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Thorsten Peinemann

Publications and source records attributed to Thorsten Peinemann.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

MammothDP: Private Boosted Decision Trees Ready for Trusted Hardware and Leakage-free Hyperparameters

Data spaces like the European Health Data Space (EHDS) require the protection of sensitive data in studies during the data's processing and the study's release alike. In this work, we investigate how to implement this mandate using established trusted execution environments (TEEs) and timing side-channel hardening to protect the processing even under a compromised server, and the state-of-the-art differential privacy (DP) notion to protect the release of studies on tabular data. This combined setup could seem to complete the picture, but in fact raises unexpected security challenges that we mitigate by introducing MammothDP: a significant milestone towards a holistic machine learning system based on the recent gradient boosted decision tree learner S-BDT that is provably DP if used within a privacy filter, timing side-channel hardened, and deployed on a TEE. To achieve a strong privacy-utility tradeoff, we introduce two novel components: an early stopping criterion that adaptively selects the number of trees without any privacy overhead, and an improved rollback protection that is no longer vulnerable under timing side-channel attacks.

cs.CR↗

Provable one-poison backdoor attacks on linear models and ReLU neural networks

Backdoor poisoning attacks are a threat to machine learning models that are trained on data collected from untrusted sources; these attacks enable attackers to inject malicious behavior into the model that can be triggered by specially crafted inputs. Prior work has established bounds on the success of backdoor attacks and their impact on the benign learning task, however, an open question is what amount of poison data is needed for a successful backdoor attack. Typical attacks either use few samples but need much information about the data points, or need to poison many data points. In this paper, we show that an adversary can mount a one-poison backdoor attack without knowledge of individual training data, requiring only coarse geometric bounds of the input space and training parameters. We identify provably sufficient conditions that allow an adversary with one poison sample with high probability to inject a backdoor into linear models and MLPs. We show that our backdoor has zero backdooring error and the injection does not significantly impact the benign learning task performance.

cs.LG↗

DP-Hype: Federated Differentially Private Hyperparameter Search

Tuning hyperparameters in federated machine learning can substantially impact model performance. When hyperparameters are tuned on sensitive data, privacy becomes an important challenge and to this end, differential privacy has emerged as the de facto standard for provable privacy. A standard setting in federated learning is that clients agree on a shared setup, i.e., find a compromise from a set of hyperparameters, like a model's learning rate. Yet, prior work on privacy-preserving hyperparameter tuning is tailored to specific learning tasks, does not account for the privacy leakage of aggregated results, or offers a sub-optimal privacy-utility trade-off. In this work, we present our algorithm DP-Hype, which performs a federated and privacy-preserving hyperparameter search by conducting a federated voting based on local hyperparameter evaluations of clients. In this way, DP-Hype selects hyperparameters that lead to a compromise supported by a majority of clients, while maintaining scalability and independence from specific learning tasks. We prove that DP-Hype preserves the strong notion of differential privacy called client-level differential privacy and, importantly, show that its privacy guarantees do not depend on the number of hyperparameters. We also provide bounds on its utility guarantees, that is, the probability of finding good hyperparameters, and implement DP-Hype as a submodule in the popular Flower framework for federated machine learning. In addition, we evaluate performance on multiple benchmark data sets in iid as well as multiple non-iid settings and demonstrate high utility of DP-Hype even under small privacy budgets.

cs.LG↗

S-BDT: Distributed Differentially Private Boosted Decision Trees

We introduce S-BDT: a novel $(\varepsilon,δ)$-differentially private distributed gradient boosted decision tree (GBDT) learner that improves the protection of single training data points (privacy) while achieving meaningful learning goals, such as accuracy or regression error (utility). S-BDT uses less noise by relying on non-spherical multivariate Gaussian noise, for which we show tight subsampling bounds for privacy amplification and incorporate that into a Rényi filter for individual privacy accounting. We experimentally reach the same utility while saving $50\%$ in terms of epsilon for $\varepsilon \le 0.5$ on the Abalone regression dataset (dataset size $\approx 4K$), saving $30\%$ in terms of epsilon for $\varepsilon \le 0.08$ for the Adult classification dataset (dataset size $\approx 50K$), and saving $30\%$ in terms of epsilon for $\varepsilon\leq0.03$ for the Spambase classification dataset (dataset size $\approx 5K$). Moreover, we show that for situations where a GBDT is learning a stream of data that originates from different subpopulations (non-IID), S-BDT improves the saving of epsilon even further.

cs.CR↗