Identification in Auctions with Truncated Transaction Prices
I establish nonparametric identification results in first- and second-price auctions when transaction prices are truncated by a binding reserve price under a range of information structures. When the number of potential bidders is fixed and known across all auctions, if only the transaction price is observed, the bidders' private-value distribution is identified in second-price auctions but not in first-price auctions. Identification in first-price auctions can be achieved if either the number of active bidders or the number of auctions with no sales is observed. When the number of potential bidders varies across auctions and is unknown, the bidders' private-value distribution is identified in first-price auctions but not in second-price auctions, provided that both the transaction price and the number of active bidders are observed. I derive analogous results to auctions with entry costs, which face a similar truncation issue when data on potential bidders who do not enter are missing.