithms to the optimum offline benchmark from the prophet inequality literature. Optimum online is a recently popular benchmark for online Bayesian problems which can use unbounded computation, but not "prophetic" knowledge of future inputs. Our algorithm (which also works for the case of stochastic rewards) rounds a generalized LP relaxation from the unit-capacity case via a two-proposal algorithm, as in previous works in the online matching literature. A key technical challenge in deriving our guarantee is bounding the positive correlation among users introduced when rounding our LP relaxation online. Unlike in the case of unit capacities, this positive correlation is unavoidable for guarantees beyond $1/2$. Conceptually, our results show that the study of optimum online as a benchmark can reveal problem-specific insights that are irrelevant to competitive analysis.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2024

Sample Complexity of Posted Pricing for a Single Item

Selling a single item to $n$ self-interested buyers is a fundamental problem in economics, where the two objectives typically considered are welfare maximization and revenue maximization. Since the optimal mechanisms are often impractical and do not work for sequential buyers, posted pricing mechanisms, where fixed prices are set for the item for different buyers, have emerged as a practical and effective alternative. This paper investigates how many samples are needed from buyers' value distributions to find near-optimal posted prices, considering both independent and correlated buyer distributions, and welfare versus revenue maximization. We obtain matching upper and lower bounds (up to logarithmic factors) on the sample complexity for all these settings.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Multi-Agent Combinatorial Contracts

Combinatorial contracts are emerging as a key paradigm in algorithmic contract design, paralleling the role of combinatorial auctions in algorithmic mechanism design. In this paper we study natural combinatorial contract settings involving teams of agents, each capable of performing multiple actions. This scenario extends two fundamental special cases previously examined in the literature, namely the single-agent combinatorial action model of [Duetting et al., 2021] and the multi-agent binary-action model of [Babaioff et al., 2012, Duetting et al., 2023]. We study the algorithmic and computational aspects of these settings, highlighting the unique challenges posed by the absence of certain monotonicity properties essential for analyzing the previous special cases. To navigate these complexities, we introduce a broad set of novel tools that deepen our understanding of combinatorial contracts environments and yield good approximation guarantees. Our main result is a constant-factor approximation for submodular multi-agent multi-action problems with value and demand oracles access. This result is tight: we show that this problem admits no PTAS (even under binary actions). As a side product of our main result, we devise an FPTAS, with value and demand oracles, for single-agent combinatorial action scenarios with general reward functions, which is of independent interest. We also provide bounds on the gap between the optimal welfare and the principal's utility. We show that, for subadditive rewards, perhaps surprisingly, this gap scales only logarithmically (rather than linearly) in the size of the action space.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Bandit Algorithms for Prophet Inequality and Pandora's Box

The Prophet Inequality and Pandora's Box problems are fundamental stochastic problem with applications in Mechanism Design, Online Algorithms, Stochastic Optimization, Optimal Stopping, and Operations Research. A usual assumption in these works is that the probability distributions of the $n$ underlying random variables are given as input to the algorithm. Since in practice these distributions need to be learned, we initiate the study of such stochastic problems in the Multi-Armed Bandits model. In the Multi-Armed Bandits model we interact with $n$ unknown distributions over $T$ rounds: in round $t$ we play a policy $x^{(t)}$ and receive a partial (bandit) feedback on the performance of $x^{(t)}$. The goal is to minimize the regret, which is the difference over $T$ rounds in the total value of the optimal algorithm that knows the distributions vs. the total value of our algorithm that learns the distributions from the partial feedback. Our main results give near-optimal $\tilde{O}(\mathsf{poly}(n)\sqrt{T})$ total regret algorithms for both Prophet Inequality and Pandora's Box. Our proofs proceed by maintaining confidence intervals on the unknown indices of the optimal policy. The exploration-exploitation tradeoff prevents us from directly refining these confidence intervals, so the main technique is to design a regret upper bound that is learnable while playing low-regret Bandit policies.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2022

Multi-Agent Contracts

We study a natural combinatorial single-principal multi-agent contract design problem, in which a principal motivates a team of agents to exert effort toward a given task. At the heart of our model is a reward function, which maps the agent efforts to an expected reward of the principal. We seek to design computationally efficient algorithms for finding optimal (or near-optimal) linear contracts for reward functions that belong to the complement-free hierarchy. Our first main result gives constant-factor approximation algorithms for submodular and XOS reward functions, with value oracles for submodular reward functions and value and demand oracles for XOS reward functions. It relies on an unconventional use of ``prices'' and (approximate) demand queries for selecting the set of agents that the principal should contract with, and exploits a novel scaling property of XOS functions and their marginals, which may be of independent interest. As our second main result, we show that constant approximation is the best we can get for submodular reward functions, even with both value and demand oracles. For the larger class of subadditive reward functions, we establish an $\Omega(\sqrt{n})$ impossibility for settings with $n$ agents. A striking feature of this impossibility is that it applies to subadditive functions that are constant-factor close to submodular. This rapid degradation presents a surprising departure from previous literature, e.g., on combinatorial auctions, where approximation guarantees tend to deteriorate more

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Simplified Prophet Inequalities for Combinatorial Auctions

We consider prophet inequalities for XOS and MPH-$k$ combinatorial auctions and give a simplified proof for the existence of static and anonymous item prices which recover the state-of-the-art competitive ratios. Our proofs make use of a linear programming formulation which has a non-negative objective value if there are prices which admit a given competitive ratio $α\geq 1$. Changing our perspective to dual space by an application of strong LP duality, we use an interpretation of the dual variables as probabilities to directly obtain our result. In contrast to previous work, our proofs do not require to argue about specific values of buyers for bundles, but only about the presence or absence of items. As a side remark, for any $k \geq 2$, this simplification also leads to a tiny improvement in the best competitive ratio for MPH-$k$ combinatorial auctions from $4k-2$ to $2k + 2 \sqrt{k(k-1)} -1$.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Online and Bandit Algorithms Beyond $\ell_p$ Norms

Vector norms play a fundamental role in computer science and optimization, so there is an ongoing effort to generalize existing algorithms to settings beyond $\ell_\infty$ and $\ell_p$ norms. We show that many online and bandit applications for general norms admit good algorithms as long as the norm can be approximated by a function that is ``gradient-stable'', a notion that we introduce. Roughly it says that the gradient of the function should not drastically decrease (multiplicatively) in any component as we increase the input vector. We prove that several families of norms, including all monotone symmetric norms, admit a gradient-stable approximation, giving us the first online and bandit algorithms for these norm families. In particular, our notion of gradient-stability gives $O\big(\log^2 (\text{dimension})\big)$-competitive algorithms for the symmetric norm generalizations of Online Generalized Load Balancing and Bandits with Knapsacks. Our techniques extend to applications beyond symmetric norms as well, e.g., to Online Vector Scheduling and to Online Generalized Assignment with Convex Costs. Some key properties underlying our applications that are implied by gradient-stable approximations are a ``smooth game inequality'' and an approximate converse to Jensen's inequality.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2021

Combinatorial Contracts

We introduce a new model of combinatorial contracts in which a principal delegates the execution of a costly task to an agent. To complete the task, the agent can take any subset of a given set of unobservable actions, each of which has an associated cost. The cost of a set of actions is the sum of the costs of the individual actions, and the principal's reward as a function of the chosen actions satisfies some form of diminishing returns. The principal incentivizes the agents through a contract, based on the observed outcome. Our main results are for the case where the task delegated to the agent is a project, which can be successful or not. We show that if the success probability as a function of the set of actions is gross substitutes, then an optimal contract can be computed with polynomially many value queries, whereas if it is submodular, the optimal contract is NP-hard. All our results extend to linear contracts for higher-dimensional outcome spaces, which we show to be robustly optimal given first moment constraints. Our analysis uncovers a new property of gross substitutes functions, and reveals many interesting connections between combinatorial contracts and combinatorial auctions, where gross substitutes is known to be the frontier for efficient computation.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Asymptotically Optimal Welfare of Posted Pricing for Multiple Items with MHR Distributions

We consider the problem of posting prices for unit-demand buyers if all $n$ buyers have identically distributed valuations drawn from a distribution with monotone hazard rate. We show that even with multiple items asymptotically optimal welfare can be guaranteed. Our main results apply to the case that either a buyer's value for different items are independent or that they are perfectly correlated. We give mechanisms using dynamic prices that obtain a $1 - Θ\left( \frac{1}{\log n}\right)$-fraction of the optimal social welfare in expectation. Furthermore, we devise mechanisms that only use static item prices and are $1 - Θ\left( \frac{\log\log\log n}{\log n}\right)$-competitive compared to the optimal social welfare. As we show, both guarantees are asymptotically optimal, even for a single item and exponential distributions.

cs.GT↗