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Tonia Haikal

Publications and source records attributed to Tonia Haikal.

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Bridging High-Level Intent and Network Execution: Detecting Violations and Intent Drift Through Low-Level Traffic Analysis

Intent-Based Networking (IBN) structures a core management pillar for autonomous 6G networks by translating high-level administrative goals into autonomous configurations, yet a critical validation gap persists between declarative intent and data-plane execution. This paper investigates this gap by formalizing low-level flow headers into standardized 7-tuple vectors, establishing an Internal Low-Level Intent (ILI) telemetry interface. Leveraging an empirical dataset of 100.91 million flow records from a distributed honeynet, we evaluate three administrative policy regimes (Strict, Balanced, and Permissive) across two metrics: Policy Violations ($V$) and Intent Drift ($D$). Our results expose a distinct Compliance Paradox where widening policy permissiveness systematically suppresses violation counts, yet underlying operational intent drift remains mostly invariant. This demonstrates that conventional, violation-centric tracking are unreliable. Furthermore, an empirical case study show that ILI metrics structural violations can inform closed-loop orchestrators to dynamically recalculate and enforce low-level rules that maintain high-level operational intent.

cs.NI

Characterizing Large-Scale Adversarial Activities Through Large-Scale Honey-Nets

The increasing sophistication of cyber threats demands novel approaches to characterize adversarial strategies, particularly those targeting critical infrastructure and IoT ecosystems. This paper presents a longitudinal analysis of attacker behavior using HoneyTrap, an adaptive honeypot framework deployed across geographically distributed nodes to emulate vulnerable services and safely capture malicious traffic. Over a 24 day observation window, more than 60.3 million events were collected. To enable scalable analytics, raw JSON logs were transformed into Apache Parquet, achieving 5.8 - 9.3x compression and 7.2x faster queries, while ASN enrichment and salted SHA-256 pseudonymization added network intelligence and privacy preservation. Our analysis reveals three key findings: (1) The majority of traffic targeted HTTP and HTTPS services (ports 80 and 443), with more than 8 million connection attempts and daily peaks exceeding 1.7 million events. (2) SSH (port 22) was frequently subject to brute-force attacks, with over 4.6 million attempts. (3) Less common services like Minecraft (25565) and SMB (445) were also targeted, with Minecraft receiving about 118,000 daily attempts that often coincided with spikes on other ports.

cs.CR