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Tristan Ravitch

Publications and source records attributed to Tristan Ravitch.

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Verified Foundations for Differential Privacy

Differential privacy (DP) has become the gold standard for privacy-preserving data analysis, but implementing it correctly has proven challenging. Prior work has focused on verifying DP at a high level, assuming the foundations are correct and a perfect source of randomness is available. However, the underlying theory of differential privacy can be very complex and subtle. Flaws in basic mechanisms and random number generation have been a critical source of vulnerabilities in real-world DP systems. In this paper, we present SampCert, the first comprehensive, mechanized foundation for differential privacy. SampCert is written in Lean with over 12,000 lines of proof. It offers a generic and extensible notion of DP, a framework for constructing and composing DP mechanisms, and formally verified implementations of Laplace and Gaussian sampling algorithms. SampCert provides (1) a mechanized foundation for developing the next generation of differentially private algorithms, and (2) mechanically verified primitives that can be deployed in production systems. Indeed, SampCert's verified algorithms power the DP offerings of Amazon Web Services (AWS), demonstrating its real-world impact. SampCert's key innovations include: (1) A generic DP foundation that can be instantiated for various DP definitions (e.g., pure, concentrated, Rényi DP); (2) formally verified discrete Laplace and Gaussian sampling algorithms that avoid the pitfalls of floating-point implementations; and (3) a simple probability monad and novel proof techniques that streamline the formalization. To enable proving complex correctness properties of DP and random number generation, SampCert makes heavy use of Lean's extensive Mathlib library, leveraging theorems in Fourier analysis, measure and probability theory, number theory, and topology.

cs.CR

Macaw: A Machine Code Toolbox for the Busy Binary Analyst

When attempting to understand the behavior of an executable, a binary analyst can make use of many different techniques. These include program slicing, dynamic instrumentation, binary-level rewriting, symbolic execution, and formal verification, all of which can uncover insights into how a piece of machine code behaves. As a result, there is no one-size-fits-all binary analysis tool, so a binary analysis researcher will often combine several different tools. Sometimes, a researcher will even need to design new tools to study problems that existing frameworks are not well equipped to handle. Designing such tools from complete scratch is rarely time- or cost-effective, however, given the scale and complexity of modern ISAs. We present Macaw, a modular framework that makes it possible to rapidly build reliable binary analysis tools across a range of use cases. Statically typed functional programming techniques are used pervasively throughout Macaw -- these range from using functional optimization passes to encoding tricky architectural invariants at the type level to statically check correctness properties. The level of assurance that functional programming ideas afford us allow us to iterate rapidly on Macaw while still having confidence that the underlying semantics are correct. Over a decade of development, we have used Macaw to support an industrial research team in building tools for machine code-related tasks. As such, the name 'Macaw' refers not just to the framework, but also a suite of tools that are built on top of it. We describe Macaw in depth and describe the different static and dynamic analyses that it performs, many powered by an SMT-based symbolic execution engine. We put a particular focus on interoperability between machine code and higher-level languages, including binary lifting from x86 to LLVM, as well verifying the correctness of mixed C and assembly code.

cs.PL