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Tri-Dung Nguyen

Publications and source records attributed to Tri-Dung Nguyen.

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Faster than Fast-LTS: Robust Regression and Outlier Detection with DC Programming

When datasets contain outliers, robust regression is a well-established alternative to Ordinary Least Squares. A commonly employed robust estimator is Least Trimmed Squares (LTS), which computes the regression coefficients from a subset of observations. Determining the exact solution corresponds to a combinatorial problem with prohibitive computational costs, even for instances of moderate dimension. Thus, the most prevalent approach in practice remains a heuristic known as Fast-LTS. Although the heuristic often performs effectively, certain elements of the approach remain open to improvement. In particular, its core procedure provides robust results only when initialized with a large number of starting points. To address the heuristic's limitations, this paper reformulates the LTS problem as a concave minimization problem subject to a capped simplex constraint, and proposes the successive Boosted Difference of Convex Functions Algorithm (sBDCA) as a solution method. Theoretically, we establish via the \L ojasiewicz property that sBDCA converges to a local solution with a linear rate in the fastest case. To ensure robustness from a single initialization in practice, we derive and integrate a problem-specific preconditioning matrix into the algorithmic setup. Building on this theoretical foundation, we conduct numerical studies on various synthetic and real-world datasets to demonstrate the effectiveness of sBDCA with preconditioning. Specifically, we show that our approach is up to 3.25 times faster than Fast-LTS and achieves up to 90% lower objective function values, particularly in high-dimensional settings. As all code is openly available, this paper further provides a practical guide to robust regression in Python.

math.OC

Last Round Convergence and No-Instant Regret in Repeated Games with Asymmetric Information

This paper considers repeated games in which one player has more information about the game than the other players. In particular, we investigate repeated two-player zero-sum games where only the column player knows the payoff matrix A of the game. Suppose that while repeatedly playing this game, the row player chooses her strategy at each round by using a no-regret algorithm to minimize her (pseudo) regret. We develop a no-instant-regret algorithm for the column player to exhibit last round convergence to a minimax equilibrium. We show that our algorithm is efficient against a large set of popular no-regret algorithms of the row player, including the multiplicative weight update algorithm, the online mirror descent method/follow-the-regularized-leader, the linear multiplicative weight update algorithm, and the optimistic multiplicative weight update.

cs.GT

Achieving Better Regret against Strategic Adversaries

We study online learning problems in which the learner has extra knowledge about the adversary's behaviour, i.e., in game-theoretic settings where opponents typically follow some no-external regret learning algorithms. Under this assumption, we propose two new online learning algorithms, Accurate Follow the Regularized Leader (AFTRL) and Prod-Best Response (Prod-BR), that intensively exploit this extra knowledge while maintaining the no-regret property in the worst-case scenario of having inaccurate extra information. Specifically, AFTRL achieves $O(1)$ external regret or $O(1)$ \emph{forward regret} against no-external regret adversary in comparison with $O(\sqrt{T})$ \emph{dynamic regret} of Prod-BR. To the best of our knowledge, our algorithm is the first to consider forward regret that achieves $O(1)$ regret against strategic adversaries. When playing zero-sum games with Accurate Multiplicative Weights Update (AMWU), a special case of AFTRL, we achieve \emph{last round convergence} to the Nash Equilibrium. We also provide numerical experiments to further support our theoretical results. In particular, we demonstrate that our methods achieve significantly better regret bounds and rate of last round convergence, compared to the state of the art (e.g., Multiplicative Weights Update (MWU) and its optimistic counterpart, OMWU).

cs.LG

Simplifying the Kohlberg Criterion on the Nucleolus

The nucleolus offers a desirable payoff-sharing solution in cooperative games thanks to its attractive properties - it always exists and lies in the core (if the core is non-empty), and is unique. Although computing the nucleolus is very challenging, the Kohlberg criterion offers a powerful method for verifying whether a solution is the nucleolus in relatively small games (i.e., the number of players $n \leq 20$). This, however, becomes more challenging for larger games because of the need to form and check the balancedness of possibly exponentially large sets of coalitions, each set could be of an exponentially large size. We develop a simplifying set of the Kohlberg criteria that involves checking the balancedness of at most $(n-1)$ sets of coalitions. We also provide a method for reducing the size of these sets and a fast algorithm for verifying the balancedness.

math.OC

Robust Newsvendor Games with Ambiguity in Demand Distributions

We investigate newsvendor games whose payoff function is uncertain due to ambiguity in demand distributions. We discuss the concept of stability under uncertainty and introduce solution concepts for robust cooperative games which could be applied to these newsvendor games. Properties and numerical schemes for finding core solutions of robust newsvendor games are presented.

math.OC