arXiv subjects

Tiziana Cimoli

Publications and source records attributed to Tiziana Cimoli.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2019

Dissecting Ponzi schemes on Ethereum: identification, analysis, and impact

Ponzi schemes are financial frauds which lure users under the promise of high profits. Actually, users are repaid only with the investments of new users joining the scheme: consequently, a Ponzi scheme implodes soon after users stop joining it. Originated in the offline world 150 years ago, Ponzi schemes have since then migrated to the digital world, approaching first the Web, and more recently hanging over cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin. Smart contract platforms like Ethereum have provided a new opportunity for scammers, who have now the possibility of creating "trustworthy" frauds that still make users lose money, but at least are guaranteed to execute "correctly". We present a comprehensive survey of Ponzi schemes on Ethereum, analysing their behaviour and their impact from various viewpoints.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2018

Blockchain for social good: a quantitative analysis

The rise of blockchain technologies has given a boost to social good projects, which are trying to exploit various characteristic features of blockchains: the quick and inexpensive transfer of cryptocurrency, the transparency of transactions, the ability to tokenize any kind of assets, and the increase in trustworthiness due to decentralization. However, the swift pace of innovation in blockchain technologies, and the hype that has surrounded their "disruptive potential", make it difficult to understand whether these technologies are applied correctly, and what one should expect when trying to apply them to social good projects. This paper addresses these issues, by systematically analysing a collection of 120 blockchain-enabled social good projects. Focussing on measurable and objective aspects, we try to answer various relevant questions: which features of blockchains are most commonly used? Do projects have success in fund raising? Are they making appropriate choices on the blockchain architecture? How many projects are released to the public, and how many are eventually abandoned?

cs.CY↗

arXiv2017

Timed Session Types

Timed session types formalise timed communication protocols between two participants at the endpoints of a session. They feature a decidable compliance relation, which generalises to the timed setting the progress-based compliance between untimed session types. We show a sound and complete technique to decide when a timed session type admits a compliant one. Then, we show how to construct the most precise session type compliant with a given one, according to the subtyping preorder induced by compliance. Decidability of subtyping follows from these results.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2014

A note on two notions of compliance

We establish a relation between two models of contracts: binary session types, and a model based on event structures and game-theoretic notions. In particular, we show that compliance in session types corresponds to the existence of certain winning strategies in game-based contracts.

cs.PL↗

arXiv2013

Contract agreements via logic

We relate two contract models: one based on event structures and game theory, and the other one based on logic. In particular, we show that the notions of agreement and winning strategies in the game-theoretic model are related to that of provability in the logical model.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2013

Lending Petri nets and contracts

Choreography-based approaches to service composition typically assume that, after a set of services has been found which correctly play the roles prescribed by the choreography, each service respects his role. Honest services are not protected against adversaries. We propose a model for contracts based on a extension of Petri nets, which allows services to protect themselves while still realizing the choreography. We relate this model with Propositional Contract Logic, by showing a translation of formulae into our Petri nets which preserves the logical notion of agreement, and allows for compositional verification.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2013

An event-based model for contracts

We introduce a basic model for contracts. Our model extends event structures with a new relation, which faithfully captures the circular dependencies among contract clauses. We establish whether an agreement exists which respects all the contracts at hand (i.e. all the dependencies can be resolved), and we detect the obligations of each participant. The main technical contribution is a correspondence between our model and a fragment of the contract logic PCL. More precisely, we show that the reachable events are exactly those which correspond to provable atoms in the logic. Despite of this strong correspondence, our model improves previous work on PCL by exhibiting a finer-grained notion of culpability, which takes into account the legitimate orderings of events.

cs.LO↗