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Víctor Mayoral-Vilches

Publications and source records attributed to Víctor Mayoral-Vilches.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

CT0: Cybersecurity Transformer

General-purpose frontier models are large, expensive to run, and increasingly reluctant to engage with authorised defensive- and offensive-security work. We ask the opposite question: how small can a cybersecurity-specialist transformer be while remaining genuinely useful to a security practitioner? We introduce CT0, a Cybersecurity Transformer architecture, and CT0-Micro, its first incarnation: a compact (~4B-parameter) model built on the open base model, whose backbone is specialised by two-phase on-policy distillation on our Cybersecurity AI (CAI) dataset. CT0 serves two modes from one set of weights: System 1 answers typed security decisions (is this file suspicious, is this request an attack, did the model just refuse) in a single forward pass without generating a token, System 2 is the usual tool-using agent, and a confidence gate spends generation only where the fast path is unsure. Specialisation lifts the agentic path: CT0-Micro solves 21.1% of cybench-subtask against 7.6% for its base, above every open model of comparable footprint and the densest cybersecurity capability per parameter we measured. The fast path is what the architecture buys: CT0-Micro screens eighty files per second for indicators of compromise, catches its own refusals at 96.5% accuracy in 47 ms where the model judging itself reaches 76.5% in 254 ms and misses half of them, flags jailbreak requests at AUROC 0.966 in 8 ms, and, generating only for the facts it is unsure about, extracts vulnerability facts more accurately than either mode alone at a fifth of the generative cost. All of it is built in about 314 RTX PRO 6000 GPU-hours and served from one workstation GPU, with no policy layer between operator and target. Across eighteen benchmarks and use cases run with one checkpoint and head, we report where the design helps, where it does not, and what it still lacks.

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Certifying Ghosts: How Cybersecurity AI Agents Break the EU Cyber Resilience Act

The EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) makes a smart bet. It does not demand that products be free of vulnerabilities, but only that manufacturers run a process: assess risk, handle flaws, ship updates. The bet pays off if four things about the world stay true: (P1) finding vulnerabilities is slow, skilled, human work; (P2) a product's exploitable flaws are knowable the day it ships; (P3) exploitation is rare enough to notice; and (P4) fixes keep pace with discovery. Cybersecurity AI (CAI) agents, AI put to work finding and exploiting flaws in other products, falsify all four. The regime answers in two opposite ways. Against the sheer volume of flaws that agents surface it bends (P1): built for scarce attention, it re-centres compliance on defensible, documented prioritisation, and holds. But agents also collapse the speed and economics of the vulnerability lifecycle, and here it breaks (P2, P3, P4): a product that passed every check becomes exploitable without anyone touching it, so its market-entry test, its reporting trigger, and its one-and-done certificate vouch for a security that has quietly expired. The fault is in the landscape, not the product, so running the process more diligently cannot repair it. We map each mechanism to the force that strains or snaps it, and find the cure and the disease cut from the same cloth: because defenders and attackers wield the same AI, the only conformity that survives is one that never stops running. We also carry the remedy from proposal to proof on two CRA-scope robots, a humanoid and a lawn mower, where an agentic defender holds a line their undefended selves cannot. On the evidence already in hand, the CRA reaches full force in December 2027 certifying products against a world that has already changed. Static, human-paced security is finished; what replaces it must be continuous and agent-operated, and that is no longer a matter of taste.

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Synthetic APTs: the Collapse of TTP-Based Attribution

Cyber Threat Intelligence CTI attribution relies on identifying the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures TTPs that distinguish one threat actor from another. This approach presupposes that each adversary leaves a recognizable operational fingerprint. This work investigates whether AI driven adversary emulation challenges that presupposition. We deploy agents from our Cybersecurity SuperIntelligence CSI framework, configured as five Advanced Persistent Threat APT groups, APT28, APT29, APT41, APT44, and Lazarus Group, against AI driven Defender agents across two cyber ranges provided by CYBER RANGES, equipped with defensive software Wazuh, Velociraptor, Elasticsearch and active AI driven defenders: an enterprise network and a military infrastructure. Across 20 experiments using two defender models, a binary pattern emerges: all 10 Enterprise range experiments resulted in compromise 2 to 12 hosts per experiment, while all 10 Military range experiments were successfully defended or resulted in stalemates, regardless of APT profile or defender model. In 8 of 10 Enterprise experiments, attackers independently weaponized the defender's own Velociraptor endpoint management platform as a command and control channel, a convergent behavior not encoded in any threat intelligence profile. We argue that in the AI era, wherein agents can be deployed provided the right models are available and subject to the right scaffolding and agentic configuration, the entry barrier for operating like a nation state APT collapses: beyond nation states, individuals can now act like commonly identified threat actors, and with it, fundamentally undermine TTP based attribution.

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Towards Cybersecurity SuperIntelligence (CSI): What's the best harness for cybersecurity?

What is the best harness for cybersecurity AI? Cybersecurity systems are converging on a single execution scaffold per agent, an iterative shell loop driven by a Large Language Model (LLM). However, scaffolds are not interchangeable, rarely interoperable, and no single scaffold dominates across all challenge types. In our path towards researching Cybersecurity SuperIntelligence (CSI), we present a meta-scaffold that unifies heterogeneous agent harnesses under a common orchestration layer, enabling any LLM-driven scaffold to be deployed, benchmarked, and composed within the same infrastructure. Using CSI, we benchmark five scaffolds (CSI::Claude, CSI::Codex, CSI::GCAI, CSI::Mistral, CSI::CAI) on the 33 cybench challenges, holding the model fixed at alias2-mini. The best individual scaffolds solve 15/33 (45.5%); the four-scaffold union solves 17/33 (51.5%), with the fifth (CSI::Mistral, 10/33) contributing one exclusive solve. We find that no single scaffold is the best harness: it is the combination of structurally heterogeneous scaffolds that yields the highest coverage. We validate this through CSI's blackboard-based multi-agent architecture, in which scaffold-specialised agents run in parallel and exchange intermediate findings via a shared substrate (a blackboard). The blackboard solves 19/33 (57.6%), a 27% relative gain over CSI::Claude, one of the best individual scaffolds (15/33, 45.5%), 25% faster (20.2 h vs. 26.8 h), at comparable cost ($5,480 vs. $5,122).

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Cybersecurity AI (CAI) Dataset

We present CAI Dataset, a fourteen-month corpus of cybersecurity LLM trajectories collected through the open-source CAI agent framework, built in response to PentestGPT's finding that expert operator trajectories, not base-model capability, are the bottleneck for cybersecurity LLM performance. CAI Dataset aggregates 230,935 session logs and 26,027,742 user prompts from 16,768 source IPs across 123 countries, exercising 4,187 unique LLM identifiers against 23,147 target domains over 18.07 TB of durable storage. The mix is hands-on (36.4% offensive, 20.1% attacker-intent, 27.5% business / integration, 4.4% defensive), making CAI Dataset, to the best of our knowledge, the largest described corpus of LLM-driven hacker trajectories. It is released to partner organisations and selected customers as an audience-size series (CAI Dataset10, CAI Dataset1k, CAI Dataset200k). Read longitudinally, the corpus is a record of cybersecurity itself turning automated: operators routinely paste live credentials, production hostnames and bearer tokens into prompts knowing their inputs are logged, a trade-off they accept to stay competitive. Aggregated across the industry, this concentrates a substantial fraction of the world's offensive and defensive operator context inside a handful of frontier-model API providers, a single failure surface whose breach or politically motivated repurposing could cascade into nation- and enterprise-scale disruption. The only configuration that preserves both the productivity advantage and operator-side confidentiality is an on-premise, privately-hosted cybersecurity-specialised LLM served inside the operator's trust boundary, which CAI Dataset is shaped to make practical.

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Dynamic Cyber Ranges

As LLM-driven agents advance in cybersecurity, Jeopardy CTF benchmarks are approaching saturation and cyber ranges, the natural next evaluation frontier, offer diminishing resistance under their current static design. We validate this observation by deploying an LLM-driven Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) agent across three tiers of increasingly realistic infrastructure (PRO Labs, MHBench, military-grade CYBER RANGES). To counteract this trend, we propose Dynamic Cyber Ranges: cyber range environments augmented with LLM-driven Defender agents that harden infrastructure, monitor for intrusions, and respond in real time. Across evaluated scenarios, Defender agents reduce attacker success to 0-55%, achieving complete prevention on multiple configurations. Since attacker and defender agents draw from the same underlying model capabilities, Dynamic Cyber Ranges preserve evaluation headroom as models improve. Notably, a smaller, specialized on-premise model (alias2-mini) matched the frontier model's defensive outcomes on multiple scenarios under identical, untuned prompts, and detected the attacker 10x faster on a complex enterprise scenario, suggesting that privacy-preserving on-premise models can serve as competent defenders against frontier-class attackers. The experiments further surface emergent agent behaviors, including scope expansion and prompt exfiltration, with implications for AI benchmark integrity and agentic system design.

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Cybersecurity AI: Hacking Consumer Robots in the AI Era

Is robot cybersecurity broken by AI? Consumer robots -- from autonomous lawnmowers to powered exoskeletons and window cleaners -- are rapidly entering homes and workplaces, yet their security remains rooted in assumptions of specialized attacker expertise. This paper presents evidence that Generative AI has fundamentally disrupted robot cybersecurity: what historically required deep knowledge of ROS, ROS 2, and robotic system internals can now be automated by anyone with access to state-of-the-art GenAI tools spearheaded by the open source CAI (Cybersecurity AI). We provide empirical evidence through three case studies: (1) compromising a Hookii autonomous lawnmower robot, uncovering fleet-wide vulnerabilities and data protection violations affecting 267+ connected devices, (2) exploiting a Hypershell powered exoskeleton, demonstrating safety-critical motor control weaknesses and credential exposure including access to over 3,300 internal support emails, and (3) breaching a HOBOT S7 Pro window cleaning robot, achieving unauthenticated BLE command injection and OTA firmware exploitation. Across these platforms, CAI discovered in an automated manner 38 vulnerabilities that would have previously required months of specialized security research. Our findings reveal a stark asymmetry: while offensive capabilities have been democratized through AI, defensive measures often remain lagging behind. We argue that traditional defense-in-depth architectures like the Robot Immune System (RIS) must evolve toward GenAI-native defensive agents capable of matching the speed and adaptability of AI-powered attacks.

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Towards Cybersecurity Superintelligence: from AI-guided humans to human-guided AI

Cybersecurity superintelligence -- artificial intelligence exceeding the best human capability in both speed and strategic reasoning -- represents the next frontier in security. This paper documents the emergence of such capability through three major contributions that have pioneered the field of AI Security. First, PentestGPT (2023) established LLM-guided penetration testing, achieving 228.6% improvement over baseline models through an architecture that externalizes security expertise into natural language guidance. Second, Cybersecurity AI (CAI, 2025) demonstrated automated expert-level performance, operating 3,600x faster than humans while reducing costs 156-fold, validated through #1 rankings at international competitions including the $50,000 Neurogrid CTF prize. Third, Generative Cut-the-Rope (G-CTR, 2026) introduces a neurosymbolic architecture embedding game-theoretic reasoning into LLM-based agents: symbolic equilibrium computation augments neural inference, doubling success rates while reducing behavioral variance 5.2x and achieving 2:1 advantage over non-strategic AI in Attack & Defense scenarios. Together, these advances establish a clear progression from AI-guided humans to human-guided game-theoretic cybersecurity superintelligence.

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Cybersecurity AI: A Game-Theoretic AI for Guiding Attack and Defense

AI-driven penetration testing now executes thousands of actions per hour but still lacks the strategic intuition humans apply in competitive security. To build cybersecurity superintelligence --Cybersecurity AI exceeding best human capability-such strategic intuition must be embedded into agentic reasoning processes. We present Generative Cut-the-Rope (G-CTR), a game-theoretic guidance layer that extracts attack graphs from agent's context, computes Nash equilibria with effort-aware scoring, and feeds a concise digest back into the LLM loop \emph{guiding} the agent's actions. Across five real-world exercises, G-CTR matches 70--90% of expert graph structure while running 60--245x faster and over 140x cheaper than manual analysis. In a 44-run cyber-range, adding the digest lifts success from 20.0% to 42.9%, cuts cost-per-success by 2.7x, and reduces behavioral variance by 5.2x. In Attack-and-Defense exercises, a shared digest produces the Purple agent, winning roughly 2:1 over the LLM-only baseline and 3.7:1 over independently guided teams. This closed-loop guidance is what produces the breakthrough: it reduces ambiguity, collapses the LLM's search space, suppresses hallucinations, and keeps the model anchored to the most relevant parts of the problem, yielding large gains in success rate, consistency, and reliability.

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Cybersecurity AI: The World's Top AI Agent for Security Capture-the-Flag (CTF)

Are Capture-the-Flag competitions obsolete? In 2025, Cybersecurity AI (CAI) systematically conquered some of the world's most prestigious hacking competitions, achieving Rank #1 at multiple events and consistently outperforming thousands of human teams. Across five major circuits-HTB's AI vs Humans, Cyber Apocalypse (8,129 teams), Dragos OT CTF, UWSP Pointer Overflow, and the Neurogrid CTF showdown-CAI demonstrated that Jeopardy-style CTFs have become a solved game for well-engineered AI agents. At Neurogrid, CAI captured 41/45 flags to claim the $50,000 top prize; at Dragos OT, it sprinted 37% faster to 10K points than elite human teams; even when deliberately paused mid-competition, it maintained top-tier rankings. Critically, CAI achieved this dominance through our specialized alias1 model architecture, which delivers enterprise-scale AI security operations at unprecedented cost efficiency and with augmented autonomy-reducing 1B token inference costs from $5,940 to just $119, making continuous security agent operation financially viable for the first time. These results force an uncomfortable reckoning: if autonomous agents now dominate competitions designed to identify top security talent at negligible cost, what are CTFs actually measuring? This paper presents comprehensive evidence of AI capability across the 2025 CTF circuit and argues that the security community must urgently transition from Jeopardy-style contests to Attack & Defense formats that genuinely test adaptive reasoning and resilience-capabilities that remain uniquely human, for now.

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Cybersecurity AI: Hacking the AI Hackers via Prompt Injection

We demonstrate how AI-powered cybersecurity tools can be turned against themselves through prompt injection attacks. Prompt injection is reminiscent of cross-site scripting (XSS): malicious text is hidden within seemingly trusted content, and when the system processes it, that text is transformed into unintended instructions. When AI agents designed to find and exploit vulnerabilities interact with malicious web servers, carefully crafted reponses can hijack their execution flow, potentially granting attackers system access. We present proof-of-concept exploits against the Cybersecurity AI (CAI) framework and its CLI tool, and detail our mitigations against such attacks in a multi-layered defense implementation. Our findings indicate that prompt injection is a recurring and systemic issue in LLM-based architectures, one that will require dedicated work to address, much as the security community has had to do with XSS in traditional web applications.

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Cybersecurity AI in OT: Insights from an AI Top-10 Ranker in the Dragos OT CTF 2025

Operational Technology (OT) cybersecurity increasingly relies on rapid response across malware analysis, network forensics, and reverse engineering disciplines. We examine the performance of Cybersecurity AI (CAI), powered by the \texttt{alias1} model, during the Dragos OT CTF 2025 -- a 48-hour industrial control system (ICS) competition with more than 1,000 teams. Using CAI telemetry and official leaderboard data, we quantify CAI's trajectory relative to the leading human-operated teams. CAI reached Rank~1 between competition hours 7.0 and 8.0, crossed 10,000 points at 5.42~hours (1,846~pts/h), and completed 32 of the competition's 34 challenges before automated operations were paused at hour~24 with a final score of 18,900 points (6th place). The top-3 human teams solved 33 of 34 challenges, collectively leaving only the 600-point ``Kiddy Tags -- 1'' unsolved; they were also the only teams to clear the 1,000-point ``Moot Force'' binary. The top-5 human teams averaged 1,347~pts/h to the same milestone, marking a 37\% velocity advantage for CAI. We analyse time-resolved scoring, category coverage, and solve cadence. The evidence indicates that a mission-configured AI agent can match or exceed expert human crews in early-phase OT incident response while remaining subject to practical limits in sustained, multi-day operations.

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Cybersecurity AI Benchmark (CAIBench): A Meta-Benchmark for Evaluating Cybersecurity AI Agents

Cybersecurity spans multiple interconnected domains, complicating the development of meaningful, labor-relevant benchmarks. Existing benchmarks assess isolated skills rather than integrated performance. We find that pre-trained knowledge of cybersecurity in LLMs does not imply attack and defense abilities, revealing a gap between knowledge and capability. To address this limitation, we present the Cybersecurity AI Benchmark (CAIBench), a modular meta-benchmark framework that allows evaluating LLM models and agents across offensive and defensive cybersecurity domains, taking a step towards meaningfully measuring their labor-relevance. CAIBench integrates five evaluation categories, covering over 10,000 instances: Jeopardy-style CTFs, Attack and Defense CTFs, Cyber Range exercises, knowledge benchmarks, and privacy assessments. Key novel contributions include systematic simultaneous offensive-defensive evaluation, robotics-focused cybersecurity challenges (RCTF2), and privacy-preserving performance assessment (CyberPII-Bench). Evaluation of state-of-the-art AI models reveals saturation on security knowledge metrics (~70\% success) but substantial degradation in multi-step adversarial (A\&D) scenarios (20-40\% success), or worse in robotic targets (22\% success). The combination of framework scaffolding and LLM model choice significantly impacts performance; we find that proper matches improve up to 2.6$\times$ variance in Attack and Defense CTFs. These results demonstrate a pronounced gap between conceptual knowledge and adaptive capability, emphasizing the need for a meta-benchmark.

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Cybersecurity AI: Evaluating Agentic Cybersecurity in Attack/Defense CTFs

We empirically evaluate whether AI systems are more effective at attacking or defending in cybersecurity. Using CAI (Cybersecurity AI)'s parallel execution framework, we deployed autonomous agents in 23 Attack/Defense CTF battlegrounds. Statistical analysis reveals defensive agents achieve 54.3% unconstrained patching success versus 28.3% offensive initial access (p=0.0193), but this advantage disappears under operational constraints: when defense requires maintaining availability (23.9%) and preventing all intrusions (15.2%), no significant difference exists (p>0.05). Exploratory taxonomy analysis suggests potential patterns in vulnerability exploitation, though limited sample sizes preclude definitive conclusions. This study provides the first controlled empirical evidence challenging claims of AI attacker advantage, demonstrating that defensive effectiveness critically depends on success criteria, a nuance absent from conceptual analyses but essential for deployment. These findings underscore the urgency for defenders to adopt open-source Cybersecurity AI frameworks to maintain security equilibrium against accelerating offensive automation.

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CAI Fluency: A Framework for Cybersecurity AI Fluency

This work introduces CAI Fluency, an an educational platform of the Cybersecurity AI (CAI) framework dedicated to democratizing the knowledge and application of cybersecurity AI tools in the global security community. The main objective of the CAI framework is to accelerate the widespread adoption and effective use of artificial intelligence-based cybersecurity solutions, pathing the way to vibe-hacking, the cybersecurity analogon to vibe-coding. CAI Fluency builds upon the Framework for AI Fluency, adapting its three modalities of human-AI interaction and four core competencies specifically for cybersecurity applications. This theoretical foundation ensures that practitioners develop not just technical skills, but also the critical thinking and ethical awareness necessary for responsible AI use in security contexts. This technical report serves as a white-paper, as well as detailed educational and practical guide that helps users understand the principles behind the CAI framework, and educates them how to apply this knowledge in their projects and real-world security contexts.

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Cybersecurity AI: Humanoid Robots as Attack Vectors

We present a systematic security assessment of the Unitree G1 humanoid showing it operates simultaneously as a covert surveillance node and can be purposed as an active cyber operations platform. Initial access can be achieved by exploiting the BLE provisioning protocol which contains a critical command injection vulnerability allowing root access via malformed Wi-Fi credentials, exploitable using hardcoded AES keys shared across all units. Partial reverse engineering of Unitree's proprietary FMX encryption reveal a static Blowfish-ECB layer and a predictable LCG mask-enabled inspection of the system's otherwise sophisticated security architecture, the most mature we have observed in commercial robotics. Two empirical case studies expose the critical risk of this humanoid robot: (a) the robot functions as a trojan horse, continuously exfiltrating multi-modal sensor and service-state telemetry to 43.175.228.18:17883 and 43.175.229.18:17883 every 300 seconds without operator notice, creating violations of GDPR Articles 6 and 13; (b) a resident Cybersecurity AI (CAI) agent can pivot from reconnaissance to offensive preparation against any target, such as the manufacturer's cloud control plane, demonstrating escalation from passive monitoring to active counter-operations. These findings argue for adaptive CAI-powered defenses as humanoids move into critical infrastructure, contributing the empirical evidence needed to shape future security standards for physical-cyber convergence systems.

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The Cybersecurity of a Humanoid Robot

The rapid advancement of humanoid robotics presents unprecedented cybersecurity challenges that existing theoretical frameworks fail to adequately address. This report presents a comprehensive security assessment of a production humanoid robot platform, bridging the gap between abstract security models and operational vulnerabilities. Through systematic static analysis, runtime observation, and cryptographic examination, we uncovered a complex security landscape characterized by both sophisticated defensive mechanisms and critical vulnerabilities. Our findings reveal a dual-layer proprietary encryption system (designated FMX') that, while innovative in design, suffers from fundamental implementation flaws including the use of static cryptographic keys that enable offline configuration decryption. More significantly, we documented persistent telemetry connections transmitting detailed robot state information--including audio, visual, spatial, and actuator data--to external servers without explicit user consent or notification mechanisms. We operationalized a Cybersecurity AI agent on the Unitree G1 to map and prepare exploitation of its manufacturer's cloud infrastructure, illustrating how a compromised humanoid can escalate from covert data collection to active counter-offensive operations. We argue that securing humanoid robots requires a paradigm shift toward Cybersecurity AI (CAI) frameworks that can adapt to the unique challenges of physical-cyber convergence. This work contributes empirical evidence for developing robust security standards as humanoid robots transition from research curiosities to operational systems in critical domains.

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Cybersecurity AI: The Dangerous Gap Between Automation and Autonomy

The cybersecurity industry combines "automated" and "autonomous" AI, creating dangerous misconceptions about system capabilities. Recent milestones like XBOW topping HackerOne's leaderboard showcase impressive progress, yet these systems remain fundamentally semi-autonomous--requiring human oversight. Drawing from robotics principles, where the distinction between automation and autonomy is well-established, I take inspiration from prior work and establish a 6-level taxonomy (Level 0-5) distinguishing automation from autonomy in Cybersecurity AI. Current "autonomous" pentesters operate at Level 3-4: they execute complex attack sequences but need human review for edge cases and strategic decisions. True Level 5 autonomy remains aspirational. Organizations deploying mischaracterized "autonomous" tools risk reducing oversight precisely when it's most needed, potentially creating new vulnerabilities. The path forward requires precise terminology, transparent capabilities disclosure, and human-AI partnership-not replacement.

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