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Ulysse Planta

Publications and source records attributed to Ulysse Planta.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

HoneySat: A Network-based Satellite Honeypot Framework

Satellites are the backbone of several mission-critical services that enable our modern society to function, for example, GPS. For years, satellites were assumed to be secure because of their indecipherable architectures and the reliance on security by obscurity. However, technological advancements have made these assumptions obsolete, paving the way for potential attacks, and sparking interest in satellite security. Unfortunately, to this day, there is no efficient way to collect data on adversarial techniques for satellites, hurting the generation of security intelligence that can lead to the development of effective countermeasures. In this paper, we present HoneySat, the first high-interaction satellite honeypot framework, fully capable of convincingly simulating a real-world CubeSat, a type of Small Satellite (SmallSat). To provide evidence of HoneySat's effectiveness, we surveyed experienced SmallSat operators in charge of in-orbit satellites and deployed HoneySat over the Internet to entice adversaries. Our results show that 90% of satellite operators agreed that HoneySat provides a realistic and engaging simulation of a SmallSat mission. Additionally, HoneySat successfully deceived human adversaries in the wild and collected 22 real-world satellite-specific adversarial interactions. Finally, in a major demonstration of HoneySat's robustness, we collaborated with an aerospace company to perform a hardware-in-the-loop operation that resulted in HoneySat successfully communicating with an in-orbit, operational SmallSat mission.

cs.CR

Exploring Power Side-Channel Challenges in Embedded Systems Security

Power side-channel (PSC) attacks are widely used in embedded microcontrollers, particularly in cryptographic applications, to extract sensitive information. However, expanding the applications of PSC attacks to broader security contexts in the embedded systems domain faces significant challenges. These include the need for specialized hardware setups to manage high noise levels in real-world targets and assumptions regarding the attacker's knowledge and capabilities. This paper systematically analyzes these challenges and introduces a novel signal-processing method that addresses key limitations, enabling effective PSC attacks in real-world embedded systems without requiring hardware modifications. We validate the proposed approach through experiments on real-world black-box embedded devices, verifying its potential to expand its usage in various embedded systems security applications beyond traditional cryptographic applications.

cs.CR

On the Feasibility of CubeSats Application Sandboxing for Space Missions

This paper details our journey in designing and selecting a suitable application sandboxing mechanism for a satellite under development, with a focus on small satellites. Central to our study is the development of selection criteria for sandboxing and assessing its appropriateness for our satellite payload. We also test our approach on two already operational satellites, Suchai and SALSAT, to validate its effectiveness. These experiments highlight the practicality and efficiency of our chosen sandboxing method for real-world space systems. Our results provide insights and highlight the challenges involved in integrating application sandboxing in the space sector.

cs.CR

SoK: Security of Programmable Logic Controllers

Billions of people rely on essential utility and manufacturing infrastructures such as water treatment plants, energy management, and food production. Our dependence on reliable infrastructures makes them valuable targets for cyberattacks. One of the prime targets for adversaries attacking physical infrastructures are Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) because they connect the cyber and physical worlds. In this study, we conduct the first comprehensive systematization of knowledge that explores the security of PLCs: We present an in-depth analysis of PLC attacks and defenses and discover trends in the security of PLCs from the last 17 years of research. We introduce a novel threat taxonomy for PLCs and Industrial Control Systems (ICS). Finally, we identify and point out research gaps that, if left ignored, could lead to new catastrophic attacks against critical infrastructures.

cs.CR