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Tomislav Lipic

Publications and source records attributed to Tomislav Lipic.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Explainability in reinforcement learning: perspective and position

Artificial intelligence (AI) has been embedded into many aspects of people's daily lives and it has become normal for people to have AI make decisions for them. Reinforcement learning (RL) models increase the space of solvable problems with respect to other machine learning paradigms. Some of the most interesting applications are in situations with non-differentiable expected reward function, operating in unknown or underdefined environment, as well as for algorithmic discovery that surpasses performance of any teacher, whereby agent learns from experimental experience through simple feedback. The range of applications and their social impact is vast, just to name a few: genomics, game-playing (chess, Go, etc.), general optimization, financial investment, governmental policies, self-driving cars, recommendation systems, etc. It is therefore essential to improve the trust and transparency of RL-based systems through explanations. Most articles dealing with explainability in artificial intelligence provide methods that concern supervised learning and there are very few articles dealing with this in the area of RL. The reasons for this are the credit assignment problem, delayed rewards, and the inability to assume that data is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.). This position paper attempts to give a systematic overview of existing methods in the explainable RL area and propose a novel unified taxonomy, building and expanding on the existing ones. The position section describes pragmatic aspects of how explainability can be observed. The gap between the parties receiving and generating the explanation is especially emphasized. To reduce the gap and achieve honesty and truthfulness of explanations, we set up three pillars: proactivity, risk attitudes, and epistemological constraints. To this end, we illustrate our proposal on simple variants of the shortest path problem.

cs.AI

Social physics

Recent decades have seen a rise in the use of physics methods to study different societal phenomena. This development has been due to physicists venturing outside of their traditional domains of interest, but also due to scientists from other disciplines taking from physics the methods that have proven so successful throughout the 19th and the 20th century. Here we dub this field 'social physics' and pay our respect to intellectual mavericks who nurtured it to maturity. We do so by reviewing the current state of the art. Starting with a set of topics that are at the heart of modern human societies, we review research dedicated to urban development and traffic, the functioning of financial markets, cooperation as the basis for our evolutionary success, the structure of social networks, and the integration of intelligent machines into these networks. We then shift our attention to a set of topics that explore potential threats to society. These include criminal behaviour, large-scale migrations, epidemics, environmental challenges, and climate change. We end the coverage of each topic with promising directions for future research. Based on this, we conclude that the future for social physics is bright. Physicists studying societal phenomena are no longer a curiosity, but rather a force to be reckoned with. Notwithstanding, it remains of the utmost importance that we continue to foster constructive dialogue and mutual respect at the interfaces of different scientific disciplines.

physics.soc-ph

The cost of attack in competing networks

Real-world attacks can be interpreted as the result of competitive interactions between networks, ranging from predator-prey networks to networks of countries under economic sanctions. Although the purpose of an attack is to damage a target network, it also curtails the ability of the attacker, which must choose the duration and magnitude of an attack to avoid negative impacts on its own functioning. Nevertheless, despite the large number of studies on interconnected networks, the consequences of initiating an attack have never been studied. Here, we address this issue by introducing a model of network competition where a resilient network is willing to partially weaken its own resilience in order to more severely damage a less resilient competitor. The attacking network can take over the competitor nodes after their long inactivity. However, due to a feedback mechanism the takeovers weaken the resilience of the attacking network. We define a conservation law that relates the feedback mechanism to the resilience dynamics for two competing networks. Within this formalism, we determine the cost and optimal duration of an attack, allowing a network to evaluate the risk of initiating hostilities.

cs.SI