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Udari Madhushani Sehwag

Publications and source records attributed to Udari Madhushani Sehwag.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

DistressBench: Evaluating Multi-Dimensional Crisis Support in Large Language Models

Language models have been adopted faster than evaluation practices that reliably assess their risks, and a growing share of use is affective rather than informational. Within that traffic users disclose suicide and self-harm (SSH) crises. Existing safety benchmarks score models primarily on refusal, but refusal is not the desired behavior here; the conversation requires a substantive supportive response. We introduce DistressBench, 718 English conversations with clinician-authored user turns spanning 23 SSH subcategories, each paired with a task-specific rubric of weighted atomic criteria across seven dimensions of crisis support and a clinician reference response. A model's score is the weighted average over the criteria its reply satisfies, reading directly as the fraction of required care delivered. The best of 25 frontier models satisfies 88.4% of weighted criteria and the median model 71.4%, against 98.7% for clinician references scored on the same criteria. Pooled across all 25 models, in 35.3% of conversations where a model satisfied every criterion for recognizing the crisis, it failed to route the user toward human help. The shortfall concentrates in the dimensions requiring the model to act rather than withhold. Contrasting each dimension's median model against its best separates capability limits from choices: de-escalation reaches 74.6% in the strongest model against a median of 46.0%, and safety disclaimers 84.6% against 8.3%. Multi-turn conversations score below single-turn ones (68.5% against 74.2%). We release the corpus, rubrics, judge calibration labels, and a companion annex of 20 long-horizon red-team transcripts. These results argue for evaluating crisis safety on the care a model delivers rather than on what it declines to say, and for treating de-escalation and resource routing as deployment requirements.

cs.CL↗

The Low Frequency Trap: Video Language Models Fail at Simple Event Bookkeeping

Real-world video benchmarks provide broad coverage, but their fixed clips entangle event count, rate, duration, and visual complexity, making failure modes hard to isolate. While existing programmatic benchmarks offer better control, they score only the final answer rather than auditing reported events against executable ground truth. To bridge this gap, we introduce trace-grounded parametric profiling for event counting in three controlled video tasks: bouncing-ball wall contacts, visual blinks, and categorical state transitions. Across 2,190 videos, we vary event count N and frequency F while holding rendering fixed. Each video includes an executable event trace for capability-surface estimation and timestamp-level evaluation. Our results reveal a staged temporal failure. At an 80% reliability threshold, Gemini 3.6 Flash reliably counts persistent state transitions up to 12 events at 0.5 and 1.0 Hz, yet demonstrates no reliable positive-count region for transient blinking events. Thus, event representation dictates whether a model initially accesses evidence -- a limitation that compounds as count and frequency increase. In the high-count, high-frequency regime, only 0.2% of final counts are correct and the model recovers just 18.1% of true events. To test if visual access is the primary bottleneck, we increase sampling rate. Although this boosts Bounce Ball accuracy from 19.6% to 29.3%, the reported sequence agrees with ground truth only 3.7% of the time. Extra frames can therefore inflate final scores without producing faithful event recovery. Different prompting strategies yield similarly limited gains, and real-world video evaluations show the same concentration of success at low event counts. Ultimately, trace-grounded profiling shifts video evaluation from aggregate accuracy metrics to a detailed diagnostic of where temporal reasoning fails.

cs.AI↗

ROK-FORTRESS: Measuring the Effect of Geopolitical Transcreation for National Security and Public Safety

Safety evaluations for large language models (LLMs) increasingly target high-stakes National Security and Public Safety (NSPS) risks, yet multilingual safety is mostly assessed through translation-only benchmarks that preserve the underlying scenario, leaving how language and geopolitical context interact largely unexamined beyond a few language pairs. We introduce ROK-FORTRESS, a bilingual, culturally adversarial NSPS benchmark that uses the English-Korean language pair and U.S.-ROK geopolitical axis as a case study, separating the effects of language and geopolitical grounding via a transcreation matrix: adversarial intents are evaluated under controlled combinations of (i) English versus Korean language and (ii) U.S. versus Korean entities, institutions, and operational details. Each adversarial prompt is paired with a dual-use benign counterpart to quantify over-refusal, and responses are scored by calibrated LLM-as-a-judge panels using expert-crafted, prompt-specific binary rubrics. Across a dual-track set of frontier and Korean-optimized models, we find a consistent suppression effect in Korean variants and substantial model-to-model variation in how geopolitical grounding interacts with language; in a subset of models, Korean grounding further mitigates the language-driven suppression. This indicates that, at least in the English-Korean case, safety behavior is shaped by language-as-risk signals and context interactions that translation-only evaluations miss. A direct-request ablation that strips jailbreak wrappers separates a small but persistent reduction for closed-source models from a larger, wrapper-dependent effect that reverses for open-source models, suggesting part of the Korean suppression reflects prompt specialization rather than intrinsic language-based safety alignment. The transcreation matrix methodology is designed to generalize to other language-culture pairs.

cs.CL↗

MoReBench: Evaluating Procedural and Pluralistic Moral Reasoning in Language Models, More than Outcomes

As AI systems progress, we rely more on them to make decisions with us and for us. To ensure that such decisions are aligned with human values, it is imperative for us to understand not only what decisions they make but also how they come to those decisions. Reasoning language models, which provide both final responses and (partially transparent) intermediate thinking traces, present a timely opportunity to study AI procedural reasoning. Unlike math and code problems which often have objectively correct answers, moral dilemmas are an excellent testbed for process-focused evaluation because they allow for multiple defensible conclusions. To do so, we present MoReBench: 1,000 moral scenarios, each paired with a set of rubric criteria that experts consider essential to include (or avoid) when reasoning about the scenarios. MoReBench contains over 23 thousand criteria including identifying moral considerations, weighing trade-offs, and giving actionable recommendations to cover cases on AI advising humans moral decisions as well as making moral decisions autonomously. Separately, we curate MoReBench-Theory: 150 examples to test whether AI can reason under five major frameworks in normative ethics. Our results show that scaling laws and existing benchmarks on math, code, and scientific reasoning tasks fail to predict models' abilities to perform moral reasoning. Models also show partiality towards specific moral frameworks (e.g., Benthamite Act Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology), which might be side effects of popular training paradigms. Together, these benchmarks advance process-focused reasoning evaluation towards safer and more transparent AI.

cs.CL↗

ASPI: Seeking Ambiguity Clarification Amplifies Prompt Injection Vulnerability in LLM Agents

Clarification-seeking behavior is widely regarded as a desirable property of LLM agents, enabling them to resolve ambiguity before acting on underspecified tasks. However, the security implications of this interaction pattern remain unexplored. We investigate whether the transition from standard execution to a clarification-seeking state increases an agent's susceptibility to prompt injection attacks. We introduce ASPI (Ambiguous-State Prompt Injection), a benchmark of 728 task-attack scenarios that isolates clarification as a distinct agent state and measures how this state transition affects vulnerability under controlled conditions. Each benchmark instance is evaluated under matched execution and clarification settings: in the execution setting, the agent acts on a fully specified instruction and encounters adversarial content only through tool-returned data; in the clarification setting, the agent must first request and incorporate additional user input before acting. We evaluate ten frontier LLMs and find that clarification-seeking consistently and substantially amplifies vulnerability. For instance, attack success rises from 1.8% to 34.0% for o3 and from 2.2% to 35.7% for Gemini-3-Flash. A decomposition analysis reveals that this gap reflects both a state-dependent shift in how models process incoming content and a channel-specific effect arising from the agent-solicited clarification interface. These findings demonstrate that standard execution-time security evaluation systematically underestimates the attack surface of interactive agents, and that robustness under fully specified tasks does not translate to robustness under ambiguity. For reproducibility, our data and source code are available at https://github.com/scaleapi/aspi.

cs.CR↗

AgentCrypt: Advancing Privacy and (Secure) Computation in AI Agent Collaboration

As AI agents increasingly operate in complex environments, ensuring reliable, context-aware privacy is critical for regulatory compliance. Traditional access controls are insufficient because privacy risks often arise after access is granted; agents may inadvertently compromise privacy during reasoning by messaging humans, leaking context to peers, or executing unsafe tool calls. Existing approaches typically treat privacy as a binary constraint, overlooking nuanced, computation-dependent requirements. Furthermore, Large Language Model (LLM) agents are inherently probabilistic, lacking formal guarantees for security-critical operations. To address this, we introduce AgentCrypt, a three-tiered framework for secure agent communication that adds a deterministic protection layer atop any AI platform. AgentCrypt spans the full spectrum of privacy needs: from unrestricted data exchange (Level 1), to context-aware masking (Level 2), up to fully encrypted computation using Homomorphic Encryption (Level 3). Unlike prompt-based defenses, our approach guarantees that tagged data privacy is strictly preserved even when the underlying model errs. Security is decoupled from the agent's probabilistic reasoning, ensuring sensitive data remains protected throughout the computational lifecycle. AgentCrypt enables collaborative computation on otherwise inaccessible data, overcoming barriers like data silos. We implemented and validated it using LangGraph and Google ADK, demonstrating versatility across architectures. Finally, we introduce a benchmark dataset simulating privacy-critical tasks to enable systematic evaluation and foster the development of trustworthy, regulatable machine learning systems.

cs.CR↗

SciPredict: Can LLMs Predict the Outcomes of Scientific Experiments in Natural Sciences?

Accelerating scientific discovery requires the identification of which experiments would yield the best outcomes before committing resources to costly physical validation. While existing benchmarks evaluate LLMs on scientific knowledge and reasoning, their ability to predict experimental outcomes - a task where AI could significantly exceed human capabilities - remains largely underexplored. We introduce SciPredict, a benchmark comprising 405 tasks derived from recent empirical studies in 33 specialized sub-fields of physics, biology, and chemistry. SciPredict addresses two critical questions: (a) can LLMs predict the outcome of scientific experiments with sufficient accuracy? and (b) can such predictions be reliably used in the scientific research process? Evaluations reveal fundamental limitations on both fronts. Model accuracies are 14-26% and human expert performance is $\approx$20%. Although some frontier models exceed human performance model accuracy is still far below what would enable reliable experimental guidance. Even within the limited performance, models fail to distinguish reliable predictions from unreliable ones, achieving only $\approx$20% accuracy regardless of their confidence or whether they judge outcomes as predictable without physical experimentation. Human experts, in contrast, demonstrate strong calibration: their accuracy increases from $\approx$5% to $\approx$80% as they deem outcomes more predictable without conducting the experiment. SciPredict establishes a rigorous framework demonstrating that superhuman performance in experimental science requires not just better predictions, but better awareness of prediction reliability. For reproducibility all our data and code are provided at https://github.com/scaleapi/scipredict

cs.AI↗

LHAW: Controllable Underspecification for Long-Horizon Tasks

Long-horizon workflow agents that operate effectively over extended periods are essential for truly autonomous systems. Their reliable execution critically depends on the ability to reason through ambiguous situations in which clarification seeking is necessary to ensure correct task execution. However, progress is limited by the lack of scalable, task-agnostic frameworks for systematically curating and measuring the impact of ambiguity across custom workflows. We address this gap by introducing LHAW (Long-Horizon Augmented Workflows), a modular, dataset-agnostic synthetic pipeline that transforms any well-specified task into controllable underspecified variants by systematically removing information across four dimensions - Goals, Constraints, Inputs, and Context - at configurable severity levels. Unlike approaches that rely on LLM predictions of ambiguity, LHAW validates variants through empirical agent trials, classifying them as outcome-critical, divergent, or benign based on observed terminal state divergence. We release 285 task variants from TheAgentCompany, SWE-Bench Pro and MCP-Atlas according to our taxonomy alongside formal analysis measuring how current agents detect, reason about, and resolve underspecification across ambiguous settings. LHAW provides the first systematic framework for cost-sensitive evaluation of agent clarification behavior in long-horizon settings, enabling development of reliable autonomous systems.

cs.CL↗

Defensive Refusal Bias: How Safety Alignment Fails Cyber Defenders

Safety alignment in large language models (LLMs), particularly for cybersecurity tasks, primarily focuses on preventing misuse. While this approach reduces direct harm, it obscures a complementary failure mode: denial of assistance to legitimate defenders. We study Defensive Refusal Bias -- the tendency of safety-tuned frontier LLMs to refuse assistance for authorized defensive cybersecurity tasks when those tasks include similar language to an offensive cyber task. Based on 2,390 real-world examples from the National Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition (NCCDC), we find that LLMs refuse defensive requests containing security-sensitive keywords at $2.72\times$ the rate of semantically equivalent neutral requests ($p < 0.001$). The highest refusal rates occur in the most operationally critical tasks: system hardening (43.8%) and malware analysis (34.3%). Interestingly, explicit authorization, where the user directly instructs the model that they have authority to complete the target task, increases refusal rates, suggesting models interpret justifications as adversarial rather than exculpatory. These findings are urgent for interactive use and critical for autonomous defensive agents, which cannot rephrase refused queries or retry. Our findings suggest that current LLM cybersecurity alignment relies on semantic similarity to harmful content rather than reasoning about intent or authorization. We call for mitigations that analyze intent to maximize defensive capabilities while still preventing harmful compliance.

cs.CR↗

Continual Learning of Domain Knowledge from Human Feedback in Text-to-SQL

Large Language Models (LLMs) can generate SQL queries from natural language questions but struggle with database-specific schemas and tacit domain knowledge. We introduce a framework for continual learning from human feedback in text-to-SQL, where a learning agent receives natural language feedback to refine queries and distills the revealed knowledge for reuse on future tasks. This distilled knowledge is stored in a structured memory, enabling the agent to improve execution accuracy over time. We design and evaluate multiple variations of a learning agent architecture that vary in how they capture and retrieve past experiences. Experiments on the BIRD benchmark Dev set show that memory-augmented agents, particularly the Procedural Agent, achieve significant accuracy gains and error reduction by leveraging human-in-the-loop feedback. Our results highlight the importance of transforming tacit human expertise into reusable knowledge, paving the way for more adaptive, domain-aware text-to-SQL systems that continually learn from a human-in-the-loop.

cs.CL↗

PropensityBench: Evaluating Latent Safety Risks in Large Language Models via an Agentic Approach

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have sparked concerns over their potential to acquire and misuse dangerous or high-risk capabilities, posing frontier risks. Current safety evaluations primarily test for what a model \textit{can} do - its capabilities - without assessing what it $\textit{would}$ do if endowed with high-risk capabilities. This leaves a critical blind spot: models may strategically conceal capabilities or rapidly acquire them, while harboring latent inclinations toward misuse. We argue that $\textbf{propensity}$ - the likelihood of a model to pursue harmful actions if empowered - is a critical, yet underexplored, axis of safety evaluation. We present $\textbf{PropensityBench}$, a novel benchmark framework that assesses the proclivity of models to engage in risky behaviors when equipped with simulated dangerous capabilities using proxy tools. Our framework includes 5,874 scenarios with 6,648 tools spanning four high-risk domains: cybersecurity, self-proliferation, biosecurity, and chemical security. We simulate access to powerful capabilities via a controlled agentic environment and evaluate the models' choices under varying operational pressures that reflect real-world constraints or incentives models may encounter, such as resource scarcity or gaining more autonomy. Across open-source and proprietary frontier models, we uncover 9 alarming signs of propensity: models frequently choose high-risk tools when under pressure, despite lacking the capability to execute such actions unaided. These findings call for a shift from static capability audits toward dynamic propensity assessments as a prerequisite for deploying frontier AI systems safely. Our code is available at https://github.com/scaleapi/propensity-evaluation.

cs.CY↗

Best Practices for Biorisk Evaluations on Open-Weight Bio-Foundation Models

Open-weight bio-foundation models present a dual-use dilemma. While holding great promise for accelerating scientific research and drug development, they could also enable bad actors to develop more deadly bioweapons. To mitigate the risk posed by these models, current approaches focus on filtering biohazardous data during pre-training. However, the effectiveness of such an approach remains unclear, particularly against determined actors who might fine-tune these models for malicious use. To address this gap, we propose BioRiskEval, a framework to evaluate the robustness of procedures that are intended to reduce the dual-use capabilities of bio-foundation models. BioRiskEval assesses models' virus understanding through three lenses, including sequence modeling, mutational effects prediction, and virulence prediction. Our results show that current filtering practices may not be particularly effective: Excluded knowledge can be rapidly recovered in some cases via fine-tuning, and exhibits broader generalizability in sequence modeling. Furthermore, dual-use signals may already reside in the pretrained representations, and can be elicited via simple linear probing. These findings highlight the challenges of data filtering as a standalone procedure, underscoring the need for further research into robust safety and security strategies for open-weight bio-foundation models.

cs.CR↗

Remote Labor Index: Measuring AI Automation of Remote Work

AIs have made rapid progress on research-oriented benchmarks of knowledge and reasoning, but it remains unclear how these gains translate into economic value and automation. To measure this, we introduce the Remote Labor Index (RLI), a broadly multi-sector benchmark comprising real-world, economically valuable projects designed to evaluate end-to-end agent performance in practical settings. AI agents perform near the floor on RLI, with the highest-performing agent achieving an automation rate of 2.5%. These results help ground discussions of AI automation in empirical evidence, setting a common basis for tracking AI impacts and enabling stakeholders to proactively navigate AI-driven labor automation.

cs.LG↗

GenARM: Reward Guided Generation with Autoregressive Reward Model for Test-time Alignment

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit impressive capabilities but require careful alignment with human preferences. Traditional training-time methods finetune LLMs using human preference datasets but incur significant training costs and require repeated training to handle diverse user preferences. Test-time alignment methods address this by using reward models (RMs) to guide frozen LLMs without retraining. However, existing test-time approaches rely on trajectory-level RMs which are designed to evaluate complete responses, making them unsuitable for autoregressive text generation that requires computing next-token rewards from partial responses. To address this, we introduce GenARM, a test-time alignment approach that leverages the Autoregressive Reward Model--a novel reward parametrization designed to predict next-token rewards for efficient and effective autoregressive generation. Theoretically, we demonstrate that this parametrization can provably guide frozen LLMs toward any distribution achievable by traditional RMs within the KL-regularized reinforcement learning framework. Experimental results show that GenARM significantly outperforms prior test-time alignment baselines and matches the performance of training-time methods. Additionally, GenARM enables efficient weak-to-strong guidance, aligning larger LLMs with smaller RMs without the high costs of training larger models. Furthermore, GenARM supports multi-objective alignment, allowing real-time trade-offs between preference dimensions and catering to diverse user preferences without retraining. Our project page is available at: https://genarm.github.io.

cs.CL↗

AdvBDGen: Adversarially Fortified Prompt-Specific Fuzzy Backdoor Generator Against LLM Alignment

With the growing adoption of reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF) for aligning large language models (LLMs), the risk of backdoor installation during alignment has increased, leading to unintended and harmful behaviors. Existing backdoor triggers are typically limited to fixed word patterns, making them detectable during data cleaning and easily removable post-poisoning. In this work, we explore the use of prompt-specific paraphrases as backdoor triggers, enhancing their stealth and resistance to removal during LLM alignment. We propose AdvBDGen, an adversarially fortified generative fine-tuning framework that automatically generates prompt-specific backdoors that are effective, stealthy, and transferable across models. AdvBDGen employs a generator-discriminator pair, fortified by an adversary, to ensure the installability and stealthiness of backdoors. It enables the crafting and successful installation of complex triggers using as little as 3% of the fine-tuning data. Once installed, these backdoors can jailbreak LLMs during inference, demonstrate improved stability against perturbations compared to traditional constant triggers, and are more challenging to remove. These findings underscore an urgent need for the research community to develop more robust defenses against adversarial backdoor threats in LLM alignment.

cs.LG↗

Collab: Controlled Decoding using Mixture of Agents for LLM Alignment

Alignment of Large Language models (LLMs) is crucial for safe and trustworthy deployment in applications. Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as an effective technique to align LLMs to human preferences and broader utilities, but it requires updating billions of model parameters, which is computationally expensive. Controlled Decoding, by contrast, provides a mechanism for aligning a model at inference time without retraining. However, single-agent decoding approaches often struggle to adapt to diverse tasks due to the complexity and variability inherent in these tasks. To strengthen the test-time performance w.r.t the target task, we propose a mixture of agent-based decoding strategies leveraging the existing off-the-shelf aligned LLM policies. Treating each prior policy as an agent in the spirit of mixture of agent collaboration, we develop a decoding method that allows for inference-time alignment through a token-level selection strategy among multiple agents. For each token, the most suitable LLM is dynamically chosen from a pool of models based on a long-term utility metric. This policy-switching mechanism ensures optimal model selection at each step, enabling efficient collaboration and alignment among LLMs during decoding. Theoretical analysis of our proposed algorithm establishes optimal performance with respect to the target task represented via a target reward for the given off-the-shelf models. We conduct comprehensive empirical evaluations with open-source aligned models on diverse tasks and preferences, which demonstrates the merits of this approach over single-agent decoding baselines. Notably, Collab surpasses the current SoTA decoding strategy, achieving an improvement of up to 1.56x in average reward and 71.89% in GPT-4 based win-tie rate.

cs.CL↗

SORRY-Bench: Systematically Evaluating Large Language Model Safety Refusal

Evaluating aligned large language models' (LLMs) ability to recognize and reject unsafe user requests is crucial for safe, policy-compliant deployments. Existing evaluation efforts, however, face three limitations that we address with SORRY-Bench, our proposed benchmark. First, existing methods often use coarse-grained taxonomies of unsafe topics, and are over-representing some fine-grained topics. For example, among the ten existing datasets that we evaluated, tests for refusals of self-harm instructions are over 3x less represented than tests for fraudulent activities. SORRY-Bench improves on this by using a fine-grained taxonomy of 44 potentially unsafe topics, and 440 class-balanced unsafe instructions, compiled through human-in-the-loop methods. Second, linguistic characteristics and formatting of prompts are often overlooked, like different languages, dialects, and more -- which are only implicitly considered in many evaluations. We supplement SORRY-Bench with 20 diverse linguistic augmentations to systematically examine these effects. Third, existing evaluations rely on large LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) for evaluation, which can be computationally expensive. We investigate design choices for creating a fast, accurate automated safety evaluator. By collecting 7K+ human annotations and conducting a meta-evaluation of diverse LLM-as-a-judge designs, we show that fine-tuned 7B LLMs can achieve accuracy comparable to GPT-4 scale LLMs, with lower computational cost. Putting these together, we evaluate over 50 proprietary and open-weight LLMs on SORRY-Bench, analyzing their distinctive safety refusal behaviors. We hope our effort provides a building block for systematic evaluations of LLMs' safety refusal capabilities, in a balanced, granular, and efficient manner. Benchmark demo, data, code, and models are available through https://sorry-bench.github.io.

cs.AI↗

In-Context Learning with Topological Information for Knowledge Graph Completion

Knowledge graphs (KGs) are crucial for representing and reasoning over structured information, supporting a wide range of applications such as information retrieval, question answering, and decision-making. However, their effectiveness is often hindered by incompleteness, limiting their potential for real-world impact. While knowledge graph completion (KGC) has been extensively studied in the literature, recent advances in generative AI models, particularly large language models (LLMs), have introduced new opportunities for innovation. In-context learning has recently emerged as a promising approach for leveraging pretrained knowledge of LLMs across a range of natural language processing tasks and has been widely adopted in both academia and industry. However, how to utilize in-context learning for effective KGC remains relatively underexplored. We develop a novel method that incorporates topological information through in-context learning to enhance KGC performance. By integrating ontological knowledge and graph structure into the context of LLMs, our approach achieves strong performance in the transductive setting i.e., nodes in the test graph dataset are present in the training graph dataset. Furthermore, we apply our approach to KGC in the more challenging inductive setting, i.e., nodes in the training graph dataset and test graph dataset are disjoint, leveraging the ontology to infer useful information about missing nodes which serve as contextual cues for the LLM during inference. Our method demonstrates superior performance compared to baselines on the ILPC-small and ILPC-large datasets.

cs.CL↗