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Tommaso Toso

Publications and source records attributed to Tommaso Toso.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

On the impact of coordinated fleets size on traffic efficiency

We investigate a traffic assignment problem on a transportation network, considering both the demands of individual drivers and of a large fleet controlled by a central operator (minimizing the fleet's average travel time). We formulate this problem as a two-player convex game and we study how the size of the coordinated fleet, measured in terms of share of the total demand, influences the Price of Anarchy (PoA). We show that, for two-terminal networks, there are cases in which the fleet must reach a minimum share before actually affecting the PoA, which otherwise remains unchanged. Moreover, for parallel networks we prove that, under suitable assumptions, the PoA is monotonically non-increasing in the fleet share.

cs.GT

Potential detrimental effects of real-time route recommendations in traffic networks

Navigation apps have become pervasive in providing real-time route recommendations to travelers willing to minimize their travel times. However, such technologies introduce new complexities, raising concerns about their overall impact on traffic networks. This paper focuses on evaluating the effect of navigation apps on traffic flows, particularly examining how real-time route recommendations influence network efficiency and congestion. Using a dynamical network flow model, we study traffic dynamics between an origin-destination pair, where a fraction of drivers follow app recommendations while others rely on fixed route preferences. By incorporating supply-demand mechanisms to account for capacity and volume constraints on routes, we uncover partial demand transfer, i.e., only a portion of the traffic demand is able to traverse the network, while the rest builds up congestion at the origin. We prove that the dynamics converges to a globally stable equilibrium and we provide a detailed analysis of this equilibrium when the choices of the informed drivers follow a logit model, correlating the emergence of partial demand transfer to the penetration rate of navigation apps among users.

eess.SY

Selfish routing on transportation networks with supply and demand constraints

Traditional non-atomic selfish routing games present some limitations in properly modeling road traffic. This paper introduces a novel type of non-atomic selfish routing game leveraging concepts from Daganzo's cell transmission model (CTM). Each network link is characterized by a supply and demand mechanism that enforces capacity constraints based on current density, providing a more accurate representation of real-world traffic phenomena. We characterize the Wardrop equilibria and social optima of this game and identify a previously unrecognized inefficiency in selfish routing: partially transferring Wardrop equilibria, where only part of the exogenous flow traverses the network.

math.OC

Stability and bifurcations in transportation networks with heterogeneous users

A critical aspect in strategic modeling of transportation systems is user heterogeneity. In many real-world scenarios, e.g., when tolls are charged and drivers have different trade-offs between time and money, or when they get informed about current congestion by different routing apps, modeling users as rational decision makers with homogeneous utility functions becomes too restrictive. While global asymptotic stability of user equilibria in homogeneous routing games is known to hold for a broad class of evolutionary dynamics, the stability analysis of user equilibria in heterogeneous routing games is a largely open problem. In this work we study the logit dynamics in heterogeneous routing games on arbitrary network topologies. We show that the dynamics may exhibit bifurcations as the noise level of the dynamics varies, and provide sufficient conditions for asymptotic stability of user equilibria.

cs.GT