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Tung-Che Chang

Publications and source records attributed to Tung-Che Chang.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Keel: A Verified In-Kernel Proof Checker for Proof Carrying BPF

Recent systems such as the eBPF Certificate Framework (BCF) and Proof-Carrying BPF address the imprecision in the Linux eBPF verifier with proof-carrying code. When the verifier's abstract domains cannot prove a safety condition, an in-kernel proof checker checks an untrusted user-space refutation proof. A single bug in this checker can compromise the security of the entire kernel. While formalizing BCF's in-kernel checker, we discovered 13 bugs such as unsound rewrite rules, silently unchecked proof steps, and memory safety errors. We demonstrate that forged certificates can trick the kernel to accept arbitrary unsafe eBPF programs. To address this problem, we propose Keel, a formally verified in-kernel proof checker for the Linux eBPF verifier. First, we specify the checker as a pure functional program in Lean and prove its soundness against bit-vector semantics. We decouple the steps of the proof certificate checker from the mathematical rewrite rules, which enables us to extend the rewrite rules without the need to change the checker. Second, we implement the checker in EmbC, a deeply embedded C fragment, and prove that our C implementation refines the functional specification without undefined behavior or memory leaks. Third, using an amortized potential argument, we prove linear time and memory bounds for the C checker. Keel is correct-by-construction while also being faster than the BCF checker inside the kernel, 1.3X in total and 2.0X on the slowest 1.4% of certificates.

cs.PL↗

FLoPS: Semantics, Operations, and Properties of P3109 Floating-Point Representations in Lean

The upcoming IEEE-P3109 standard for low-precision floating-point arithmetic can become the foundation of future machine learning hardware and software. Unlike IEEE-754, P3109 introduces a parametric framework defined by bitwidth, precision, signedness, and domain. This flexibility results in a vast combinatorial space of formats -- some with as little as one bit of precision -- alongside novel features such as stochastic rounding and saturation arithmetic. These deviations create a unique verification gap that this paper intends to address. This paper presents FLoPS, Formalization in Lean of the P3109 Standard, which is a comprehensive formal model of P3109 in Lean. Our work serves as a rigorous, machine-checked specification that facilitates deep analysis of the standard. We demonstrate the model's utility by verifying foundational properties and analyzing key algorithms within the P3109 context. Specifically, we reveal that FastTwoSum exhibits a novel property of computing exact "overflow error" under saturation using any rounding mode, whereas previously established properties of the ExtractScalar algorithm fail for formats with one bit of precision. This work provides a verified foundation for reasoning about P3109 and enables formal verification of future numerical software. Our Lean development is open source and publicly available.

cs.MS↗