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Tianhang Lu

Publications and source records attributed to Tianhang Lu.

12 recordsLinked to original sources
arXiv2026

Paging with Per-Replacement Maximum Delay

Classical paging couples every miss to an immediate replacement. We ask what remains of its algorithmic structure when a miss may wait. In our per-replacement maximum-delay model, loading a pending page costs one unit of movement plus the age of its oldest outstanding request and clears the whole page-specific episode. Equivalently, the instantaneous holding rate is the number of pending pages, rather than the number of pending requests. The classical competitive hierarchy survives this change. For cache size $k$, we give a deterministic $(5k+3)$-competitive threshold-LRU algorithm and a randomized $5H_k$-competitive algorithm against an oblivious adversary; classical lower-bound instances give matching $\Omega(k)$ and $\Omega(H_k)$ orders. The randomized algorithm uses cache-independent temporal windows to create an ordinary-paging sequence fixed before any random choices; a shadow paging algorithm is then projected onto nonproactive physical replacements. The offline picture is less classical. We give an exact $O(nk)$ dynamic program with one hole, an exact configuration dynamic program for a fixed number of holes, and a deterministic nonproactive polynomial-time $5$-approximation without fixing that number. Yet farthest-next-use victim selection can be suboptimal in the physical delayed problem already with three pages.

cs.DS↗
arXiv2026

Online Service with Per-Batch Maximum Delay

We study online service with one maximum-waiting-time charge per service batch. The persistent server endpoint prevents a phase-by-phase comparison with the offline optimum: an offline schedule may merge many online phases, share movement globally, and finish at unrelated endpoints. Our main contribution is a metric-independent \emph{group--trajectory certificate framework} that restores such a comparison. For ordered request groups in disjoint time windows, a certificate value is bounded both by the window length and by the metric Steiner cost of the group. After normalizing the offline schedule into consecutive arrival blocks, strictly interior groups are charged to offline delay, while boundary groups induce connectors of congestion at most two along the offline trajectory. One color class therefore has certificate sum at most $2\OPT$; a parity decomposition yields $\sum_h C_h\le4\OPT$. Consequently, any phase rule whose cost is at most $\alpha C_h$ is $4\alpha$-competitive. For visible service, this theorem yields deterministic ratios $10$ on a line, $12$ on a weighted tree, and $20$ on an arbitrary finite metric; the last algorithm is polynomial and uses a phase-local terminal-MST envelope, while an exact metric-Steiner oracle gives ratio $12$. Structurally, elective and automatic schedules can have different event structures but equal offline optimal values. The common value is computable exactly in polynomial time on lines and explicitly represented weighted trees, whereas exact optimization on arbitrary finite metrics is NP-hard. Finally, we use spatial blindness---announced requests whose locations are revealed only when visited---as a stress test: dyadic exploration preserves a constant ratio on a known finite line, while a single hidden request on a star forces a loss linear in its degree.

cs.DS↗
arXiv2026

A New Lower Bound for Online Vertex Cover under Vertex Arrivals

We prove that no randomized integral or fractional algorithm for online vertex cover under general vertex arrivals achieves a competitive ratio strictly below $1+\sqrt{e}/2\approx1.824360635$, even on bipartite graphs and against an oblivious adversary. This improves the previous lower bound of approximately $1.753$. Our proof extends the complete-bipartite alternating construction of Wang and Wong to an arbitrary number of alternations. The resulting adversary is described by a monotone integral recurrence. If the recurrence never violates the competitive budget, its iterates converge to an integrable fixed point; classifying all such fixed points forces the excess ratio to be at least $\sqrt{e}/2$. A truncated discrete recurrence and a Riemann-sum argument convert every strict continuous violation into a finite, algorithm-dependent but realization-oblivious input. We also exhibit a critical fixed point showing that $1+\sqrt{e}/2$ is the exact limit of this homogeneous complete-bipartite recurrence, rather than a numerical artifact.

cs.DS↗
arXiv2026

Online Multi-Level Aggregation with Per-Batch Maximum Delay

We study online multi-level aggregation on finite rooted trees with a per-batch maximum-delay objective. A service pays for a rooted subtree and for the maximum waiting time among the requests cleared by that service. We show that the offline optimum admits a consecutive-arrival-block normal form and can be computed by a polynomial-time dynamic program. The same dynamic program defines the deadlines of a family of online algorithms, which we call DP-Envelope. Its deterministic endpoint is $2$-competitive. Sampling one global parameter with density $e^\theta/(e-1)$ leads to an $e/(e-1)$-competitive randomized algorithm against an oblivious adversary. The deterministic guarantee matches the known fixed-node lower bound, and we prove a matching randomized lower bound. Thus, both guarantees are optimal on every nondegenerate rooted tree. We first develop the line metric as a warm-up, where the algorithm and its nested block partitions have a direct geometric interpretation. Finally, we show that the upper bounds extend to every realizable static service system with a normalized, nondecreasing, submodular joint service cost.

cs.DS↗
arXiv2026

Learning-Augmented and Randomized Algorithms for Line Aggregation with Delays

This paper studies learning-augmented and randomized online aggregation with delays on a line metric. We consider advice given as online suggested service lengths, and evaluate the algorithms in terms of robustness and consistency. For each $\lambda \in (0,1]$, we first propose a deterministic learning-augmented \textsc{Balance} algorithm that is $(4/\lambda+1/\lambda^2)$-robust and $(4+\lambda)$-consistent. We also propose a randomized algorithm for the problem in the classical adversarial model, which is $(e+1)$-competitive against an oblivious adversary, improving over the deterministic $5$-competitive \textsc{Balance} benchmark~\cite{bienkowski2013chain}. Notably, this competitive ratio is even lower than the lower bound of $4$ for deterministic online algorithms. Moreover, we establish a lower bound of $e$ on the competitive ratio of randomized online algorithms, improving the previous lower bound of $e/(e-1)$. Besides, we combine the two ideas and obtain a randomized learning-augmented algorithm that is $(e/\lambda+1/\lambda^2)$-robust and $(e+\lambda)$-consistent. Finally, we conduct numerical experiments to complement our theoretical analysis and evaluate the empirical performance of our algorithms.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2026

Learning-Augmented Algorithms for Online Vertex Cover

This paper studies learning-augmented online weighted vertex cover with local advice and a tradeoff parameter $\lambda \in (0,1)$. We consider two graph settings: bipartite graphs and general graphs. In both settings, the online algorithm must maintain a feasible vertex cover under irrevocable decisions. We show that these problems admit the same robustness--consistency tradeoffs as learning-augmented ski rental. For the bipartite graph model, we give a randomized algorithm that is $\frac{1}{1-e^{-\lambda}}$-robust and $\frac{\lambda}{1-e^{-\lambda}}$-consistent. For the general graph model, we give a deterministic algorithm that is $(1+\frac{1}{\lambda})$-robust and $(1+\lambda)$-consistent. We prove that the tradeoffs above are optimal in both settings. We also validate the proposed algorithms through experiments on synthetic and real-world datasets.

cs.CC↗
arXiv2026

Flow Games with Public Arcs: the Least Core and the Nucleolus

We study flow games with public arcs, an extension of classical cooperative flow games that allows players to use public resources. In these games, a coalition corresponds to a set of arcs, while certain arcs, called public arcs, can be used freely by any coalition. The value of a coalition is the maximum flow value achievable using the arcs controlled by the coalition along with the public arcs. We investigate two solution concepts, the least core and the nucleolus. Both solution concepts provide fair ways to allocate the value of the grand coalition among individual players. We provide polynomial-size formulations of the least core of these games. We also give a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for computing the nucleolus, whether or not the core is empty.

econ.TH↗
arXiv2026

Full characterization of core for nonlinear optimization games

We fully characterize the core of a broad class of nonlinear games by identifying a suitable relaxation for inherent nonlinearity, directly generalizing the linear frameworks in the literature. This characterization significantly expands the scope of cooperative games that can be analyzed and contributes to the literature on games induced from optimization models. We apply these insights to not only establish connections with and provide new insights on classical models but also solve new games untamed in the existing literature, including combinatorial quadratic and ratio games such as portfolio, maximum cut, matching, and assortment games. These results are further extended to more general models and also the approximate core.

math.OC↗
arXiv2024

On the Approximate Core and Nucleon of Flow Games with Public Arcs

We investigate flow games featuring both private arcs owned by individual players and public arcs accessible cost-free to all coalitions. We explore two solution concepts within this framework: the approximate core and the nucleon. The approximate core relaxes core requirements by permitting a bounded relative payoff deviation for every coalition, and the nucleon is a multiplicative analogue of Schmeidler's nucleolus which lexicographically maximizes the vector consisting of relative payoff deviations for every coalition arranged in a non-decreasing order. By leveraging a decomposition property for paths and cycles in a flow network, we derive complete characterizations for the approximate core and demonstrate that the nucleon can be computed in polynomial time.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2023

Approximate Core Allocations for Edge Cover Games

We study the approximate core for edge cover games, which are cooperative games stemming from edge cover problems. In these games, each player controls a vertex on a network $G = (V, E; w)$, and the cost of a coalition $S\subseteq V$ is equivalent to the minimum weight of edge covers in the subgraph induced by $S$. We prove that the 3/4-core of edge cover games is always non-empty and can be computed in polynomial time by using linear program duality approach. This ratio is the best possible, as it represents the integrality gap of the natural LP for edge cover problems. Moreover, our analysis reveals that the ratio of approximate core corresponds with the length of the shortest odd cycle of underlying graphs.

math.CO↗
arXiv2021

Approximate Core Allocations for Multiple Partners Matching Games

The matching game is a cooperative game where the value of every coalition is the maximum revenue of players in the coalition can make by forming pairwise disjoint partners. The multiple partners matching game generalizes the matching game by allowing each player to have more than one possibly repeated partner. In this paper, we study profit-sharing in multiple partners matching games. A central concept for profit-sharing is the core which consists of all possible ways of distributing the profit among individual players such that the grand coalition remains intact. The core of multiple partners matching games may be empty [Deng et al., Algorithmic aspects of the core of combinatorial optimization games, Math. Oper. Res., 1999.]; even when the core is non-empty, the core membership problem is intractable in general [Biro et al., The stable fixtures problem with payments, Games Econ. Behav., 2018]. Thus we study approximate core allocations upon which a coalition may be paid less than the profit it makes by seceding from the grand coalition. We provide an LP-based mechanism guaranteeing that no coalition is paid less than $2/3$ times the profit it makes on its own. We also show that $2/3$ is the best possible factor relative to the underlying LP-relaxation. Our result generalizes the work of Vazirani [Vazirani, The general graph matching game: approximate core, arXiv, 2021] from matching games to multiple partners matching games.

cs.GT↗