Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Tomoyuki Morimae

Publications and source records attributed to Tomoyuki Morimae.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Quantum Public-Key Encryption with Tamper-Resilient Public Keys from One-Way Functions

We construct quantum public-key encryption from one-way functions. In our construction, public keys are quantum, but ciphertexts are classical. Quantum public-key encryption from one-way functions (or weaker primitives such as pseudorandom function-like states) are also proposed in some recent works [Morimae-Yamakawa, eprint:2022/1336; Coladangelo, eprint:2023/282; Barooti-Grilo-Malavolta-Sattath-Vu-Walter, eprint:2023/877]. However, they have a huge drawback: they are secure only when quantum public keys can be transmitted to the sender (who runs the encryption algorithm) without being tampered with by the adversary, which seems to require unsatisfactory physical setup assumptions such as secure quantum channels. Our construction is free from such a drawback: it guarantees the secrecy of the encrypted messages even if we assume only unauthenticated quantum channels. Thus, the encryption is done with adversarially tampered quantum public keys. Our construction is the first quantum public-key encryption that achieves the goal of classical public-key encryption, namely, to establish secure communication over insecure channels, based only on one-way functions. Moreover, we show a generic compiler to upgrade security against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA security) into security against chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA security) only using one-way functions. As a result, we obtain CCA secure quantum public-key encryption based only on one-way functions.

quant-ph↗

Quantum Advantage from One-Way Functions

We demonstrate quantum advantage with several basic assumptions, specifically based on only the existence of OWFs. We introduce inefficient-verifier proofs of quantumness (IV-PoQ), and construct it from classical bit commitments. IV-PoQ is an interactive protocol between a verifier and a quantum prover consisting of two phases. In the first phase, the verifier is probabilistic polynomial-time, and it interacts with the prover. In the second phase, the verifier becomes inefficient, and makes its decision based on the transcript of the first phase. If the prover is honest, the inefficient verifier accepts with high probability, but any classical malicious prover only has a small probability of being accepted by the inefficient verifier. Our construction demonstrates the following results: (1)If one-way functions exist, then IV-PoQ exist. (2)If distributional collision-resistant hash functions exist (which exist if hard-on-average problems in $\mathbf{SZK}$ exist), then constant-round IV-PoQ exist. We also demonstrate quantum advantage based on worst-case-hard assumptions. We define auxiliary-input IV-PoQ (AI-IV-PoQ) that only require that for any malicious prover, there exist infinitely many auxiliary inputs under which the prover cannot cheat. We construct AI-IV-PoQ from an auxiliary-input version of commitments in a similar way, showing that (1)If auxiliary-input one-way functions exist (which exist if $\mathbf{CZK}\not\subseteq\mathbf{BPP}$), then AI-IV-PoQ exist. (2)If auxiliary-input collision-resistant hash functions exist (which is equivalent to $\mathbf{PWPP}\nsubseteq \mathbf{FBPP}$) or $\mathbf{SZK}\nsubseteq \mathbf{BPP}$, then constant-round AI-IV-PoQ exist.

quant-ph↗

Certified Everlasting Secure Collusion-Resistant Functional Encryption, and More

We study certified everlasting secure functional encryption (FE) and many other cryptographic primitives in this work. Certified everlasting security roughly means the following. A receiver possessing a quantum cryptographic object can issue a certificate showing that the receiver has deleted the cryptographic object and information included in the object was lost. If the certificate is valid, the security is guaranteed even if the receiver becomes computationally unbounded after the deletion. Many cryptographic primitives are known to be impossible (or unlikely) to have information-theoretical security even in the quantum world. Hence, certified everlasting security is a nice compromise (intrinsic to quantum). In this work, we define certified everlasting secure versions of FE, compute-and-compare obfuscation, predicate encryption (PE), secret-key encryption (SKE), public-key encryption (PKE), receiver non-committing encryption (RNCE), and garbled circuits. We also present the following constructions: - Adaptively certified everlasting secure collusion-resistant public-key FE for all polynomial-size circuits from indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions. - Adaptively certified everlasting secure bounded collusion-resistant public-key FE for NC1 circuits from standard PKE. - Certified everlasting secure compute-and-compare obfuscation from standard fully homomorphic encryption and standard compute-and-compare obfuscation - Adaptively (resp., selectively) certified everlasting secure PE from standard adaptively (resp., selectively) secure attribute-based encryption and certified everlasting secure compute-and-compare obfuscation. - Certified everlasting secure SKE and PKE from standard SKE and PKE, respectively. - Certified everlasting secure RNCE from standard PKE. - Certified everlasting secure garbled circuits from standard SKE.

quant-ph↗

One-Wayness in Quantum Cryptography

The existence of one-way functions is one of the most fundamental assumptions in classical cryptography. In the quantum world, on the other hand, there are evidences that some cryptographic primitives can exist even if one-way functions do not exist. We therefore have the following important open problem in quantum cryptography: What is the most fundamental element in quantum cryptography? In this direction, Brakerski, Canetti, and Qian recently defined a notion called EFI pairs, which are pairs of efficiently generatable states that are statistically distinguishable but computationally indistinguishable, and showed its equivalence with some cryptographic primitives including commitments, oblivious transfer, and general multi-party computations. However, their work focuses on decision-type primitives and does not cover search-type primitives like quantum money and digital signatures. In this paper, we study properties of one-way state generators (OWSGs), which are a quantum analogue of one-way functions. We first revisit the definition of OWSGs and generalize it by allowing mixed output states. Then we show the following results. (1) We define a weaker version of OWSGs, weak OWSGs, and show that they are equivalent to OWSGs. (2) Quantum digital signatures are equivalent to OWSGs. (3) Private-key quantum money schemes (with pure money states) imply OWSGs. (4) Quantum pseudo one-time pad schemes imply both OWSGs and EFI pairs. (5) We introduce an incomparable variant of OWSGs, which we call secretly-verifiable and statistically-invertible OWSGs, and show that they are equivalent to EFI pairs.

quant-ph↗

Quantum Unpredictability

Unpredictable functions (UPFs) play essential roles in classical cryptography, including message authentication codes (MACs) and digital signatures. In this paper, we introduce a quantum analog of UPFs, which we call unpredictable state generators (UPSGs). UPSGs are implied by pseudorandom function-like states generators (PRFSs), which are a quantum analog of pseudorandom functions (PRFs), and therefore UPSGs could exist even if one-way functions do not exist, similar to other recently introduced primitives like pseudorandom state generators (PRSGs), one-way state generators (OWSGs), and EFIs. In classical cryptography, UPFs are equivalent to PRFs, but in the quantum case, the equivalence is not clear, and UPSGs could be weaker than PRFSs. Despite this, we demonstrate that all known applications of PRFSs are also achievable with UPSGs. They include IND-CPA-secure secret-key encryption and EUF-CMA-secure MACs with unclonable tags. Our findings suggest that, for many applications, quantum unpredictability, rather than quantum pseudorandomness, is sufficient.

quant-ph↗

Exponential Quantum One-Wayness and EFI Pairs

In classical cryptography, one-way functions are widely considered to be the minimal computational assumption. However, when taking quantum information into account, the situation is more nuanced. There are currently two major candidates for the minimal assumption: the search quantum generalization of one-way functions are one-way state generators (OWSG), whereas the decisional variant are EFI pairs. A well-known open problem in quantum cryptography is to understand how these two primitives are related. A recent breakthrough result of Khurana and Tomer (STOC'24) shows that OWSGs imply EFI pairs, for the restricted case of pure states. In this work, we make progress towards understanding the general case. To this end, we define the notion of inefficiently-verifiable one-way state generators (IV-OWSGs), where the verification algorithm is not required to be efficient, and show that these are precisely equivalent to EFI pairs, with an exponential loss in the reduction. Significantly, this equivalence holds also for mixed states. Thus our work establishes the following relations among these fundamental primitives of quantum cryptography: (mixed) OWSGs => (mixed) IV-OWSGs $\equiv_{\rm exp}$ EFI pairs, where $\equiv_{\rm exp}$ denotes equivalence up to exponential security of the primitives.

quant-ph↗

Improved Hardness Results for the Guided Local Hamiltonian Problem

Estimating the ground state energy of a local Hamiltonian is a central problem in quantum chemistry. In order to further investigate its complexity and the potential of quantum algorithms for quantum chemistry, Gharibian and Le Gall (STOC 2022) recently introduced the guided local Hamiltonian problem (GLH), which is a variant of the local Hamiltonian problem where an approximation of a ground state (which is called a guiding state) is given as an additional input. Gharibian and Le Gall showed quantum advantage (more precisely, BQP-completeness) for GLH with $6$-local Hamiltonians when the guiding state has fidelity (inverse-polynomially) close to $1/2$ with a ground state. In this paper, we optimally improve both the locality and the fidelity parameter: we show that the BQP-completeness persists even with 2-local Hamiltonians, and even when the guiding state has fidelity (inverse-polynomially) close to 1 with a ground state. Moreover, we show that the BQP-completeness also holds for 2-local physically motivated Hamiltonians on a 2D square lattice or a 2D triangular lattice. Beyond the hardness of estimating the ground state energy, we also show BQP-hardness persists when considering estimating energies of excited states of these Hamiltonians instead. Those make further steps towards establishing practical quantum advantage in quantum chemistry.

quant-ph↗

Revocable Quantum Digital Signatures

We study digital signatures with revocation capabilities and show two results. First, we define and construct digital signatures with revocable signing keys from the LWE assumption. In this primitive, the signing key is a quantum state which enables a user to sign many messages and yet, the quantum key is also revocable, i.e., it can be collapsed into a classical certificate which can later be verified. Once the key is successfully revoked, we require that the initial recipient of the key loses the ability to sign. We construct digital signatures with revocable signing keys from a newly introduced primitive which we call two-tier one-shot signatures, which may be of independent interest. This is a variant of one-shot signatures, where the verification of a signature for the message ``0'' is done publicly, whereas the verification for the message ``1'' is done in private. We give a construction of two-tier one-shot signatures from the LWE assumption. As a complementary result, we also construct digital signatures with quantum revocation from group actions, where the quantum signing key is simply ``returned'' and then verified as part of revocation. Second, we define and construct digital signatures with revocable signatures from OWFs. In this primitive, the signer can produce quantum signatures which can later be revoked. Here, the security property requires that, once revocation is successful, the initial recipient of the signature loses the ability to find accepting inputs to the signature verification algorithm. We construct this primitive using a newly introduced two-tier variant of tokenized signatures. For the construction, we show a new lemma which we call the adaptive hardcore bit property for OWFs, which may enable further applications.

quant-ph↗

From the Hardness of Detecting Superpositions to Cryptography: Quantum Public Key Encryption and Commitments

Recently, Aaronson et al. (arXiv:2009.07450) showed that detecting interference between two orthogonal states is as hard as swapping these states. While their original motivation was from quantum gravity, we show its applications in quantum cryptography. 1. We construct the first public key encryption scheme from cryptographic \emph{non-abelian} group actions. Interestingly, the ciphertexts of our scheme are quantum even if messages are classical. This resolves an open question posed by Ji et al. (TCC '19). We construct the scheme through a new abstraction called swap-trapdoor function pairs, which may be of independent interest. 2. We give a simple and efficient compiler that converts the flavor of quantum bit commitments. More precisely, for any prefix X,Y $\in$ {computationally,statistically,perfectly}, if the base scheme is X-hiding and Y-binding, then the resulting scheme is Y-hiding and X-binding. Our compiler calls the base scheme only once. Previously, all known compilers call the base schemes polynomially many times (Crépeau et al., Eurocrypt '01 and Yan, Asiacrypt '22). For the security proof of the conversion, we generalize the result of Aaronson et al. by considering quantum auxiliary inputs.

quant-ph↗

Classically Verifiable NIZK for QMA with Preprocessing

We propose three constructions of classically verifiable non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs and arguments (CV-NIZK) for QMA in various preprocessing models. - We construct a CV-NIZK for QMA in the quantum secret parameter model where a trusted setup sends a quantum proving key to the prover and a classical verification key to the verifier. It is information theoretically sound and zero-knowledge. - Assuming the quantum hardness of the learning with errors problem, we construct a CV-NIZK for QMA in a model where a trusted party generates a CRS and the verifier sends an instance-independent quantum message to the prover as preprocessing. This model is the same as one considered in the recent work by Coladangelo, Vidick, and Zhang (CRYPTO '20). Our construction has the so-called dual-mode property, which means that there are two computationally indistinguishable modes of generating CRS, and we have information theoretical soundness in one mode and information theoretical zero-knowledge property in the other. This answers an open problem left by Coladangelo et al, which is to achieve either of soundness or zero-knowledge information theoretically. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first dual-mode NIZK for QMA in any kind of model. - We construct a CV-NIZK for QMA with quantum preprocessing in the quantum random oracle model. This quantum preprocessing is the one where the verifier sends a random Pauli-basis states to the prover. Our construction uses the Fiat-Shamir transformation. The quantum preprocessing can be replaced with the setup that distributes Bell pairs among the prover and the verifier, and therefore we solve the open problem by Broadbent and Grilo (FOCS '20) about the possibility of NIZK for QMA in the shared Bell pair model via the Fiat-Shamir transformation.

quant-ph↗

Proofs of Quantumness from Trapdoor Permutations

Assume that Alice can do only classical probabilistic polynomial-time computing while Bob can do quantum polynomial-time computing. Alice and Bob communicate over only classical channels, and finally Bob gets a state $|x_0\rangle+|x_1\rangle$ with some bit strings $x_0$ and $x_1$. Is it possible that Alice can know $\{x_0,x_1\}$ but Bob cannot? Such a task, called {\it remote state preparations}, is indeed possible under some complexity assumptions, and is bases of many quantum cryptographic primitives such as proofs of quantumness, (classical-client) blind quantum computing, (classical) verifications of quantum computing, and quantum money. A typical technique to realize remote state preparations is to use 2-to-1 trapdoor collision resistant hash functions: Alice sends a 2-to-1 trapdoor collision resistant hash function $f$ to Bob, and Bob evaluates it on superposition and measures the image. Bob's post-measurement state is $|x_0\rangle+|x_1\rangle$, where $f(x_0)=f(x_1)=y$. With the trapdoor, Alice can learn $\{x_0,x_1\}$, but due to the collision resistance, Bob cannot. This Alice's advantage can be leveraged to realize the quantum cryptographic primitives listed above. It seems that the collision resistance is essential here. In this paper, surprisingly, we show that the collision resistance is not necessary for a restricted case: we show that (non-verifiable) remote state preparations of $|x_0\rangle+|x_1\rangle$ secure against {\it classical} probabilistic polynomial-time Bob can be constructed from classically-secure (full-domain) trapdoor permutations. Trapdoor permutations are not likely to imply the collision resistance, because black-box reductions from collision-resistant hash functions to trapdoor permutations are known to be impossible. As an application of our result, we construct proofs of quantumness from classically-secure (full-domain) trapdoor permutations.

quant-ph↗

Certified Everlasting Functional Encryption

Computational security in cryptography has a risk that computational assumptions underlying the security are broken in the future. One solution is to construct information-theoretically-secure protocols, but many cryptographic primitives are known to be impossible (or unlikely) to have information-theoretical security even in the quantum world. A nice compromise (intrinsic to quantum) is certified everlasting security, which roughly means the following. A receiver with possession of quantum encrypted data can issue a certificate that shows that the receiver has deleted the encrypted data. If the certificate is valid, the security is guaranteed even if the receiver becomes computationally unbounded. Although several cryptographic primitives, such as commitments and zero-knowledge, have been made certified everlasting secure, there are many other important primitives that are not known to be certified everlasting secure. In this paper, we introduce certified everlasting FE. In this primitive, the receiver with the ciphertext of a message m and the functional decryption key of a function f can obtain f(m) and nothing else. The security holds even if the adversary becomes computationally unbounded after issuing a valid certificate. We, first, construct certified everlasting FE for P/poly circuits where only a single key query is allowed for the adversary. We, then, extend it to q-bounded one for NC1 circuits where q-bounded means that q key queries are allowed for the adversary with an a priori bounded polynomial q. For the construction of certified everlasting FE, we introduce and construct certified everlasting versions of secret-key encryption, public-key encryption, receiver non-committing encryption, and a garbling scheme, which are of independent interest.

cs.CR↗

Sumcheck-based delegation of quantum computing to rational server

Delegated quantum computing enables a client with weak computational power to delegate quantum computing to a remote quantum server in such a way that the integrity of the server can be efficiently verified by the client. Recently, a new model of delegated quantum computing has been proposed, namely, rational delegated quantum computing. In this model, after the client interacts with the server, the client pays a reward to the server. The rational server sends messages that maximize the expected value of the reward. It is known that the classical client can delegate universal quantum computing to the rational quantum server in one round. In this paper, we propose novel one-round rational delegated quantum computing protocols by generalizing the classical rational sumcheck protocol. The construction of the previous rational protocols depends on gate sets, while our sumcheck technique can be easily realized with any local gate set. Furthermore, as with the previous protocols, our reward function satisfies natural requirements. We also discuss the reward gap. Simply speaking, the reward gap is a minimum loss on the expected value of the server's reward incurred by the server's behavior that makes the client accept an incorrect answer. Although our sumcheck-based protocols have only exponentially small reward gaps as in the previous protocols, we show that a constant reward gap can be achieved if two noncommunicating but entangled rational servers are allowed. We also discuss whether a single rational server is sufficient under the (widely believed) assumption that the learning-with-errors problem is hard for polynomial-time quantum computing. Apart from these results, we show, under a certain condition, the equivalence between $rational$ and $ordinary$ delegated quantum computing protocols. This equivalence then serves as a basis for a reward-gap amplification method.

quant-ph↗

Divide-and-conquer verification method for noisy intermediate-scale quantum computation

Several noisy intermediate-scale quantum computations can be regarded as logarithmic-depth quantum circuits on a sparse quantum computing chip, where two-qubit gates can be directly applied on only some pairs of qubits. In this paper, we propose a method to efficiently verify such noisy intermediate-scale quantum computation. To this end, we first characterize small-scale quantum operations with respect to the diamond norm. Then by using these characterized quantum operations, we estimate the fidelity $\langleψ_t|\hatρ_{\rm out}|ψ_t\rangle$ between an actual $n$-qubit output state $\hatρ_{\rm out}$ obtained from the noisy intermediate-scale quantum computation and the ideal output state (i.e., the target state) $|ψ_t\rangle$. Although the direct fidelity estimation method requires $O(2^n)$ copies of $\hatρ_{\rm out}$ on average, our method requires only $O(D^32^{12D})$ copies even in the worst case, where $D$ is the denseness of $|ψ_t\rangle$. For logarithmic-depth quantum circuits on a sparse chip, $D$ is at most $O(\log{n})$, and thus $O(D^32^{12D})$ is a polynomial in $n$. By using the IBM Manila 5-qubit chip, we also perform a proof-of-principle experiment to observe the practical performance of our method.

quant-ph↗

Quantum commitments and signatures without one-way functions

In the classical world, the existence of commitments is equivalent to the existence of one-way functions. In the quantum setting, on the other hand, commitments are not known to imply one-way functions, but all known constructions of quantum commitments use at least one-way functions. Are one-way functions really necessary for commitments in the quantum world? In this work, we show that non-interactive quantum commitments (for classical messages) with computational hiding and statistical binding exist if pseudorandom quantum states exist. Pseudorandom quantum states are sets of quantum states that are efficiently generated but their polynomially many copies are computationally indistinguishable from the same number of copies of Haar random states [Ji, Liu, and Song, CRYPTO 2018]. It is known that pseudorandom quantum states exist even if $\BQP=\QMA$ (relative to a quantum oracle) [Kretschmer, TQC 2021], which means that pseudorandom quantum states can exist even if no quantum-secure classical cryptographic primitive exists. Our result therefore shows that quantum commitments can exist even if no quantum-secure classical cryptographic primitive exists. In particular, quantum commitments can exist even if no quantum-secure one-way function exists. In this work, we also consider digital signatures, which are other fundamental primitives in cryptography. We show that one-time secure digital signatures with quantum public keys exist if pseudorandom quantum states exist. In the classical setting, the existence of digital signatures is equivalent to the existence of one-way functions. Our result, on the other hand, shows that quantum signatures can exist even if no quantum-secure classical cryptographic primitive (including quantum-secure one-way functions) exists.

quant-ph↗

Quantum randomized encoding, verification of quantum computing, no-cloning, and blind quantum computing

Randomized encoding is a powerful cryptographic primitive with various applications such as secure multiparty computation, verifiable computation, parallel cryptography, and complexity lower-bounds. Intuitively, randomized encoding $\hat{f}$ of a function $f$ is another function such that $f(x)$ can be recovered from $\hat{f}(x)$, and nothing except for $f(x)$ is leaked from $\hat{f}(x)$. Its quantum version, quantum randomized encoding, has been introduced recently [Brakerski and Yuen, arXiv:2006.01085]. Intuitively, quantum randomized encoding $\hat{F}$ of a quantum operation $F$ is another quantum operation such that, for any quantum state $ρ$, $F(ρ)$ can be recovered from $\hat{F}(ρ)$, and nothing except for $F(ρ)$ is leaked from $\hat{F}(ρ)$. In this paper, we show that if quantum randomized encoding of BB84 state generations is possible with an encoding operation $E$, then a two-round verification of quantum computing is possible with a classical verifier who can additionally do the operation $E$. One of the most important goals in the field of the verification of quantum computing is to construct a verification protocol with a verifier as classical as possible. This result therefore demonstrates a potential application of quantum randomized encoding to the verification of quantum computing: if we can find a good quantum randomized encoding (in terms of the encoding complexity), then we can construct a good verification protocol of quantum computing. We, however, also show that too good quantum randomized encoding is impossible: if quantum randomized encoding with a classical encoding operation is possible, then the no-cloning is violated. We finally consider a natural modification of blind quantum computing protocols in such a way that the server gets the output like quantum randomized encoding. We show that the modified protocol is not secure.

quant-ph↗

Certified Everlasting Zero-Knowledge Proof for QMA

In known constructions of classical zero-knowledge protocols for NP, either of zero-knowledge or soundness holds only against computationally bounded adversaries. Indeed, achieving both statistical zero-knowledge and statistical soundness at the same time with classical verifier is impossible for NP unless the polynomial-time hierarchy collapses, and it is also believed to be impossible even with a quantum verifier. In this work, we introduce a novel compromise, which we call the certified everlasting zero-knowledge proof for QMA. It is a computational zero-knowledge proof for QMA, but the verifier issues a classical certificate that shows that the verifier has deleted its quantum information. If the certificate is valid, even unbounded malicious verifier can no longer learn anything beyond the validity of the statement. We construct a certified everlasting zero-knowledge proof for QMA. For the construction, we introduce a new quantum cryptographic primitive, which we call commitment with statistical binding and certified everlasting hiding, where the hiding property becomes statistical once the receiver has issued a valid certificate that shows that the receiver has deleted the committed information. We construct commitment with statistical binding and certified everlasting hiding from quantum encryption with certified deletion by Broadbent and Islam [TCC 2020] (in a black box way), and then combine it with the quantum sigma-protocol for QMA by Broadbent and Grilo [FOCS 2020] to construct the certified everlasting zero-knowledge proof for QMA. Our constructions are secure in the quantum random oracle model. Commitment with statistical binding and certified everlasting hiding itself is of independent interest, and there will be many other useful applications beyond zero-knowledge.

quant-ph↗

Quantum Encryption with Certified Deletion, Revisited: Public Key, Attribute-Based, and Classical Communication

Broadbent and Islam (TCC '20) proposed a quantum cryptographic primitive called quantum encryption with certified deletion. In this primitive, a receiver in possession of a quantum ciphertext can generate a classical certificate that the encrypted message is deleted. Although their construction is information-theoretically secure, it is limited to the setting of one-time symmetric key encryption (SKE), where a sender and receiver have to share a common key in advance and the key can be used only once. Moreover, the sender has to generate a quantum state and send it to the receiver over a quantum channel in their construction. Although deletion certificates are privately verifiable, which means a verification key for a certificate has to be kept secret, in the definition by Broadbent and Islam, we can also consider public verifiability. In this work, we present various constructions of encryption with certified deletion. - Quantum communication case: We achieve (reusable-key) public key encryption (PKE) and attribute-based encryption (ABE) with certified deletion. Our PKE scheme with certified deletion is constructed assuming the existence of IND-CPA secure PKE, and our ABE scheme with certified deletion is constructed assuming the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way function. These two schemes are privately verifiable. - Classical communication case: We also achieve PKE with certified deletion that uses only classical communication. We give two schemes, a privately verifiable one and a publicly verifiable one. The former is constructed assuming the LWE assumption in the quantum random oracle model. The latter is constructed assuming the existence of one-shot signatures and extractable witness encryption.

quant-ph↗