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Tobias Cloosters

Publications and source records attributed to Tobias Cloosters.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

SseRex: Practical Symbolic Execution of Solana Smart Contracts

Solana is rapidly gaining traction among smart contract developers and users. However, its growing adoption has been accompanied by a series of major security incidents, which have spurred research into automated analysis techniques for Solana smart contracts. Unfortunately, existing approaches do not address the unique and complex account model of Solana. In this paper, we propose SseRex, the first symbolic execution vulnerability detection approach for finding Solana-specific bugs such as missing owner checks, missing signer checks, and missing key checks, as well as arbitrary cross-program invocations. Our evaluation of 8,714 bytecode-only contracts shows that our approach outperforms existing approaches and identifies potential bugs in 467 different contracts. Additionally, we analyzed 120 open-source Solana projects and conducted in-depth case studies on four of them. Our findings reveal that subtle, easily overlooked issues often serve as the root cause of severe exploits, further highlighting the need for specialized analysis tools like SseRex.

cs.CR↗

Defying the Odds: Solana's Unexpected Resilience in Spite of the Security Challenges Faced by Developers

Solana gained considerable attention as one of the most popular blockchain platforms for deploying decentralized applications. Compared to Ethereum, however, we observe a lack of research on how Solana smart contract developers handle security, what challenges they encounter, and how this affects the overall security of the ecosystem. To address this, we conducted the first comprehensive study on the Solana platform consisting of a 90-minute Solana smart contract code review task with 35 participants followed by interviews with a subset of seven participants. Our study shows, quite alarmingly, that none of the participants could detect all important security vulnerabilities in a code review task and that 83% of the participants are likely to release vulnerable smart contracts. Our study also sheds light on the root causes of developers' challenges with Solana smart contract development, suggesting the need for better security guidance and resources. In spite of these challenges, our automated analysis on currently deployed Solana smart contracts surprisingly suggests that the prevalence of vulnerabilities - especially those pointed out as the most challenging in our developer study - is below 0.3%. We explore the causes of this counter-intuitive resilience and show that frameworks, such as Anchor, are aiding Solana developers in deploying secure contracts.

cs.CR↗

TeeRex: Discovery and Exploitation of Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities in SGX Enclaves

Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX) introduced new instructions to switch the processor to enclave mode which protects it from introspection. While the enclave mode strongly protects the memory and the state of the processor, it cannot withstand memory corruption errors inside the enclave code. In this paper, we show that the attack surface of SGX enclaves provides new challenges for enclave developers as exploitable memory corruption vulnerabilities are easily introduced into enclave code. We develop TeeRex to automatically analyze enclave binary code for vulnerabilities introduced at the host-to-enclave boundary by means of symbolic execution. Our evaluation on public enclave binaries reveal that many of them suffer from memory corruption errors allowing an attacker to corrupt function pointers or perform arbitrary memory writes. As we will show, TeeRex features a specifically tailored framework for SGX enclaves that allows simple proof-of-concept exploit construction to assess the discovered vulnerabilities. Our findings reveal vulnerabilities in multiple enclaves, including enclaves developed by Intel, Baidu, and WolfSSL, as well as biometric fingerprint software deployed on popular laptop brands.

cs.CR↗