arXiv subjects

Tim J. Boonen

Publications and source records attributed to Tim J. Boonen.

13 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Nash Peer-to-Peer Insurance Bargaining under Price Fairness and Coalitional Stability

We study peer-to-peer (P2P) insurance contracting between a risk-averse P2P reinsurer and multiple risk-averse peers in an asymmetric Nash-bargaining framework, where all agents seek to improve expected utility relative to their disagreement points. Consistent with the expected value premium principle, we impose a price-fairness condition requiring each peer's expected contribution to be based on a common loading applied to the peer's expected loss. To justify the bargaining formulation relative to a standard fixed-weight weighted-sum optimization problem, we provide an axiomatic characterization showing that the Nash bargaining solution satisfies properties well suited to voluntary P2P insurance contracting in small pools. We establish the existence and uniqueness of the optimal contract and derive first-order characterizations for the full-, partial-, and zero-reinsurance regimes. To address subgroup formation, we develop computationally tractable sufficient conditions that rule out viable coalitional deviations, both with and without price fairness. Our numerical study investigates the impact of price fairness and pool size on the optimal contract and agents' welfare. Price fairness reduces dispersion in risk allocations and certainty-equivalent loadings among peers. Regarding pool size, welfare need not increase monotonically, highlighting that risk-pool expansion depends not only on diversification but also on the evolution of bargaining power.

q-fin.RM↗

arXiv2026

Optimal Dividend, Reinsurance, and Capital Injection for Collaborating Business Lines under Model Uncertainty

This paper considers an insurer with two collaborating business lines that faces three critical decisions: (1) dividend payout, (2) reinsurance coverage, and (3) capital injection between the lines, in the presence of model uncertainty. The insurer considers the reference model to be an approximation of the true model, and each line has its own robustness preference. The reserve level of each line is modeled using a diffusion process. The objective is to obtain a robust strategy that maximizes the expected weighted sum of discounted dividends until the first ruin time, while incorporating a penalty term for the distortion between the reference and alternative models in the worst-case scenario. We completely solve this problem and obtain the value function and optimal (equilibrium) strategies in closed form. We show that the optimal dividend-capital injection strategy is a barrier strategy. The optimal proportion of risk ceded to the reinsurer and the deviation of the worst-case model from the reference model are decreasing with respect to the aggregate reserve level. Finally, numerical examples are presented to show the impact of the model parameters and ambiguity aversion on the optimal strategies.

math.OC↗

arXiv2026

Pareto and Bowley Reinsurance Games in Peer-to-Peer Insurance

We propose a peer-to-peer (P2P) insurance scheme comprising a risk-sharing pool and a reinsurer. A plan manager determines how risks are allocated among members and ceded to the reinsurer, while the reinsurer sets the reinsurance loading. Our work focuses on the strategic interaction between the plan manager and the reinsurer, and this focus leads to two game-theoretic contract designs: a Pareto design and a Bowley design, for which we derive closed-form optimal contracts. In the Pareto design, cooperation between the reinsurer and the plan manager leads to multiple Pareto-optimal contracts, which are further refined by introducing the notion of coalitional stability. In contrast, the Bowley design yields a unique optimal contract through a leader-follower framework, and we provide a rigorous verification of the individual rationality constraints via pointwise comparisons of payoff vectors. Comparing the two designs, we prove that the Bowley-optimal contract is never Pareto optimal and typically yields lower total welfare. In our numerical examples, the presence of reinsurance improves welfare, especially with Pareto designs and a less risk-averse reinsurer. We further analyze the impact of the single-loading restriction, which disproportionately favors members with riskier losses.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Fairness-Aware Insurance Pricing: A Multi-Objective Optimization Approach

Machine learning improves predictive accuracy in insurance pricing but exacerbates trade-offs between competing fairness criteria across different discrimination measures, challenging regulators and insurers to reconcile profitability with equitable outcomes. While existing fairness-aware models offer partial solutions under GLM and XGBoost estimation methods, they remain constrained by single-objective optimization, failing to holistically navigate a conflicting landscape of accuracy, group fairness, individual fairness, and counterfactual fairness. To address this, we propose a novel multi-objective optimization framework that jointly optimizes all four criteria via the Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II (NSGA-II), generating a diverse Pareto front of trade-off solutions. We use a specific selection mechanism to extract a premium on this front. Our results show that XGBoost outperforms GLM in accuracy but amplifies fairness disparities; the Orthogonal model excels in group fairness, while Synthetic Control leads in individual and counterfactual fairness. Our method consistently achieves a balanced compromise, outperforming single-model approaches.

q-fin.RM↗

arXiv2025

Pareto-optimal reinsurance under dependence uncertainty

This paper studies Pareto-optimal reinsurance design in a monopolistic market with multiple primary insurers and a single reinsurer, all with heterogeneous risk preferences. The risk preferences are characterized by a family of risk measures, called Range Value-at-Risk (RVaR), which includes both Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES) as special cases. Recognizing the practical difficulty of accurately estimating the dependence structure among the insurers' losses, we adopt a robust optimization approach that assumes the marginal distributions are known while leaving the dependence structure unspecified. We provide a complete characterization of optimal indemnity schedules under the worst-case scenario, showing that the infinite-dimensional optimization problem can be reduced to a tractable finite-dimensional problem involving only two or three parameters for each indemnity function. Additionally, for independent and identically distributed risks, we exploit the argument of asymptotic normality to derive optimal two-parameter layer contracts. Finally, numerical applications are considered in a two-insurer setting to illustrate the influence of the dependence structures and heterogeneous risk tolerances on optimal strategies and the corresponding risk evaluation.

q-fin.RM↗

arXiv2025

Monopoly Pricing of Weather Index Insurance

This study models the monopoly pricing of weather index insurance as a Bowley-type sequential game involving a profit-maximizing insurer (leader) and a farmer (follower). The farmer chooses an insurance payoff to minimize a convex distortion risk measure, while the insurer anticipates this best response and selects a premium principle and its parameters to maximize profit net of administrative costs. For the insurer, we adopt three different premium-principle parameterizations: (i) an expected premium with a single risk-loading factor, (ii) a two-parameter distortion premium based on a power transform, and (iii) a fully flexible pricing kernel drawn from the general Choquet integral representation with nondecreasing distortions. For the farmer, we model index payoffs using neural networks and compare solutions under fully connected architectures with those under convolutional neural networks (CNNs). We solve the game using a penalized bilevel programming algorithm that employs a function-value-gap penalty and delivers convergence guarantees without requiring the lower-level objective to be strongly convex. Based on Iowa's soybean yields and high-dimensional PRISM weather data, we find that CNN-based designs yield smoother, less noisy payoffs that reduce basis risk and push insurer profits closer to indemnity insurance levels. Moreover, expanding pricing flexibility from a single loading to a two-parameter distortion premium, and ultimately to a flexible pricing kernel, systematically increases equilibrium profits.

q-fin.RM↗

arXiv2025

Optimal Dividend, Reinsurance and Capital Injection Strategies for Collaborating Business Lines: The Case of Excess-of-Loss Reinsurance

This paper considers an insurer with two collaborating business lines that must make three critical decisions: (1) dividend payout, (2) a combination of proportional and excess-of-loss reinsurance coverage, and (3) capital injection between the lines. The reserve level of each line is modeled using a diffusion approximation, with the insurer's objective being to maximize the weighted total discounted dividends paid until the first ruin time. We obtain the value function and the optimal strategies in closed form. We then prove that the optimal dividend payout strategy for bounded dividend rates is of threshold type, while for unbounded dividend rates it is of barrier type. The optimal combination of proportional and excess-of-loss reinsurance is shown to be pure excess-of-loss reinsurance. We also show that the optimal level of risk ceded to the reinsurer decreases as the aggregate reserve level increases. The optimal capital injection strategy involves transferring reserves to prevent the ruin of one line. Finally, numerical examples are presented to illustrate these optimal strategies.

math.OC↗

arXiv2025

Optimal Dividend, Reinsurance, and Capital Injection Strategies for an Insurer with Two Collaborating Business Lines

This paper considers an insurer with two collaborating business lines, and the risk exposure of each line follows a diffusion risk model. The manager of the insurer makes three decisions for each line: (i) dividend payout, (ii) (proportional) reinsurance coverage, and (iii) capital injection (from one line into the other). The manager seeks an optimal dividend, reinsurance, and capital injection strategy to maximize the expected weighted sum of the total dividend payments until the first ruin. We completely solve this problem and obtain the value function and optimal strategies in closed form. We show that the optimal dividend strategy is a threshold strategy, and the more important line always has a lower threshold to pay dividends. The optimal proportion of risk ceded to the reinsurer is decreasing with respect to the aggregate reserve level for each line, and capital injection is only used to prevent the ruin of a business line. Finally, numerical examples are presented to illustrate the impact of model parameters on the optimal strategies.

math.OC↗

arXiv2024

Optimal Ratcheting of Dividends with Irreversible Reinsurance

This paper considers an insurance company that faces two key constraints: a ratcheting dividend constraint and an irreversible reinsurance constraint. The company allocates part of its reserve to pay dividends to its shareholders while strategically purchasing reinsurance for its claims. The ratcheting dividend constraint ensures that dividend cuts are prohibited at any time. The irreversible reinsurance constraint ensures that reinsurance contracts cannot be prematurely terminated or sold to external entities. The dividend rate and reinsurance level are modeled as nondecreasing processes, thereby satisfying the constraints. Claims are modeled using a Brownian risk model. The main objective is to maximize the cumulative expected discounted dividend payouts until the time of ruin. The reinsurance and dividend levels are restricted to a finite set. The optimal value function is shown to be the unique viscosity solution of the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. A threshold strategy is constructed and shown to be optimal. Finally, numerical examples are presented to illustrate the optimality conditions and optimal strategies.

math.OC↗

arXiv2024

Optimal insurance design with Lambda-Value-at-Risk

This paper explores optimal insurance solutions based on the Lambda-Value-at-Risk ($\Lambda\VaR$). If the expected value premium principle is used, our findings confirm that, similar to the VaR model, a truncated stop-loss indemnity is optimal in the $\Lambda\VaR$ model. We further provide a closed-form expression of the deductible parameter under certain conditions. Moreover, we study the use of a $\Lambda'\VaR$ as premium principle as well, and show that full or no insurance is optimal. Dual stop-loss is shown to be optimal if we use a $\Lambda'\VaR$ only to determine the risk-loading in the premium principle. Moreover, we study the impact of model uncertainty, considering situations where the loss distribution is unknown but falls within a defined uncertainty set. Our findings indicate that a truncated stop-loss indemnity is optimal when the uncertainty set is based on a likelihood ratio. However, when uncertainty arises from the first two moments of the loss variable, we provide the closed-form optimal deductible in a stop-loss indemnity.

q-fin.RM↗

arXiv2023

Optimal insurance with mean-deviation measures

This paper studies an optimal insurance contracting problem in which the preferences of the decision maker given by the sum of the expected loss and a convex, increasing function of a deviation measure. As for the deviation measure, our focus is on convex signed Choquet integrals (such as the Gini coefficient and a convex distortion risk measure minus the expected value) and on the standard deviation. We find that if the expected value premium principle is used, then stop-loss indemnities are optimal, and we provide a precise characterization of the corresponding deductible. Moreover, if the premium principle is based on Value-at-Risk or Expected Shortfall, then a particular layer-type indemnity is optimal, in which there is coverage for small losses up to a limit, and additionally for losses beyond another deductible. The structure of these optimal indemnities remains unchanged if there is a limit on the insurance premium budget. If the unconstrained solution is not feasible, then the deductible is increased to make the budget constraint binding. We provide several examples of these results based on the Gini coefficient and the standard deviation.

q-fin.RM↗

arXiv2020

Optimal Insurance under Maxmin Expected Utility

We examine a problem of demand for insurance indemnification, when the insured is sensitive to ambiguity and behaves according to the Maxmin-Expected Utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), whereas the insurer is a (risk-averse or risk-neutral) Expected-Utility maximizer. We characterize optimal indemnity functions both with and without the customary ex ante no-sabotage requirement on feasible indemnities, and for both concave and linear utility functions for the two agents. This allows us to provide a unifying framework in which we examine the effects of the no-sabotage condition, marginal utility of wealth, belief heterogeneity, as well as ambiguity (multiplicity of priors) on the structure of optimal indemnity functions. In particular, we show how the singularity in beliefs leads to an optimal indemnity function that involves full insurance on an event to which the insurer assigns zero probability, while the decision maker assigns a positive probability. We examine several illustrative examples, and we provide numerical studies for the case of a Wasserstein and a Renyi ambiguity set.

q-fin.RM↗

arXiv2020

Nash Equilibria in Optimal Reinsurance Bargaining

We introduce a strategic behavior in reinsurance bilateral transactions, where agents choose the risk preferences they will appear to have in the transaction. Within a wide class of risk measures, we identify agents' strategic choices to a range of risk aversion coefficients. It is shown that at the strictly beneficial Nash equilibria, agents appear homogeneous with respect to their risk preferences. While the game does not cause any loss of total welfare gain, its allocation between agents is heavily affected by the agents' strategic behavior. This allocation is reflected in the reinsurance premium, while the insurance indemnity remains the same in all strictly beneficial Nash equilibria. Furthermore, the effect of agents' bargaining power vanishes through the game procedure and the agent who gets more welfare gain is the one who has an advantage in choosing the common risk aversion at the equilibrium.

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