arXiv subjects

Thomas Nedelec

Publications and source records attributed to Thomas Nedelec.

10 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2021

Learning in repeated auctions

Online auctions are one of the most fundamental facets of the modern economy and power an industry generating hundreds of billions of dollars a year in revenue. Auction theory has historically focused on the question of designing the best way to sell a single item to potential buyers, with the concurrent objectives of maximizing revenue generated or welfare created. Theoretical results in this area have typically relied on some prior Bayesian knowledge agents were assumed to have on each-other. This assumption is no longer satisfied in new markets such as online advertising: similar items are sold repeatedly, and agents are unaware of each other or might try to manipulate each-other. On the other hand, statistical learning theory now provides tools to supplement those missing pieces of information given enough data, as agents can learn from their environment to improve their strategies. This survey covers recent advances in learning in repeated auctions, starting from the traditional economic study of optimal one-shot auctions with a Bayesian prior. We then focus on the question of learning optimal mechanisms from a dataset of bidders' past values. The sample complexity as well as the computational efficiency of different methods will be studied. We will also investigate online variants where gathering data has a cost to be accounted for, either by seller or buyers ("earning while learning"). Later in the survey, we will further assume that bidders are also adaptive to the mechanism as they interact repeatedly with the same seller. We will show how strategic agents can actually manipulate repeated auctions, to their own advantage. All the questions discussed in this survey are grounded in real-world applications and many of the ideas and algorithms we describe are used every day to power the Internet economy.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Thresholding at the monopoly price: an agnostic way to improve bidding strategies in revenue-maximizing auctions

We address the problem of improving bidders' strategies in prior-dependent revenue-maximizing auctions and introduce a simple and generic method to design novel bidding strategies if the seller uses past bids to optimize her mechanism. We propose a simple and agnostic strategy, independent of the distribution of the competition, that is robust to mechanism changes and local (as opposed to global) optimization of e.g. reserve prices by the seller. This strategy guarantees an increase in utility compared to the truthful strategy for any distribution of the competition. In textbook-style examples, for instance with uniform [0,1] value distributions and two bidders, this no-side-information and mechanism-independent strategy yields an enormous 57% increase in buyer utility for lazy second price auctions with monopoly reserves. When the bidder knows the distribution of the highest bid of the competition, we show how to optimize the tradeoff between reducing the reserve price and beating the competition. Our formulation enables to study some important robustness properties of the strategies, showing their impact even when the seller is using a data-driven approach to set the reserve prices. In this sample-size setting, we prove under what conditions, thresholding bidding strategies can still improve the buyer's utility. The gist of our approach is to see optimal auctions in practice as a Stackelberg game where the buyer is the leader, as he is the first one to move (here bid) when the seller is the follower as she has no prior information on the bidder.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Adversarial learning for revenue-maximizing auctions

We introduce a new numerical framework to learn optimal bidding strategies in repeated auctions when the seller uses past bids to optimize her mechanism. Crucially, we do not assume that the bidders know what optimization mechanism is used by the seller. We recover essentially all state-of-the-art analytical results for the single-item framework derived previously in the setup where the bidder knows the optimization mechanism used by the seller and extend our approach to multi-item settings, in which no optimal shading strategies were previously known. Our approach yields substantial increases in bidder utility in all settings. Our approach also has a strong potential for practical usage since it provides a simple way to optimize bidding strategies on modern marketplaces where buyers face unknown data-driven mechanisms.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Robust Stackelberg buyers in repeated auctions

We consider the practical and classical setting where the seller is using an exploration stage to learn the value distributions of the bidders before running a revenue-maximizing auction in a exploitation phase. In this two-stage process, we exhibit practical, simple and robust strategies with large utility uplifts for the bidders. We quantify precisely the seller revenue against non-discounted buyers, complementing recent studies that had focused on impatient/heavily discounted buyers. We also prove the robustness of these shading strategies to sample approximation error of the seller, to bidder's approximation error of the competition and to possible change of the mechanisms.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Learning to bid in revenue-maximizing auctions

We consider the problem of the optimization of bidding strategies in prior-dependent revenue-maximizing auctions, when the seller fixes the reserve prices based on the bid distributions. Our study is done in the setting where one bidder is strategic. Using a variational approach, we study the complexity of the original objective and we introduce a relaxation of the objective functional in order to use gradient descent methods. Our approach is simple, general and can be applied to various value distributions and revenue-maximizing mechanisms. The new strategies we derive yield massive uplifts compared to the traditional truthfully bidding strategy.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Explicit shading strategies for repeated truthful auctions

With the increasing use of auctions in online advertising, there has been a large effort to study seller revenue maximization, following Myerson's seminal work, both theoretically and practically. We take the point of view of the buyer in classical auctions and ask the question of whether she has an incentive to shade her bid even in auctions that are reputed to be truthful, when aware of the revenue optimization mechanism. We show that in auctions such as the Myerson auction or a VCG with reserve price set as the monopoly price, the buyer who is aware of this information has indeed an incentive to shade. Intuitively, by selecting the revenue maximizing auction, the seller introduces a dependency on the buyers' distributions in the choice of the auction. We study in depth the case of the Myerson auction and show that a symmetric equilibrium exists in which buyers shade non-linearly what would be their first price bid. They then end up with an expected payoff that is equal to what they would get in a first price auction with no reserve price. We conclude that a return to simple first price auctions with no reserve price or at least non-dynamic anonymous ones is desirable from the point of view of both buyers, sellers and increasing transparency.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Bridging the gap between regret minimization and best arm identification, with application to A/B tests

State of the art online learning procedures focus either on selecting the best alternative ("best arm identification") or on minimizing the cost (the "regret"). We merge these two objectives by providing the theoretical analysis of cost minimizing algorithms that are also delta-PAC (with a proven guaranteed bound on the decision time), hence fulfilling at the same time regret minimization and best arm identification. This analysis sheds light on the common observation that ill-callibrated UCB-algorithms minimize regret while still identifying quickly the best arm. We also extend these results to the non-iid case faced by many practitioners. This provides a technique to make cost versus decision time compromise when doing adaptive tests with applications ranging from website A/B testing to clinical trials.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2019

A comparative study of counterfactual estimators

We provide a comparative study of several widely used off-policy estimators (Empirical Average, Basic Importance Sampling and Normalized Importance Sampling), detailing the different regimes where they are individually suboptimal. We then exhibit properties optimal estimators should possess. In the case where examples have been gathered using multiple policies, we show that fused estimators dominate basic ones but can still be improved.

stat.ML↗

arXiv2018

Offline A/B testing for Recommender Systems

Before A/B testing online a new version of a recommender system, it is usual to perform some offline evaluations on historical data. We focus on evaluation methods that compute an estimator of the potential uplift in revenue that could generate this new technology. It helps to iterate faster and to avoid losing money by detecting poor policies. These estimators are known as counterfactual or off-policy estimators. We show that traditional counterfactual estimators such as capped importance sampling and normalised importance sampling are experimentally not having satisfying bias-variance compromises in the context of personalised product recommendation for online advertising. We propose two variants of counterfactual estimates with different modelling of the bias that prove to be accurate in real-world conditions. We provide a benchmark of these estimators by showing their correlation with business metrics observed by running online A/B tests on a commercial recommender system.

stat.ML↗

arXiv2017

Specializing Joint Representations for the task of Product Recommendation

We propose a unified product embedded representation that is optimized for the task of retrieval-based product recommendation. To this end, we introduce a new way to fuse modality-specific product embeddings into a joint product embedding, in order to leverage both product content information, such as textual descriptions and images, and product collaborative filtering signal. By introducing the fusion step at the very end of our architecture, we are able to train each modality separately, allowing us to keep a modular architecture that is preferable in real-world recommendation deployments. We analyze our performance on normal and hard recommendation setups such as cold-start and cross-category recommendations and achieve good performance on a large product shopping dataset.

cs.IR↗