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Tian Dong

Publications and source records attributed to Tian Dong.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

VulnGym: Benchmarking Coding Agents for Repository-Level Vulnerability Detection

Recent advances in LLM-based vulnerability detection have shown promising results, while coding agents further extend this capability from isolated code snippets to complete repositories. This shift requires agents to autonomously explore repositories and locate vulnerability-relevant code, instead of performing detection on preselected functions. However, existing benchmarks primarily focus on vulnerability classification over preselected code snippets, limiting their ability to evaluate coding agents in repository-level vulnerability detection. Moreover, without fine-grained vulnerability trace annotations, the capability limitations underlying the detection process remain difficult to explore. To address these limitations, we present \textbf{VulnGym}, a real-world repository-level benchmark for evaluating vulnerability detection by coding agents. VulnGym aligns reviewed GitHub advisories with their corresponding vulnerable version repositories. It contains 184 advisories and 408 vulnerability entries across 23 repositories, with each entry annotated with line-level entry points, critical operations, and vulnerability traces. Using this fine-grained ground truth, VulnGym defines an end-to-end detection task and three oracle-based subtasks to jointly evaluate vulnerability detection and diagnose limitations in code localization and evidence construction. Our evaluation indicates that current coding agents remain limited in both end-to-end repository-level vulnerability detection and the construction of accurate supporting traces.

cs.SE

DIPBox: A Multi-scale Testing Framework for Tracking Dataset Regeneration

Training datasets have tremendous proprietary value and are vulnerable to unauthorized copying. Existing defenses mainly focus on tracking individual data points, but pay little attention to the threat of dataset regeneration. Through a measurement study of public tumor datasets, we identify substantial real-world partial-dataset replication, raising concerns about potential license noncompliance. To counter the challenge of tracking previously unknown adversarial regeneration, our key insight is that regeneration that preserves model utility inevitably preserves measurable signals across multiple feature scales. We categorize these dataset features into sample-, set-, and distribution-level features and design four similarity metrics to accurately identify regeneration. Based on these metrics, we develop DIPBox, which to our knowledge is the first testing framework that tracks regeneration suspects via multi-scale similarity testing across a spectrum of defender access settings, from limited to full information. We further provide a learning-theoretic analysis that justifies these multi-scale metrics and formalizes an inherent utility--divergence trade-off, implying fundamental limits on evasive regeneration. Extensive experiments on 16 vision and text base datasets, 320 regenerated datasets, and 590 derived models validate that DIPBox outperforms previous solutions while characterizing its robustness and limits under three adaptive attacks.

cs.CR

Hunting Vulnerability Variants in AI Infra: Measurement and Reference-Driven Detection

AI infra has become a shared execution layer for model training, deployment, and agent orchestration. Because many projects reimplement similar model-centric workflows, a vulnerability disclosed in one repository can recur as a variant in another repository with a related design. Yet the prevalence and detectability of these variants remain poorly understood. This paper presents a measurement study of vulnerability variants in AI infra. Analyzing 688 GitHub repositories and 251 publicly disclosed vulnerabilities, we find that AI infra projects frequently share overlapping functionality and recurrent vulnerable patterns, creating a concrete basis for cross-repository variants. Building on this finding, we study how to automatically identify such variants from known disclosures. We propose INFRASCOPE, a reference-driven multi-agent framework that extracts transferable vulnerability semantics from known cases and uses them to locate and validate variants in new repositories. Evaluating INFRASCOPE on 20 real-world AI infra repositories, we uncover over 20 vulnerabilities, including 11 acknowledged cases and 4 cases that have been assigned CVEs so far.

cs.CR

Fully multiplexed photonic tensor computing

Tensor operations dominate modern computational workloads, yet their further acceleration demands hardware platforms with greater parallelism. Although photonic computing provides a compelling route for parallel processing, fully exploiting all native multiplexing dimensions of optical fields is impeded by the challenges in routing and programming light in all dimensions simultaneously. Here we introduce FieldCore, a fully multiplexed photonic tensor core that jointly harnesses wavelength, radio-frequency, guided-mode, time and space dimensions, thereby enabling parallelism to scale multiplicatively within a single optical field. Enabled by inverse-designed silicon photonics, FieldCore preserves a uniform programmed computation across all multiplexed channels in parallel. Experimentally, we validate and benchmark its performance from ultra-high-baudrate arithmetic operations to high-fidelity image convolution and parallel handwritten-digit recognition. We further use FieldCore to unlock applications that naturally require high-dimensional data processing, such as high-dimensional hyperspectral classification and massively parallel mechanical fault diagnosis. Our FieldCore supports an estimated aggregate compute throughput of 69.12 tera operations per second (TOPS) and accommodates up to 1,800 parallel input streams within a single core, establishing a scalable paradigm for fully multiplexed photonic tensor computing and AI inference.

physics.optics

AgentRAE: Remote Action Execution through Notification-based Visual Backdoors against Screenshots-based Mobile GUI Agents

The rapid adoption of mobile graphical user interface (GUI) agents, which autonomously control applications and operating systems (OS), exposes new system-level attack surfaces. Existing backdoors against web GUI agents and general GenAI models rely on environmental injection or deceptive pop-ups to mislead the agent operation. However, these techniques do not work on screenshots-based mobile GUI agents due to the challenges of restricted trigger design spaces, OS background interference, and conflicts in multiple trigger-action mappings. We propose AgentRAE, a novel backdoor attack capable of inducing Remote Action Execution in mobile GUI agents using visually natural triggers (e.g., benign app icons in notifications). To address the underfitting caused by natural triggers and achieve accurate multi-target action redirection, we design a novel two-stage pipeline that first enhances the agent's sensitivity to subtle iconographic differences via contrastive learning, and then associates each trigger with a specific mobile GUI agent action through a backdoor post-training. Our extensive evaluation reveals that the proposed backdoor preserves clean performance with an attack success rate of over 90% across ten mobile operations. Furthermore, it is hard to visibly detect the benign-looking triggers and circumvents eight representative state-of-the-art defenses. These results expose an overlooked backdoor vector in mobile GUI agents, underscoring the need for defenses that scrutinize notification-conditioned behaviors and internal agent representations.

cs.CR

EmbTracker: Traceable Black-box Watermarking for Federated Language Models

Federated Language Model (FedLM) allows a collaborative learning without sharing raw data, yet it introduces a critical vulnerability, as every untrustworthy client may leak the received functional model instance. Current watermarking schemes for FedLM often require white-box access and client-side cooperation, providing only group-level proof of ownership rather than individual traceability. We propose EmbTracker, a server-side, traceable black-box watermarking framework specifically designed for FedLMs. EmbTracker achieves black-box verifiability by embedding a backdoor-based watermark detectable through simple API queries. Client-level traceability is realized by injecting unique identity-specific watermarks into the model distributed to each client. In this way, a leaked model can be attributed to a specific culprit, ensuring robustness even against non-cooperative participants. Extensive experiments on various language and vision-language models demonstrate that EmbTracker achieves robust traceability with verification rates near 100\%, high resilience against removal attacks (fine-tuning, pruning, quantization), and negligible impact on primary task performance (typically within 1-2\%).

cs.CR

"Tab, Tab, Bug": Security Pitfalls of Next Edit Suggestions in AI-Integrated IDEs

Modern AI-integrated IDEs are shifting from passive code completion to proactive Next Edit Suggestions (NES). Unlike traditional autocompletion, NES is designed to construct a richer context from both recent user interactions and the broader codebase to suggest multi-line, cross-line, or even cross-file modifications. This evolution significantly streamlines the programming workflow into a tab-by-tab interaction and enhances developer productivity. Consequently, NES introduces a more complex context retrieval mechanism and sophisticated interaction patterns. However, existing studies focus almost exclusively on the security implications of standalone LLM-based code generation, ignoring the potential attack vectors posed by NES in modern AI-integrated IDEs. The underlying mechanisms of NES remain under-explored, and their security implications are not yet fully understood. In this paper, we conduct the first systematic security study of NES systems. First, we perform an in-depth dissection of the NES mechanisms to understand the newly introduced threat vectors. It is found that NES retrieves a significantly expanded context, including inputs from imperceptible user actions and global codebase retrieval, which increases the attack surfaces. Second, we conduct a comprehensive in-lab study to evaluate the security implications of NES. The evaluation results reveal that NES is susceptible to context poisoning and is sensitive to transactional edits and human-IDE interactions. Third, we perform a large-scale online survey involving over 200 professional developers to assess the perceptions of NES security risks in real-world development workflows. The survey results indicate a general lack of awareness regarding the potential security pitfalls associated with NES, highlighting the need for increased education and improved security countermeasures in AI-integrated IDEs.

cs.CR

Authority Backdoor: A Certifiable Backdoor Mechanism for Authoring DNNs

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), as valuable intellectual property, face unauthorized use. Existing protections, such as digital watermarking, are largely passive; they provide only post-hoc ownership verification and cannot actively prevent the illicit use of a stolen model. This work proposes a proactive protection scheme, dubbed ``Authority Backdoor," which embeds access constraints directly into the model. In particular, the scheme utilizes a backdoor learning framework to intrinsically lock a model's utility, such that it performs normally only in the presence of a specific trigger (e.g., a hardware fingerprint). But in its absence, the DNN's performance degrades to be useless. To further enhance the security of the proposed authority scheme, the certifiable robustness is integrated to prevent an adaptive attacker from removing the implanted backdoor. The resulting framework establishes a secure authority mechanism for DNNs, combining access control with certifiable robustness against adversarial attacks. Extensive experiments on diverse architectures and datasets validate the effectiveness and certifiable robustness of the proposed framework.

cs.CR

Unlock giant nonreciprocity via multi-valued behavior of non-Hermitian zero-index materials

Although Einstein's field equations are time-independent, the multivalued feature of the horizon of a blackhole naturally enables the one-way transmission, leading to the strong arrow of time from the time-independent gravitational interaction. Here we experimentally demonstrate a photonic analogue of this principle and reveal the infinite nonreciprocity of the time-reversal-symmetric Maxwell equations. By designing a non-Hermitian zero-index magneto-optical metawaveguide, we introduce multivalued feature to this metawaveguide's complex eigenspace via an exceptional point with non-zero residue, bringing nonlocal, path-dependent historical memory to the system. Hence, a weak magneto-optical response can direct forward and backward waves to two photonic branches with largely distinct momenta and losses, leading to the optical nonreciprocity far beyond the limitation imposed by the magneto-optical material. We fabricated an a-Si/Ce:YIG metawaveguide, achieving nonreciprocal phase shift of 47.78 rad/mm and nonreciprocal loss of 53.9 dB/mm near 1575 nm, exceeding state-of-the-art nonreciprocal devices by an order of magnitude. Our principle universally applies from microwave to visible frequencies, leading to compact isolators, circulators, and sensors. Our principle can also be extended to nonreciprocal acoustic, elastic, and thermal systems. The proposed new paradigm -- geometry-based strong arrow of time in covariant and reversible physical systems -- has broad implications in many disciplines including string theory, cosmology, and astronomy.

physics.optics

Oscillation Baryogenesis via Ultraviolet Dark Matter Freeze-In

We investigate baryogenesis from dark matter oscillations in the ultraviolet freeze-in regime. We find that the mechanism can simultaneously accommodate the observed abundances of baryons and dark matter for dark matter masses in the 10 keV to MeV range, provided the reheat temperature lies between the temperature of the electroweak phase transition and ~10 TeV. The mechanism predicts observable consequences due to the presence of a light dark matter component that is relativistic during structure formation, and X-ray bounds on decaying dark matter can set strong constraints depending on the operator mediating dark matter production.

hep-ph

Depth Gives a False Sense of Privacy: LLM Internal States Inversion

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into daily routines, yet they raise significant privacy and safety concerns. Recent research proposes collaborative inference, which outsources the early-layer inference to ensure data locality, and introduces model safety auditing based on inner neuron patterns. Both techniques expose the LLM's Internal States (ISs), which are traditionally considered irreversible to inputs due to optimization challenges and the highly abstract representations in deep layers. In this work, we challenge this assumption by proposing four inversion attacks that significantly improve the semantic similarity and token matching rate of inverted inputs. Specifically, we first develop two white-box optimization-based attacks tailored for low-depth and high-depth ISs. These attacks avoid local minima convergence, a limitation observed in prior work, through a two-phase inversion process. Then, we extend our optimization attack under more practical black-box weight access by leveraging the transferability between the source and the derived LLMs. Additionally, we introduce a generation-based attack that treats inversion as a translation task, employing an inversion model to reconstruct inputs. Extensive evaluation of short and long prompts from medical consulting and coding assistance datasets and 6 LLMs validates the effectiveness of our inversion attacks. Notably, a 4,112-token long medical consulting prompt can be nearly perfectly inverted with 86.88 F1 token matching from the middle layer of Llama-3 model. Finally, we evaluate four practical defenses that we found cannot perfectly prevent ISs inversion and draw conclusions for future mitigation design.

cs.CR

Programmable electro-optic frequency comb empowers integrated parallel convolution processing

Integrated photonic convolution processors make optical neural networks (ONNs) a transformative solution for artificial intelligence applications such as machine vision. To enhance the parallelism, throughput, and energy efficiency of ONNs, wavelength multiplexing is widely applied. However, it often encounters the challenges of low compactness, limited scalability, and high weight reconstruction latency. Here, we proposed and demonstrated an integrated photonic processing unit with a parallel convolution computing speed of 1.62 trillion operations per second (TOPS) and a weight reconstruction speed exceeding 38 GHz. This processing unit simultaneously achieves, for the first time, multi-wavelength generation and weight mapping via a single programmable electro-optic (EO) frequency comb, featuring unprecedented compactness, device-footprint independent scalability, and near-unity optical power conversion efficiency (conversion efficiency from input optical power to output weighted comb lines). To demonstrate the reconfigurability and functionality of this processing unit, we implemented image edge detection and object classification based on EO combs obtained using the particle swarm algorithm and an EO comb neural network training framework, respectively. Our programmable EO comb-based processing framework establishes a new paradigm towards the development of low-latency monolithic photonic processors, promising real-time in-sensor learning for autonomous vehicles, intelligent robotics, and drones.

physics.optics

Step-wise Adaptive Integration of Supervised Fine-tuning and Reinforcement Learning for Task-Specific LLMs

Large language models (LLMs) excel at mathematical reasoning and logical problem-solving. The current popular training paradigms primarily use supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning (RL) to enhance the models' reasoning abilities. However, when using SFT or RL alone, there are respective challenges: SFT may suffer from overfitting, while RL is prone to mode collapse. The state-of-the-art methods have proposed hybrid training schemes. However, static switching faces challenges such as poor generalization across different tasks and high dependence on data quality. In response to these challenges, inspired by the curriculum learning-quiz mechanism in human reasoning cultivation, We propose SASR, a step-wise adaptive hybrid training framework that theoretically unifies SFT and RL and dynamically balances the two throughout optimization. SASR uses SFT for initial warm-up to establish basic reasoning skills, and then uses an adaptive dynamic adjustment algorithm based on gradient norm and divergence relative to the original distribution to seamlessly integrate SFT with the online RL method GRPO. By monitoring the training status of LLMs and adjusting the training process in sequence, SASR ensures a smooth transition between training schemes, maintaining core reasoning abilities while exploring different paths. Experimental results demonstrate that SASR outperforms SFT, RL, and static hybrid training methods.

cs.LG

Model Inversion in Split Learning for Personalized LLMs: New Insights from Information Bottleneck Theory

Personalized Large Language Models (LLMs) have become increasingly prevalent, showcasing the impressive capabilities of models like GPT-4. This trend has also catalyzed extensive research on deploying LLMs on mobile devices. Feasible approaches for such edge-cloud deployment include using split learning. However, previous research has largely overlooked the privacy leakage associated with intermediate representations transmitted from devices to servers. This work is the first to identify model inversion attacks in the split learning framework for LLMs, emphasizing the necessity of secure defense. For the first time, we introduce mutual information entropy to understand the information propagation of Transformer-based LLMs and assess privacy attack performance for LLM blocks. To address the issue of representations being sparser and containing less information than embeddings, we propose a two-stage attack system in which the first part projects representations into the embedding space, and the second part uses a generative model to recover text from these embeddings. This design breaks down the complexity and achieves attack scores of 38%-75% in various scenarios, with an over 60% improvement over the SOTA. This work comprehensively highlights the potential privacy risks during the deployment of personalized LLMs on the edge side.

cs.LG

The Philosopher's Stone: Trojaning Plugins of Large Language Models

Open-source Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently gained popularity because of their comparable performance to proprietary LLMs. To efficiently fulfill domain-specialized tasks, open-source LLMs can be refined, without expensive accelerators, using low-rank adapters. However, it is still unknown whether low-rank adapters can be exploited to control LLMs. To address this gap, we demonstrate that an infected adapter can induce, on specific triggers,an LLM to output content defined by an adversary and to even maliciously use tools. To train a Trojan adapter, we propose two novel attacks, POLISHED and FUSION, that improve over prior approaches. POLISHED uses a superior LLM to align naïvely poisoned data based on our insight that it can better inject poisoning knowledge during training. In contrast, FUSION leverages a novel over-poisoning procedure to transform a benign adapter into a malicious one by magnifying the attention between trigger and target in model weights. In our experiments, we first conduct two case studies to demonstrate that a compromised LLM agent can use malware to control the system (e.g., a LLM-driven robot) or to launch a spear-phishing attack. Then, in terms of targeted misinformation, we show that our attacks provide higher attack effectiveness than the existing baseline and, for the purpose of attracting downloads, preserve or improve the adapter's utility. Finally, we designed and evaluated three potential defenses. However, none proved entirely effective in safeguarding against our attacks, highlighting the need for more robust defenses supporting a secure LLM supply chain.

cs.CR

Learn What You Want to Unlearn: Unlearning Inversion Attacks against Machine Unlearning

Machine unlearning has become a promising solution for fulfilling the "right to be forgotten", under which individuals can request the deletion of their data from machine learning models. However, existing studies of machine unlearning mainly focus on the efficacy and efficiency of unlearning methods, while neglecting the investigation of the privacy vulnerability during the unlearning process. With two versions of a model available to an adversary, that is, the original model and the unlearned model, machine unlearning opens up a new attack surface. In this paper, we conduct the first investigation to understand the extent to which machine unlearning can leak the confidential content of the unlearned data. Specifically, under the Machine Learning as a Service setting, we propose unlearning inversion attacks that can reveal the feature and label information of an unlearned sample by only accessing the original and unlearned model. The effectiveness of the proposed unlearning inversion attacks is evaluated through extensive experiments on benchmark datasets across various model architectures and on both exact and approximate representative unlearning approaches. The experimental results indicate that the proposed attack can reveal the sensitive information of the unlearned data. As such, we identify three possible defenses that help to mitigate the proposed attacks, while at the cost of reducing the utility of the unlearned model. The study in this paper uncovers an underexplored gap between machine unlearning and the privacy of unlearned data, highlighting the need for the careful design of mechanisms for implementing unlearning without leaking the information of the unlearned data.

cs.CR

Mate! Are You Really Aware? An Explainability-Guided Testing Framework for Robustness of Malware Detectors

Numerous open-source and commercial malware detectors are available. However, their efficacy is threatened by new adversarial attacks, whereby malware attempts to evade detection, e.g., by performing feature-space manipulation. In this work, we propose an explainability-guided and model-agnostic testing framework for robustness of malware detectors when confronted with adversarial attacks. The framework introduces the concept of Accrued Malicious Magnitude (AMM) to identify which malware features could be manipulated to maximize the likelihood of evading detection. We then use this framework to test several state-of-the-art malware detectors' abilities to detect manipulated malware. We find that (i) commercial antivirus engines are vulnerable to AMM-guided test cases; (ii) the ability of a manipulated malware generated using one detector to evade detection by another detector (i.e., transferability) depends on the overlap of features with large AMM values between the different detectors; and (iii) AMM values effectively measure the fragility of features (i.e., capability of feature-space manipulation to flip the prediction results) and explain the robustness of malware detectors facing evasion attacks. Our findings shed light on the limitations of current malware detectors, as well as how they can be improved.

cs.CR

Mind Your Heart: Stealthy Backdoor Attack on Dynamic Deep Neural Network in Edge Computing

Transforming off-the-shelf deep neural network (DNN) models into dynamic multi-exit architectures can achieve inference and transmission efficiency by fragmenting and distributing a large DNN model in edge computing scenarios (e.g., edge devices and cloud servers). In this paper, we propose a novel backdoor attack specifically on the dynamic multi-exit DNN models. Particularly, we inject a backdoor by poisoning one DNN model's shallow hidden layers targeting not this vanilla DNN model but only its dynamically deployed multi-exit architectures. Our backdoored vanilla model behaves normally on performance and cannot be activated even with the correct trigger. However, the backdoor will be activated when the victims acquire this model and transform it into a dynamic multi-exit architecture at their deployment. We conduct extensive experiments to prove the effectiveness of our attack on three structures (ResNet-56, VGG-16, and MobileNet) with four datasets (CIFAR-10, SVHN, GTSRB, and Tiny-ImageNet) and our backdoor is stealthy to evade multiple state-of-the-art backdoor detection or removal methods.

cs.CR