arXiv subjects

Thorben Tröbst

Publications and source records attributed to Thorben Tröbst.

9 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

Cardinal-Utility Matching Markets: The Quest for Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Efficient Computability

Unlike ordinal-utility matching markets, which are well-developed from the viewpoint of both theory and practice, recent insights from a computer science perspective have left cardinal-utility matching markets in a state of flux. The celebrated pricing-based mechanism for one-sided cardinal-utility matching markets due to Hylland and Zeckhauser, which had long eluded efficient algorithms, was finally shown to be intractable; the problem of computing an approximate equilibrium is PPAD-complete. This led us to ask the question: is there an alternative, polynomial time, mechanism for one-sided cardinal-utility matching markets which achieves the desirable properties of HZ, i.e. (ex-ante) envy-freeness (EF) and Pareto-optimality (PO)? We show that the problem of finding an EF+PO lottery in a one-sided cardinal-utility matching market is by itself already PPAD-complete. However, a $(2 + ε)$-approximately envy-free and (exactly) Pareto-optimal lottery can be found in polynomial time using the Nash-bargaining-based mechanism of Hosseini and Vazirani. Moreover, the mechanism is also $(2 + ε)$-approximately incentive compatible. We also present several results on two-sided cardinal-utility matching markets, including non-existence of EF+PO lotteries as well as existence of justified-envy-free and weak Pareto-optimal lotteries.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Matching Markets with Chores

The fair division of chores, as well as mixed manna (goods and chores), has received substantial recent attention in the fair division literature; however, ours is the first paper to extend this research to matching markets. Indeed, our contention is that matching markets are a natural setting for this purpose, since the manna that fit into the limited number of hours available in a day can be viewed as one unit of allocation. We extend several well-known results that hold for goods to the settings of chores and mixed manna. In addition, we show that the natural notion of an earnings-based equilibrium, which is more natural in the case of all chores, is equivalent to the pricing-based equilibrium given by Hylland and Zeckhauser for the case of goods.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Time-Efficient Algorithms for Nash-Bargaining-Based Matching Market Models

In the area of matching-based market design, existing models using cardinal utilities suffer from two deficiencies: First, the Hylland-Zeckhauser (HZ) mechanism, which has remained a classic in economics for one-sided matching markets, is intractable; computation of even an approximate equilibrium is PPAD-complete. Second, there is an extreme paucity of such models. This led Hosseini and Vazirani (2022) to define a rich collection of Nash-bargaining-based models for one-sided and two-sided matching markets, in both Fisher and Arrow-Debreu settings, together with very fast implementations using available solvers and very encouraging experimental results. In this paper, we give fast algorithms with proven running times for the models introduced by Hosseini and Vazirani, using the techniques of multiplicative weights update (MWU) and conditional gradient descent (CGD). Additionally, we make the following contributions: (1) By Tröbst and Vazirani (2024), a linear one-sided Nash-bargaining-based matching market satisfies envy-freeness within factor two. We show that the other models satisfy approximate equal-share fairness, where the exact factor depends on the utility function being used in the particular model. (2) We define a Nash-bargaining-based model for non-bipartite matching markets and give fast algorithms for it using conditional gradient descent.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Vehicle Routing with Time-Dependent Travel Times: Theory, Practice, and Benchmarks

We develop theoretical foundations and practical algorithms for vehicle routing with time-dependent travel times. We also provide new benchmark instances and experimental results. First, we study basic operations on piecewise linear arrival time functions. In particular, we devise a faster algorithm to compute the pointwise minimum of a set of piecewise linear functions and a monotonicity-preserving variant of the Imai-Iri algorithm to approximate an arrival time function with fewer breakpoints. Next, we show how to evaluate insertion and deletion operations in tours efficiently and update the underlying data structure faster than previously known when a tour changes. Evaluating a tour also requires a scheduling step which is non-trivial in the presence of time windows and time-dependent travel times. We show how to perform this in linear time. Based on these results, we develop a local search heuristic to solve real-world vehicle routing problems with various constraints efficiently and report experimental results on classical benchmarks. Since most of these do not have time-dependent travel times, we generate and publish new benchmark instances that are based on real-world data. This data also demonstrates the importance of considering time-dependent travel times in instances with tight time windows.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2024

Almost Tight Bounds for Online Hypergraph Matching

In the online hypergraph matching problem, hyperedges of size $k$ over a common ground set arrive online in adversarial order. The goal is to obtain a maximum matching (disjoint set of hyperedges). A naïve greedy algorithm for this problem achieves a competitive ratio of $\frac{1}{k}$. We show that no (randomized) online algorithm has competitive ratio better than $\frac{2+o(1)}{k}$. If edges are allowed to be assigned fractionally, we give a deterministic online algorithm with competitive ratio $\frac{1-o(1)}{\ln(k)}$ and show that no online algorithm can have competitive ratio strictly better than $\frac{1+o(1)}{\ln(k)}$. Lastly, we give a $\frac{1-o(1)}{\ln(k)}$ competitive algorithm for the fractional edge-weighted version of the problem under a free disposal assumption.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2023

Two-Sided Matching Markets: Impossibility Results on Existence of Efficient and Envy Free Solutions

The Hylland-Zeckhauser gave a classic pricing-based mechanism (HZ) for a one-sided matching market; it yields allocations satisfying Pareto optimality and envy-freeness (Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979), and the mechanism is incentive compatible in the large (He et al., 2018). They also studied the exchange extension of HZ and gave an example showing that it may not even admit an equilibrium. In this paper, we consider two models of two sided matching markets: when utility functions are symmetric and when they are non-symmetric. We ask if these models always admit allocations satisfying the two basic properties of Pareto efficiency and envy freeness. Our results are negative. A corollary of the former result is a negative result for non-bipartite matching markets as well.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Online Matching with High Probability

We study the classical, randomized Ranking algorithm which is known to be $(1 - \frac{1}{e})$-competitive in expectation for the Online Bipartite Matching Problem. We give a tail inequality bound, namely that Ranking is $(1 - \frac{1}{e} - α)$-competitive with probability at least $1 - e^{-2 α^2 n}$ where $n$ is the size of the maximum matching in the instance. Building on this, we show similar concentration results for the Fully Online Matching Problem and for the Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching Problem.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2021

One-Sided Matching Markets with Endowments: Equilibria and Algorithms

The Arrow-Debreu extension of the classic Hylland-Zeckhauser scheme for a one-sided matching market -- called ADHZ in this paper -- has natural applications but has instances which do not admit equilibria. By introducing approximation, we define the $ε$-approximate ADHZ model, and we give the following results. * Existence of equilibrium under linear utility functions. We prove that the equilibrium satisfies Pareto optimality, approximate envy-freeness, and approximate weak core stability. * A combinatorial polynomial-time algorithm for an $ε$-approximate ADHZ equilibrium for the case of dichotomous, and more generally bi-valued, utilities. * An instance of ADHZ, with dichotomous utilities and a strongly connected demand graph, which does not admit an equilibrium. Since computing an equilibrium for HZ is likely to be highly intractable and because of the difficulty of extending HZ to more general utility functions, Hosseini and Vazirani proposed (a rich collection of) Nash-bargaining-based matching market models. For the dichotomous-utilities case of their model linear Arrow-Debreu Nash bargaining one-sided matching market (1LAD), we give a combinatorial, strongly polynomial-time algorithm and show that it admits a rational convex program.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

A Real Polynomial for Bipartite Graph Minimum Weight Perfect Matchings

In a recent paper, Beniamini and Nisan gave a closed-form formula for the unique multilinear polynomial for the Boolean function determining whether a given bipartite graph $G \subseteq K_{n,n}$ has a perfect matching, together with an efficient algorithm for computing the coefficients of the monomials of this polynomial. We give the following generalization: Given an arbitrary non-negative weight function $w$ on the edges of $K_{n,n}$, consider its set of minimum weight perfect matchings. We give the real multilinear polynomial for the Boolean function which determines if a graph $G \subseteq K_{n,n}$ contains one of these minimum weight perfect matchings.

cs.DM↗