arXiv subjects

Thore Graepel

Publications and source records attributed to Thore Graepel.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

From AGI to ASI

Over the last decade, building human-level artificial general intelligence has moved from far-fetched speculation to being a concrete next-decade target for many of the largest AI organisations. Achieving this goal would have profound and far-reaching impacts on human society, which raises many complex questions for the decade ahead. This report investigates how AI itself might continue to develop in a post-AGI world along the continuum of machine intelligence. The endpoint of this continuum, Universal AI, is theoretically well understood, which provides some formal grounding for the main focus of this report: the transition from human-level AGI to artificial general superintelligence, which can intuitively be understood as a system that is more intelligent and cognitively capable than large organisations of humans. After characterizing ASI, the report discusses four potential pathways from AGI to ASI: scaling AGI, AI paradigm shifts, recursive improvement, and ASI emerging from large-scale multi-agent collectives. The report then discusses possible frictions and bottlenecks along these pathways. Determining whether the impact of these frictions will be negligible or substantial raises a number of concrete open research questions. Due to large uncertainties for predicting ASI progress, it cannot be ruled out that AI progress might continue to accelerate over the next years. This could imply that the image of a single transformative step change, caused by the introduction of human-level AGI into our society, could be inaccurate. More apt might be the prospect of a series of transformative societal changes caused by AI-enabled progress and breakthroughs across many areas of science and technology. Preparing for this prospect requires a massively interdisciplinary endeavour of global scope and interest.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

PerturBench: Benchmarking Machine Learning Models for Cellular Perturbation Analysis

We introduce a comprehensive framework for modeling single cell transcriptomic responses to perturbations, aimed at standardizing benchmarking in this rapidly evolving field. Our approach includes a modular and user-friendly model development and evaluation platform, a collection of diverse perturbational datasets, and a set of metrics designed to fairly compare models and dissect their performance. Through extensive evaluation of both published and baseline models across diverse datasets, we highlight the limitations of widely used models, such as mode collapse. We also demonstrate the importance of rank metrics which complement traditional model fit measures, such as RMSE, for validating model effectiveness. Notably, our results show that while no single model architecture clearly outperforms others, simpler architectures are generally competitive and scale well with larger datasets. Overall, this benchmarking exercise sets new standards for model evaluation, supports robust model development, and furthers the use of these models to simulate genetic and chemical screens for therapeutic discovery.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Modeling human reputation-seeking behavior in a spatio-temporally complex public good provision game

Multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms are useful for simulating social behavior in settings that are too complex for other theoretical approaches like game theory. However, they have not yet been empirically supported by laboratory experiments with real human participants. In this work we demonstrate how multi-agent reinforcement learning can model group behavior in a spatially and temporally complex public good provision game called Clean Up. We show that human groups succeed in Clean Up when they can see who is who and track reputations over time but fail under conditions of anonymity. A new multi-agent reinforcement learning model of reputation-based cooperation demonstrates the same difference between identifiable and anonymous conditions. Furthermore, both human groups and artificial agent groups solve the problem via turn-taking despite other options being available. Our results highlight the benefits of using multi-agent reinforcement learning to model human social behavior in complex environments.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2024

Crowd IQ -- Aggregating Opinions to Boost Performance

We show how the quality of decisions based on the aggregated opinions of the crowd can be conveniently studied using a sample of individual responses to a standard IQ questionnaire. We aggregated the responses to the IQ questionnaire using simple majority voting and a machine learning approach based on a probabilistic graphical model. The score for the aggregated questionnaire, Crowd IQ, serves as a quality measure of decisions based on aggregating opinions, which also allows quantifying individual and crowd performance on the same scale. We show that Crowd IQ grows quickly with the size of the crowd but saturates, and that for small homogeneous crowds the Crowd IQ significantly exceeds the IQ of even their most intelligent member. We investigate alternative ways of aggregating the responses and the impact of the aggregation method on the resulting Crowd IQ. We also discuss Contextual IQ, a method of quantifying the individual participant's contribution to the Crowd IQ based on the Shapley value from cooperative game theory.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2024

Multi-Agent Training beyond Zero-Sum with Correlated Equilibrium Meta-Solvers

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2023

A multi-agent reinforcement learning model of reputation and cooperation in human groups

Collective action demands that individuals efficiently coordinate how much, where, and when to cooperate. Laboratory experiments have extensively explored the first part of this process, demonstrating that a variety of social-cognitive mechanisms influence how much individuals choose to invest in group efforts. However, experimental research has been unable to shed light on how social cognitive mechanisms contribute to the where and when of collective action. We build and test a computational model of human behavior in Clean Up, a social dilemma task popular in multi-agent reinforcement learning research. We show that human groups effectively cooperate in Clean Up when they can identify group members and track reputations over time, but fail to organize under conditions of anonymity. A multi-agent reinforcement learning model of reputation demonstrates the same difference in cooperation under conditions of identifiability and anonymity. In addition, the model accurately predicts spatial and temporal patterns of group behavior: in this public goods dilemma, the intrinsic motivation for reputation catalyzes the development of a non-territorial, turn-taking strategy to coordinate collective action.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2022

Learning Truthful, Efficient, and Welfare Maximizing Auction Rules

From social networks to supply chains, more and more aspects of how humans, firms and organizations interact is mediated by artificial learning agents. As the influence of machine learning systems grows, it is paramount that we study how to imbue our modern institutions with our own values and principles. Here we consider the problem of allocating goods to buyers who have preferences over them in settings where the seller's aim is not to maximize their monetary gains, but rather to advance some notion of social welfare (e.g. the government trying to award construction licenses for hospitals or schools). This problem has a long history in economics, and solutions take the form of auction rules. Researchers have proposed reliable auction rules that work in extremely general settings, and in the presence of information asymmetry and strategic buyers. However, these protocols require significant payments from participants resulting in low aggregate welfare. Here we address this shortcoming by casting auction rule design as a statistical learning problem, and trade generality for participant welfare effectively and automatically with a novel deep learning network architecture and auction representation. Our analysis shows that our auction rules outperform state-of-the art approaches in terms of participants welfare, applicability, robustness.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2022

Game Theoretic Rating in N-player general-sum games with Equilibria

Rating strategies in a game is an important area of research in game theory and artificial intelligence, and can be applied to any real-world competitive or cooperative setting. Traditionally, only transitive dependencies between strategies have been used to rate strategies (e.g. Elo), however recent work has expanded ratings to utilize game theoretic solutions to better rate strategies in non-transitive games. This work generalizes these ideas and proposes novel algorithms suitable for N-player, general-sum rating of strategies in normal-form games according to the payoff rating system. This enables well-established solution concepts, such as equilibria, to be leveraged to efficiently rate strategies in games with complex strategic interactions, which arise in multiagent training and real-world interactions between many agents. We empirically validate our methods on real world normal-form data (Premier League) and multiagent reinforcement learning agent evaluation.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

EigenGame Unloaded: When playing games is better than optimizing

We build on the recently proposed EigenGame that views eigendecomposition as a competitive game. EigenGame's updates are biased if computed using minibatches of data, which hinders convergence and more sophisticated parallelism in the stochastic setting. In this work, we propose an unbiased stochastic update that is asymptotically equivalent to EigenGame, enjoys greater parallelism allowing computation on datasets of larger sample sizes, and outperforms EigenGame in experiments. We present applications to finding the principal components of massive datasets and performing spectral clustering of graphs. We analyze and discuss our proposed update in the context of EigenGame and the shift in perspective from optimization to games.

stat.ML↗

arXiv2022

NeuPL: Neural Population Learning

Learning in strategy games (e.g. StarCraft, poker) requires the discovery of diverse policies. This is often achieved by iteratively training new policies against existing ones, growing a policy population that is robust to exploit. This iterative approach suffers from two issues in real-world games: a) under finite budget, approximate best-response operators at each iteration needs truncating, resulting in under-trained good-responses populating the population; b) repeated learning of basic skills at each iteration is wasteful and becomes intractable in the presence of increasingly strong opponents. In this work, we propose Neural Population Learning (NeuPL) as a solution to both issues. NeuPL offers convergence guarantees to a population of best-responses under mild assumptions. By representing a population of policies within a single conditional model, NeuPL enables transfer learning across policies. Empirically, we show the generality, improved performance and efficiency of NeuPL across several test domains. Most interestingly, we show that novel strategies become more accessible, not less, as the neural population expands.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2022

Hidden Agenda: a Social Deduction Game with Diverse Learned Equilibria

A key challenge in the study of multiagent cooperation is the need for individual agents not only to cooperate effectively, but to decide with whom to cooperate. This is particularly critical in situations when other agents have hidden, possibly misaligned motivations and goals. Social deduction games offer an avenue to study how individuals might learn to synthesize potentially unreliable information about others, and elucidate their true motivations. In this work, we present Hidden Agenda, a two-team social deduction game that provides a 2D environment for studying learning agents in scenarios of unknown team alignment. The environment admits a rich set of strategies for both teams. Reinforcement learning agents trained in Hidden Agenda show that agents can learn a variety of behaviors, including partnering and voting without need for communication in natural language.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2022

Learning to Play No-Press Diplomacy with Best Response Policy Iteration

Recent advances in deep reinforcement learning (RL) have led to considerable progress in many 2-player zero-sum games, such as Go, Poker and Starcraft. The purely adversarial nature of such games allows for conceptually simple and principled application of RL methods. However real-world settings are many-agent, and agent interactions are complex mixtures of common-interest and competitive aspects. We consider Diplomacy, a 7-player board game designed to accentuate dilemmas resulting from many-agent interactions. It also features a large combinatorial action space and simultaneous moves, which are challenging for RL algorithms. We propose a simple yet effective approximate best response operator, designed to handle large combinatorial action spaces and simultaneous moves. We also introduce a family of policy iteration methods that approximate fictitious play. With these methods, we successfully apply RL to Diplomacy: we show that our agents convincingly outperform the previous state-of-the-art, and game theoretic equilibrium analysis shows that the new process yields consistent improvements.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

A PAC-Bayesian Analysis of Distance-Based Classifiers: Why Nearest-Neighbour works!

Abstract We present PAC-Bayesian bounds for the generalisation error of the K-nearest-neighbour classifier (K-NN). This is achieved by casting the K-NN classifier into a kernel space framework in the limit of vanishing kernel bandwidth. We establish a relation between prior measures over the coefficients in the kernel expansion and the induced measure on the weight vectors in kernel space. Defining a sparse prior over the coefficients allows the application of a PAC-Bayesian folk theorem that leads to a generalisation bound that is a function of the number of redundant training examples: those that can be left out without changing the solution. The presented bound requires to quantify a prior belief in the sparseness of the solution and is evaluated after learning when the actual redundancy level is known. Even for small sample size (m ~ 100) the bound gives non-trivial results when both the expected sparseness and the actual redundancy are high.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

Scalable Evaluation of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning with Melting Pot

Existing evaluation suites for multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) do not assess generalization to novel situations as their primary objective (unlike supervised-learning benchmarks). Our contribution, Melting Pot, is a MARL evaluation suite that fills this gap, and uses reinforcement learning to reduce the human labor required to create novel test scenarios. This works because one agent's behavior constitutes (part of) another agent's environment. To demonstrate scalability, we have created over 80 unique test scenarios covering a broad range of research topics such as social dilemmas, reciprocity, resource sharing, and task partitioning. We apply these test scenarios to standard MARL training algorithms, and demonstrate how Melting Pot reveals weaknesses not apparent from training performance alone.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2021

From Motor Control to Team Play in Simulated Humanoid Football

Intelligent behaviour in the physical world exhibits structure at multiple spatial and temporal scales. Although movements are ultimately executed at the level of instantaneous muscle tensions or joint torques, they must be selected to serve goals defined on much longer timescales, and in terms of relations that extend far beyond the body itself, ultimately involving coordination with other agents. Recent research in artificial intelligence has shown the promise of learning-based approaches to the respective problems of complex movement, longer-term planning and multi-agent coordination. However, there is limited research aimed at their integration. We study this problem by training teams of physically simulated humanoid avatars to play football in a realistic virtual environment. We develop a method that combines imitation learning, single- and multi-agent reinforcement learning and population-based training, and makes use of transferable representations of behaviour for decision making at different levels of abstraction. In a sequence of stages, players first learn to control a fully articulated body to perform realistic, human-like movements such as running and turning; they then acquire mid-level football skills such as dribbling and shooting; finally, they develop awareness of others and play as a team, bridging the gap between low-level motor control at a timescale of milliseconds, and coordinated goal-directed behaviour as a team at the timescale of tens of seconds. We investigate the emergence of behaviours at different levels of abstraction, as well as the representations that underlie these behaviours using several analysis techniques, including statistics from real-world sports analytics. Our work constitutes a complete demonstration of integrated decision-making at multiple scales in a physically embodied multi-agent setting. See project video at https://youtu.be/KHMwq9pv7mg.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2021

EigenGame: PCA as a Nash Equilibrium

We present a novel view on principal component analysis (PCA) as a competitive game in which each approximate eigenvector is controlled by a player whose goal is to maximize their own utility function. We analyze the properties of this PCA game and the behavior of its gradient based updates. The resulting algorithm -- which combines elements from Oja's rule with a generalized Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization -- is naturally decentralized and hence parallelizable through message passing. We demonstrate the scalability of the algorithm with experiments on large image datasets and neural network activations. We discuss how this new view of PCA as a differentiable game can lead to further algorithmic developments and insights.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2020

Open Problems in Cooperative AI

Problems of cooperation--in which agents seek ways to jointly improve their welfare--are ubiquitous and important. They can be found at scales ranging from our daily routines--such as driving on highways, scheduling meetings, and working collaboratively--to our global challenges--such as peace, commerce, and pandemic preparedness. Arguably, the success of the human species is rooted in our ability to cooperate. Since machines powered by artificial intelligence are playing an ever greater role in our lives, it will be important to equip them with the capabilities necessary to cooperate and to foster cooperation. We see an opportunity for the field of artificial intelligence to explicitly focus effort on this class of problems, which we term Cooperative AI. The objective of this research would be to study the many aspects of the problems of cooperation and to innovate in AI to contribute to solving these problems. Central goals include building machine agents with the capabilities needed for cooperation, building tools to foster cooperation in populations of (machine and/or human) agents, and otherwise conducting AI research for insight relevant to problems of cooperation. This research integrates ongoing work on multi-agent systems, game theory and social choice, human-machine interaction and alignment, natural-language processing, and the construction of social tools and platforms. However, Cooperative AI is not the union of these existing areas, but rather an independent bet about the productivity of specific kinds of conversations that involve these and other areas. We see opportunity to more explicitly focus on the problem of cooperation, to construct unified theory and vocabulary, and to build bridges with adjacent communities working on cooperation, including in the natural, social, and behavioural sciences.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2020

Model-free conventions in multi-agent reinforcement learning with heterogeneous preferences

Game theoretic views of convention generally rest on notions of common knowledge and hyper-rational models of individual behavior. However, decades of work in behavioral economics have questioned the validity of both foundations. Meanwhile, computational neuroscience has contributed a modernized 'dual process' account of decision-making where model-free (MF) reinforcement learning trades off with model-based (MB) reinforcement learning. The former captures habitual and procedural learning while the latter captures choices taken via explicit planning and deduction. Some conventions (e.g. international treaties) are likely supported by cognition that resonates with the game theoretic and MB accounts. However, convention formation may also occur via MF mechanisms like habit learning; though this possibility has been understudied. Here, we demonstrate that complex, large-scale conventions can emerge from MF learning mechanisms. This suggests that some conventions may be supported by habit-like cognition rather than explicit reasoning. We apply MF multi-agent reinforcement learning to a temporo-spatially extended game with incomplete information. In this game, large parts of the state space are reachable only by collective action. However, heterogeneity of tastes makes such coordinated action difficult: multiple equilibria are desirable for all players, but subgroups prefer a particular equilibrium over all others. This creates a coordination problem that can be solved by establishing a convention. We investigate start-up and free rider subproblems as well as the effects of group size, intensity of intrinsic preference, and salience on the emergence dynamics of coordination conventions. Results of our simulations show agents establish and switch between conventions, even working against their own preferred outcome when doing so is necessary for effective coordination.

cs.MA↗