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Tongchang Han

Publications and source records attributed to Tongchang Han.

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EnzyPGM: Pocket-conditioned Generative Model for Substrate-specific Enzyme Design

Designing enzymes with substrate-binding pockets is a critical challenge in protein engineering, as catalytic activity depends on the precise interaction between pockets and substrates. Currently, generative models dominate functional protein design but cannot model pocket-substrate interactions, which limits the generation of enzymes with precise catalytic environments. To address this issue, we propose EnzyPGM, a unified framework that jointly generates enzymes and substrate-binding pockets conditioned on functional priors and substrates, with a particular focus on learning accurate pocket-substrate interactions. At its core, EnzyPGM includes two main modules: a Residue-atom Bi-scale Attention (RBA) that jointly models intra-residue dependencies and fine-grained interactions between pocket residues and substrate atoms, and a Residue Function Fusion (RFF) that incorporates enzyme function priors into residue representations. Also, we curate EnzyPock, an enzyme-pocket dataset comprising 83,062 enzyme-substrate pairs across 1,036 four-level enzyme families. Extensive experiments demonstrate that EnzyPGM achieves state-of-the-art performance on EnzyPock. Notably, EnzyPGM reduces the average binding energy of 0.47 kcal/mol over EnzyGen, showing its superior performance on substrate-specific enzyme design. The code and dataset will be released later.

q-bio.BM

E-SAGE: Explainability-based Defense Against Backdoor Attacks on Graph Neural Networks

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have recently been widely adopted in multiple domains. Yet, they are notably vulnerable to adversarial and backdoor attacks. In particular, backdoor attacks based on subgraph insertion have been shown to be effective in graph classification tasks while being stealthy, successfully circumventing various existing defense methods. In this paper, we propose E-SAGE, a novel approach to defending GNN backdoor attacks based on explainability. We find that the malicious edges and benign edges have significant differences in the importance scores for explainability evaluation. Accordingly, E-SAGE adaptively applies an iterative edge pruning process on the graph based on the edge scores. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate the effectiveness of E-SAGE against state-of-the-art graph backdoor attacks in different attack settings. In addition, we investigate the effectiveness of E-SAGE against adversarial attacks.

cs.CR