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Tobias Werner

Publications and source records attributed to Tobias Werner.

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The stochastic Cahn-Hilliard equation in critical spaces

We study stochastic Cahn-Hilliard equations in bounded smooth domains with a double-well potential, transport-type noise, and natural Neumann boundary conditions in dimensions $d\le 4$. By employing stochastic maximal regularity techniques and deriving suitable energy estimates, we prove local and global well-posedness. The initial data considered here are allowed to belong to the critical trace space $B^{d/q-1}_{q,p}$, which is locally invariant under the natural scaling of the Cahn-Hilliard equation. In particular, for arbitrary $\varepsilon>1/3$ one can find $q$ sufficiently large such that uniqueness and global existence of a probabilistically strong solution hold for every initial datum $u_0\in H^{\varepsilon, q}(\mathscr{O})$. If $u_0\in H^1(\mathscr{O})$, then these global solutions have $L_t^2H_x^3 \cap C_tH_x^1$-regularity on finite time intervals.

math.PR

Deceptively Framed Lotteries in Consumer Markets

Consumers often face products sold as lotteries rather than fixed outcomes. A prominent case is the loot box in video games, where players pay for randomized rewards. We investigate how presentation formats shape consumer beliefs and willingness to pay. In an online experiment with 802 participants, sellers could frame lotteries using two common manipulations: censoring outcome probabilities and selectively highlighting rare successes. More than 80\% of sellers adopted such deceptive frames, particularly when both manipulations were available. These choices substantially inflated buyer beliefs and increased willingness to pay of up to six times the expected value. Sellers anticipated this effect and raised prices accordingly. Our results show how deceptive framing systematically shifts consumer beliefs and enables firms to extract additional surplus. For marketing practice, this highlights the strategic value of framing tools in probabilistic selling models; for policy, it underscores the importance of transparency requirements in protecting consumers.

econ.GN

Recognising, Anticipating, and Mitigating LLM Pollution of Online Behavioural Research

Online behavioural research faces an emerging threat as participants increasingly turn to large language models (LLMs) for advice, translation, or task delegation: LLM Pollution. We identify three interacting variants through which LLM Pollution threatens the validity and integrity of online behavioural research. First, Partial LLM Mediation occurs when participants make selective use of LLMs for specific aspects of a task, such as translation or wording support, leading researchers to (mis)interpret LLM-shaped outputs as human ones. Second, Full LLM Delegation arises when agentic LLMs complete studies with little to no human oversight, undermining the central premise of human-subject research at a more foundational level. Third, LLM Spillover signifies human participants altering their behaviour as they begin to anticipate LLM presence in online studies, even when none are involved. While Partial Mediation and Full Delegation form a continuum of increasing automation, LLM Spillover reflects second-order reactivity effects. Together, these variants interact and generate cascading distortions that compromise sample authenticity, introduce biases that are difficult to detect post hoc, and ultimately undermine the epistemic grounding of online research on human cognition and behaviour. Crucially, the threat of LLM Pollution is already co-evolving with advances in generative AI, creating an escalating methodological arms race. To address this, we propose a multi-layered response spanning researcher practices, platform accountability, and community efforts. As the challenge evolves, coordinated adaptation will be essential to safeguard methodological integrity and preserve the validity of online behavioural research.

cs.CY

Delegate Pricing Decisions to an Algorithm? Experimental Evidence

We analyze the delegation of pricing by participants, representing firms, to a collusive, self-learning algorithm in a repeated Bertrand experiment. In the baseline treatment, participants set prices themselves. In the other treatments, participants can either delegate pricing to the algorithm at the beginning of each supergame or receive algorithmic recommendations that they can override. Participants delegate more when they can override the algorithm's decisions. In both algorithmic treatments, prices are lower than in the baseline. Our results indicate that while self-learning pricing algorithms can be collusive, they can foster competition rather than collusion with humans-in-the-loop.

econ.GN

A new sociology of humans and machines

From fake social media accounts and generative artificial intelligence chatbots to trading algorithms and self-driving vehicles, robots, bots and algorithms are proliferating and permeating our communication channels, social interactions, economic transactions and transportation arteries. Networks of multiple interdependent and interacting humans and intelligent machines constitute complex social systems for which the collective outcomes cannot be deduced from either human or machine behaviour alone. Under this paradigm, we review recent research and identify general dynamics and patterns in situations of competition, coordination, cooperation, contagion and collective decision-making, with context-rich examples from high-frequency trading markets, a social media platform, an open collaboration community and a discussion forum. To ensure more robust and resilient human-machine communities, we require a new sociology of humans and machines. Researchers should study these communities using complex system methods; engineers should explicitly design artificial intelligence for human-machine and machine-machine interactions; and regulators should govern the ecological diversity and social co-development of humans and machines.

cs.SI

The Spoils of Algorithmic Collusion: Profit Allocation Among Asymmetric Firms

We study the propensity of independent algorithms to collude in repeated Cournot duopoly games. Specifically, we investigate the predictive power of different oligopoly and bargaining solutions regarding the effect of asymmetry between firms. We find that both consumers and firms can benefit from asymmetry. Algorithms produce more competitive outcomes when firms are symmetric, but less when they are very asymmetric. Although the static Nash equilibrium underestimates the effect on total quantity and overestimates the effect on profits, it delivers surprisingly accurate predictions in terms of total welfare. The best description of our results is provided by the equal relative gains solution. In particular, we find algorithms to agree on profits that are on or close to the Pareto frontier for all degrees of asymmetry. Our results suggest that the common belief that symmetric industries are more prone to collusion may no longer hold when algorithms increasingly drive managerial decisions.

econ.GN

Experimental Evidence That Conversational Artificial Intelligence Can Steer Consumer Behavior Without Detection

Conversational AI models are becoming increasingly popular and are about to replace traditional search engines for information retrieval and product discovery. This raises concerns about monetization strategies and the potential for subtle consumer manipulation. Companies may have financial incentives to steer users toward search results or products in a conversation in ways that are unnoticeable to consumers. Using a behavioral experiment, we show that conversational AI models can indeed significantly shift consumer preferences. We discuss implications and ask whether regulators are sufficiently prepared to combat potential consumer deception.

econ.GN