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Thorina Boenke

Publications and source records attributed to Thorina Boenke.

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CAM-LDS: Cyber Attack Manifestations for Automatic Interpretation of System Logs and Security Alerts

Log data are essential for intrusion detection and forensic investigations. However, manual log analysis is tedious due to high data volumes, heterogeneous event formats, and unstructured messages. Even though many automated methods for log analysis exist, they usually still rely on domain-specific configurations such as expert-defined detection rules, handcrafted log parsers, or manual feature-engineering. Crucially, the level of automation of conventional methods is limited due to their inability to semantically understand logs and explain their underlying causes. In contrast, Large Language Models enable domain- and format-agnostic interpretation of system logs and security alerts. Unfortunately, research on this topic remains challenging, because publicly available and labeled data sets covering a broad range of attack techniques are scarce. To address this gap, we introduce the Cyber Attack Manifestation Log Data Set (CAM-LDS), comprising seven attack scenarios that cover 81 distinct techniques across 13 tactics and collected from 18 distinct sources within a fully open-source and reproducible test environment. We extract log events that directly result from attack executions to facilitate analysis of manifestations concerning command observability, event frequencies, performance metrics, and intrusion detection alerts. We further present an illustrative case study utilizing an LLM to process the CAM-LDS. The results indicate that correct attack techniques are predicted perfectly for approximately one third of attack steps and adequately for another third, highlighting the potential of LLM-based log interpretation and utility of our data set.

cs.CR

AttackMate: Realistic Emulation and Automation of Cyber Attack Scenarios Across the Kill Chain

Adversary emulation tools facilitate scripting and automated execution of cyber attack chains, thereby reducing costs and manual expert effort required for security testing, cyber exercises, and intrusion detection research. However, due to the fact that existing tools typically rely on agents installed on target systems, they leave suspicious traces that make it easy to distinguish their activities from those of real human attackers. Moreover, these tools often lack relevant capabilities, such as handling of interactive prompts, and are unsuitable for emulating specific stages of the kill chain, such as initial access. This paper thus introduces AttackMate, an open-source attack scripting language and execution engine designed to mimic behavior patterns of actual attackers. We validate the tool in a case study covering common attack steps including privilege escalation, information gathering, and lateral movement. Our results indicate that log artifacts resulting from AttackMate's activities resemble those produced by human attackers more closely than those generated by standard adversary emulation tools.

cs.CR