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Vadim Makarov

Publications and source records attributed to Vadim Makarov.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Spectral side channels of wavelength-division multiplexer in quantum key distribution under laser damage

In the transmitter of a quantum key distribution (QKD) system, a wavelength-division multiplexer (WDM) is typically used to combine quantum and synchronization signals and is directly connected to the quantum channel. As a result, it becomes the first optical component exposed to laser-injection attacks. Therefore, understanding the behavior of WDMs under such attacks is essential for assessing the practical security of QKD systems. In this work, we systematically investigate the characteristics of WDMs under high-power laser illumination. Our experimental results show that certain WDM samples exhibit pronounced changes in their spectral features once the injected laser power surpasses a specific threshold. Taking the Trojan-horse attack as an illustrative example, we further perform a theoretical analysis of the resulting spectral side channel and show that it can reduce the maximum secure transmission distance to below $66.9\%$ of its original value. By combining experimental observations with theoretical modeling, this study advances the understanding of the influence of WDMs on the practical security of QKD systems.

quant-ph

Energy-time attack on detectors in quantum key distribution

Quantum key distribution is unbreakable in theory but may be hacked via imperfections in its hardware implementations. While many imperfections have been mitigated by countermeasures and advanced security proofs, several remain unsolved. One of these is a superlinear behaviour in single-photon detectors, when the click probability rises faster with the photon number of an incoming light pulse than expected from individual independent photon detections. Here we test an avalanche single-photon detector sinusoidally-gated at 312.5 MHz for superlinearity. Its click probability is moderately superlinear. However, we notice that the click timing depends strongly on the incoming pulse energy. The click occurs progressively earlier, shifting more than 2 ns as the energy rises over a wide 50-dB range. An attacker might use this energy-time effect to conditionally toggle the click between adjacent key bit slots, violating an implicit assumption in the security proofs and rendering them inapplicable. We propose two attacks that exploit this flaw.

quant-ph

Pulsed laser attack at 1061 nm potentially compromises quantum key distribution

Quantum key distribution systems offer cryptographic security, provided that all their components are thoroughly characterised. However, certain components might be vulnerable to a laser-damage attack, particularly when attacked at previously untested laser parameters. Here, we show that exposing 1550-nm fiber-optic isolators to 1061-nm sub-nanosecond pulsed illumination with 1.16 W average power permanently degrades their isolation at 1550 nm, while their forward transparency is less affected. One experimental sample was exposed to 17-mW average power picosecond attacking pulses that temporarily reduced its isolation below the specified guaranteed minimum value. This indicates a potential security threat in these attacking laser regimes that need to be addressed by improving security analysis for various light-injection attacks.

quant-ph

Intensity correlations in decoy-state BB84 quantum key distribution systems

The decoy-state method is a prominent approach to enhance the performance of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems that operate with weak coherent laser sources. Due to the limited transmissivity of single photons in optical fiber, current experimental decoy-state QKD setups increase their secret key rate by raising the repetition rate of the transmitter. However, this usually leads to correlations between subsequent optical pulses. This phenomenon leaks information about the encoding settings, including the intensities of the generated signals, which invalidates a basic premise of decoy-state QKD. Here we characterize intensity correlations between the emitted optical pulses in two industrial prototypes of decoy-state BB84 QKD systems and show that they significantly reduce the asymptotic key rate. In contrast to what has been conjectured, we experimentally confirm that the impact of higher-order correlations on the intensity of the generated signals can be much higher than that of nearest-neighbour correlations.

quant-ph

Wide-spectrum security of quantum key distribution

Implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) need vulnerability assessment against loopholes in their optical scheme. Most of the optical attacks involve injecting or receiving extraneous light via the communication channel. An eavesdropper can choose her attack wavelengths arbitrarily within the quantum channel passband to maximise the attack performance, exploiting spectral transparency windows of system components. Here we propose a wide-spectrum security evaluation methodology to achieve full optical spectrum safety for QKD systems. This technique requires transmittance characterisation in a wide spectral band with a high sensitivity. We report a testbench that characterises insertion loss of fiber-optic components in a wide spectral range of 400 to 2300 nm and up to 70 dB dynamic range. To illustrate practical application of the proposed methodology, we give a full Trojan-horse attack analysis for some typical QKD system configurations and discuss briefly induced-photorefraction and detector-backflash attacks. Our methodology can be used for certification of QKD systems.

quant-ph

Robustness of fiber-optic attenuators to 1061-nm sub-nanosecond pulsed laser radiation in quantum key distribution systems

The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems relies on the physical integrity of their components. While laser-damage attacks (LDAs) using high-power continuous-wave (cw) lasers have been well studied, the threat posed by pulsed lasers at alternative wavelengths remains underestimated. Here, we experimentally investigated the stability of four types of fiber-optic attenuators under exposure to sub-picosecond pulses at 1061 nm with average power reaching 1 W. Mechanical variable attenuators with blocking elements and fixed air-gap attenuators show resistance to this attack. MEMS-based variable attenuators exhibit increased attenuation or irreversible damage that causes a permanent reduction in attenuation of approximately 3.8 dB. For fixed attenuators with an absorption element, we demonstrate that initial pulsed irradiation significantly lowers the optical damage threshold of the components compared to direct cw attacks. The attenuation reduction achieved is up to 7 dB at a 1 W cw laser at 1550 nm. These results highlight the possibility of establishing a hidden side-channel for eavesdropping attacks and underscore the insufficiency of existing countermeasures against sophisticated LDA scenarios.

quant-ph

Statistical study of the transcript of vote counts in multi-member constituencies: Identifying electoral fraud and reconstructing voting returns

We propose new methods of electoral statistics. With their help, we study transcripts of vote counting in municipal elections. We construct and apply effective statistical tests to detect the ballot stuffing at the level of individual candidates and ballots as a whole. We study the difference between falsifications for the administration and against the opposition. We construct indicators assessing the credibility of transcripts as a whole. We propose a model of voter behavior to reconstruct the results of multi-member voting at the level of an individual precinct. We carry out an independent verification of the reconstruction.

physics.soc-ph

A dual approach to proving electoral fraud using statistics and forensic evidence (Dvojnoe dokazatel'stvo falsifikazij na vyborah statistikoj i kriminalistikoj)

Electoral fraud often manifests itself as statistical anomalies in election results, yet its extent can rarely be reliably confirmed by other evidence. Here we report the complete results of municipal elections in the town of Vlasikha near Moscow, where we observe both statistical irregularities in the vote-counting transcripts and forensic evidence of tampering with ballots during their overnight storage. We evaluate two types of statistical signatures in the vote sequence that can prove batches of fraudulent ballots have been injected. We find that pairs of factory-made security bags with identical serial numbers are used in this fraud scheme. At 8 out of our 9 polling stations, the statistical and forensic evidence agrees (identifying 7 as fraudulent and 1 as honest), while at the remaining station the statistical evidence detects the fraud while the forensic one is insufficient. We also illustrate that the use of tamper-indicating seals at elections is inherently unreliable.

stat.AP

Fiber-optic power limiter device based on carbon nanotubes

We experimentally demonstrate a power limiter based on single-walled carbon nanotubes dispersed in a polymer matrix. This simple fiber-optic device permanently increases its attenuation when subjected to 50-mW or higher cw illumination at 1550 nm and initiates a fiber-fuse effect at 1 to 5 W. It may be used for protecting quantum key distribution equipment from light-injection attacks. We demonstrate its compatibility with phase- and polarisation-encoding quantum key distribution systems.

quant-ph

Optical-pumping attack on a quantum key distribution laser source

We report a new type of vulnerability in practical implementations of quantum key distribution systems. We show that it is possible to increase the pulse energy of a source laser diode not only by injection-locking it by external light near its emission wavelength of 1550 nm, but also by optically pumping it at a much shorter wavelength. We demonstrate 10% increase in pulse energy when exposing the laser diode to 1310-nm, 1.6-mW cw laser light via its fiber pigtail. This may allow an eavesdropper to steal the secret key. A possible countermeasure is to install broadband optical filters and isolators at the source's output and characterise them during the security certification.

quant-ph

CubeSat single-photon detector module for investigating in-orbit laser annealing to heal radiation damage

Single-photon avalanche photodiodes (SPADs) based on silicon are widely considered for quantum satellite communications but suffer from an increasing dark count rate (DCR) due to displacement damage in their active areas induced by proton radiation. When the DCR of SPADs exceeds a certain threshold, they become unusable for quantum communication protocols. Previous laboratory experiments have demonstrated that laser annealing of SPADs' active area with about 1~W optical power can significantly reduce radiation-induced DCR of synthetically irradiated SPADs. To assess the feasibility of in-orbit laser annealing on constantly irradiated SPADs in low-Earth orbit, we developed a module with a CubeSat form factor capable of both laser and thermal annealing of four silicon SPADs. Here we report the design and ground testing of this module, investigating laser annealing in a simulated space environment. Our results pave the way for an in-orbit trial that may prove this technology useful for future satellite missions with quantum receivers on board.

physics.ins-det

Preparing a commercial quantum key distribution system for certification against implementation loopholes

A commercial quantum key distribution (QKD) system needs to be formally certified to enable its wide deployment. The certification should include the system's robustness against known implementation loopholes and attacks that exploit them. Here we ready a fiber-optic QKD system for this procedure. The system has a prepare-and-measure scheme with decoy-state BB84 protocol, polarisation encoding, qubit source rate of 312.5 MHz, and is manufactured by QRate. We detail its hardware and post-processing. We analyse the hardware for known implementation loopholes, search for possible new loopholes, and discuss countermeasures. We then amend the system design to address the highest-risk loopholes identified. We also work out technical requirements on the certification lab and outline its possible structure.

quant-ph

Protocols for healing radiation-damaged single-photon detectors suitable for space environment

Single-photon avalanche detectors (SPADs) are well-suited for satellite-based quantum communication because of their advantageous operating characteristics as well as their relatively straightforward and robust integration into satellite payloads. However, space-borne SPADs will encounter damage from space radiation, which usually manifests itself in the form of elevated dark counts. Methods for mitigating this radiation damage have been previously explored, such as thermal and optical (laser) annealing. Here we investigate in a lab, using a CubeSat payload, laser annealing protocols in terms of annealing laser power and annealing duration, for their possible later use in orbit. Four Si SPADs (Excelitas SLiK) irradiated to an equivalent of 10 years in low Earth orbit exhibit very high dark count rates (>300 kcps at -22 C operating temperature) and significant saturation effects. We show that annealing them with optical power between 1 and 2 W yields reduction in dark count rate by a factor of up to 48, as well as regaining SPAD sensitivity to a very faint optical signal (on the order of single photon) and alleviation of saturation effects. Our results suggest that an annealing duration as short as 10 seconds can reduce dark counts, which can be beneficial for power-limited small-satellite quantum communication missions. Overall, annealing power appears to be more critical than annealing duration and number of annealing exposures.

physics.space-ph

Automated verification of countermeasure against detector-control attack in quantum key distribution

Attacks that control single-photon detectors in quantum key distribution using tailored bright illumination are capable of eavesdropping the secret key. Here we report an automated testbench that checks the detector's vulnerabilities against these attacks. We illustrate its performance by testing a free-running detector that includes a rudimentary countermeasure measuring an average photocurrent. While our testbench automatically finds the detector to be controllable in a continuous-blinding regime, the countermeasure registers photocurrent significantly exceeding that in a quantum regime, thus revealing the attack. We then perform manually a pulsed blinding attack, which controls the detector intermittently. This attack is missed by the countermeasure in a wide range of blinding pulse durations and powers, still allowing to eavesdrop the key. We make recommendations for improvement of both the testbench and countermeasure.

physics.ins-det

Characterisation of state-preparation uncertainty in quantum key distribution

To achieve secure quantum key distribution, all imperfections in the source unit must be incorporated in a security proof and measured in the lab. Here we perform a proof-of-principle demonstration of the experimental techniques for characterising the source phase and intensity fluctuation in commercial quantum key distribution systems. When we apply the measured phase fluctuation intervals to the security proof that takes into account fluctuations in the state preparation, it predicts a key distribution distance of over 100 km of fiber. The measured intensity fluctuation intervals are however so large that the proof predicts zero key, indicating a source improvement may be needed. Our characterisation methods pave the way for a future certification standard.

quant-ph

Protecting fiber-optic quantum key distribution sources against light-injection attacks

A well-protected and characterised source in a quantum key distribution system is needed for its security. Unfortunately, the source is vulnerable to light-injection attacks, such as Trojan-horse, laser-seeding, and laser-damage attacks, in which an eavesdropper actively injects bright light to hack the source unit. The hacking laser could be a high-power one that can modify properties of components via the laser-damage attack and also further help the Trojan-horse and other light-injection attacks. Here we propose a countermeasure against the light-injection attacks, consisting of an additional sacrificial component placed at the exit of the source. This component should either withstand high-power incoming light while attenuating it to a safe level that cannot modify the rest of the source, or get destroyed into a permanent high-attenuation state that breaks up the line. We demonstrate experimentally that off-the-shelf fiber-optic isolators and circulators have these desired properties, at least under attack by a continuous-wave high-power laser.

quant-ph

Independent quality assessment of a commercial quantum random number generator

We reverse-engineer, test and analyse hardware and firmware of the commercial quantum-optical random number generator Quantis from ID Quantique. We show that > 99% of its output data originates in physically random processes: random timing of photon absorption in a semiconductor material, and random growth of avalanche owing to impact ionisation. Under a strong assumption that these processes correspond to a measurement of an initially pure state of the components, our analysis implies the unpredictability of the generated randomness. We have also found minor non-random contributions from imperfections in detector electronics and an internal processing algorithm, specific to this particular device. Our work shows that the design quality of a commercial quantum-optical randomness source can be verified without cooperation of the manufacturer and without access to the engineering documentation.

quant-ph

A low-noise single-photon detector for long-distance free-space quantum communication

We build and test a single-photon detector based on a Si avalanche photodiode Excelitas 30902SH thermoelectrically cooled to -100 deg. C. Our detector has dark count rate below 1 Hz, 500 um diameter photosensitive area, photon detection efficiency around 50%, afterpulsing less than 0.35%, and timing jitter under 1 ns. These characteristics make it suitable for long-distance free-space quantum communication links, which we briefly discuss. We also report an improved method that we call long-time afterpulsing analysis, used to determine and visualise long trap lifetimes at different temperatures.

quant-ph