SearcharxivSearch

arXiv subjects

Utsav Sadana

Publications and source records attributed to Utsav Sadana.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

Mitigating optimistic bias in entropic risk estimation and optimization

The entropic risk measure is widely used in high-stakes decision-making across economics, management science, finance, and safety-critical control systems because it captures tail risks associated with uncertain losses. However, when data are limited, the empirical entropic risk estimator, formed by replacing the expectation in the risk measure with a sample average, underestimates true risk. We show that this negative bias grows superlinearly with the standard deviation of the loss for distributions with unbounded right tails. We further demonstrate that several existing bias reduction techniques developed for empirical risk either continue to underestimate entropic risk or substantially overestimate it, potentially leading to overly risky or overly conservative decisions. To address this issue, we develop a parametric bootstrap procedure that is strongly asymptotically consistent and provides a controlled overestimation of entropic risk under mild assumptions. The method first fits a distribution to the data and then estimates the empirical estimator's bias via bootstrapping. We show that the fitted distribution must satisfy only weak regularity conditions, and Gaussian mixture models offer a convenient and flexible choice within this class. As an application, we introduce a distributionally robust optimization model for an insurance contract design problem that incorporates correlations in household losses. We show that selecting regularization parameters using standard cross-validation can lead to substantially higher out-of-sample risk for the insurer if the validation bias is not corrected. Our approach improves performance by recommending higher and more accurate premiums, thereby better reflecting the underlying tail risk.

math.OC

Subsidizing a New Technology: An Impulse Stackelberg Game Approach

Governments are motivated to subsidize profit-driven firms that manufacture zero-emission vehicles to ensure they become price-competitive. This paper introduces a dynamic Stackelberg game to determine the government's optimal subsidy strategy for zero-emission vehicles, taking into account the pricing decisions of a profit-maximizing firm. While firms have the flexibility to change prices continuously, subsidies are adjusted at specific time intervals. This is captured in our game formulation by using impulse controls for discrete-time interventions. We provide a verification theorem to characterize the Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium and illustrate our results with numerical experiments.

math.OC

A Survey of Contextual Optimization Methods for Decision Making under Uncertainty

Recently there has been a surge of interest in operations research (OR) and the machine learning (ML) community in combining prediction algorithms and optimization techniques to solve decision-making problems in the face of uncertainty. This gave rise to the field of contextual optimization, under which data-driven procedures are developed to prescribe actions to the decision-maker that make the best use of the most recently updated information. A large variety of models and methods have been presented in both OR and ML literature under a variety of names, including data-driven optimization, prescriptive optimization, predictive stochastic programming, policy optimization, (smart) predict/estimate-then-optimize, decision-focused learning, (task-based) end-to-end learning/forecasting/optimization, etc. Focusing on single and two-stage stochastic programming problems, this review article identifies three main frameworks for learning policies from data and discusses their strengths and limitations. We present the existing models and methods under a uniform notation and terminology and classify them according to the three main frameworks identified. Our objective with this survey is to both strengthen the general understanding of this active field of research and stimulate further theoretical and algorithmic advancements in integrating ML and stochastic programming.

math.OC

Open-loop and feedback Nash equilibrium in scalar linear-state differential games with impulse control

We consider a two-player linear-state differential game, where one player intervenes continuously in the game, while the other implements an impulse control. When the impulse instants are exogenous, we obtain the classical result in linear-state differential games that open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria coincide. When the impulse instants are endogenous, we show that this result no longer holds. In particular, the two equilibria are different. We show that the impulse level is a constant in both equilibria. More importantly, in the open-loop case, we show that the equilibrium number of impulses is at most one, while there can be at most two impulses in the feedback case.

math.OC

Feedback Nash Equilibria in Differential Games with Impulse Control

We study a class of deterministic finite-horizon two-player nonzero-sum differential games where players are endowed with different kinds of controls. We assume that Player 1 uses piecewise-continuous controls, while Player 2 uses impulse controls. For this class of games, we seek to derive conditions for the existence of feedback Nash equilibrium strategies for the players. More specifically, we provide a verification theorem for identifying such equilibrium strategies, using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations for Player 1 and the quasi-variational inequalities (QVIs) for Player 2. Further, we show that the equilibrium number of interventions by Player 2 is upper bounded. Furthermore, we specialize the obtained results to a scalar two-player linear-quadratic differential game. In this game, Player 1's objective is to drive the state variable towards a specific target value, and Player 2 has a similar objective with a different target value. We provide, for the first time, an analytical characterization of the feedback Nash equilibrium in a linear-quadratic differential game with impulse control. We illustrate our results using numerical experiments.

math.OC

The value of randomized strategies in distributionally robust risk averse network interdiction games

Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) is widely used to account for the preferences of a risk-averse agent in the extreme loss scenarios. To study the effectiveness of randomization in interdiction games with an interdictor that is both risk and ambiguity averse, we introduce a distributionally robust network interdiction game where the interdictor randomizes over the feasible interdiction plans in order to minimize the worst-case CVaR of the flow with respect to both the unknown distribution of the capacity of the arcs and his mixed strategy over interdicted arcs. The flow player, on the contrary, maximizes the total flow in the network. By using the budgeted uncertainty set, we control the degree of conservatism in the model and reformulate the interdictor's non-linear problem as a bi-convex optimization problem. For solving this problem to any given optimality level, we devise a spatial branch and bound algorithm that uses the McCormick inequalities and reduced reformulation linearization technique (RRLT) to obtain convex relaxation of the problem. We also develop a column generation algorithm to identify the optimal support of the convex relaxation which is then used in the coordinate descent algorithm to determine the upper bounds. The efficiency and convergence of the spatial branch and bound algorithm is established in the numerical experiments. Further, our numerical experiments show that randomized strategies can have significantly better in-sample and out-of-sample performance than optimal deterministic ones.

cs.GT