arXiv subjects

Vadim Makarov

Publications and source records attributed to Vadim Makarov.

At least 55 records · Page 3Linked to original sources

arXiv2017

Mitigating radiation damage of single photon detectors for space applications

Single-photon detectors in space must retain useful performance characteristics despite being bombarded with sub-atomic particles. Mitigating the effects of this space radiation is vital to enabling new space applications which require high-fidelity single-photon detection. To this end, we conducted proton radiation tests of various models of avalanche photodiodes (APDs) and one model of photomultiplier tube potentially suitable for satellite-based quantum communications. The samples were irradiated with 106 MeV protons at doses approximately equivalent to lifetimes of 0.6 , 6, 12 and 24 months in a low-Earth polar orbit. Although most detection properties were preserved, including efficiency, timing jitter and afterpulsing probability, all APD samples demonstrated significant increases in dark count rate (DCR) due to radiation-induced damage, many orders of magnitude higher than the 200 counts per second (cps) required for ground-to-satellite quantum communications. We then successfully demonstrated the mitigation of this DCR degradation through the use of deep cooling, to as low as -86 degrees C. This achieved DCR below the required 200 cps over the 24 months orbit duration. DCR was further reduced by thermal annealing at temperatures of +50 to +100 degrees C.

physics.ins-det↗

arXiv2017

Finite-key-size effect in commercial plug-and-play QKD system

A security evaluation against the finite-key-size effect was performed for a commercial plug-and-play quantum key distribution (QKD) system. We demonstrate the ability of an eavesdropper to force the system to distill key from a smaller length of sifted-key. We also derive a key-rate equation that is specific for this system. This equation provides bounds above the upper bound of secure key under finite-key-size analysis. From this equation and our experimental data, we show that the keys that have been distilled from the smaller sifted-key size fall above our bound. Thus, their security is not covered by finite-key-size analysis. Experimentally, we could consistently force the system to generate the key outside of the bound. We also test manufacturer's software update. Although all the keys after the patch fall under our bound, their security cannot be guaranteed under this analysis. Our methodology can be used for security certification and standardization of QKD systems.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2017

Invisible Trojan-horse attack

We demonstrate the experimental feasibility of a Trojan-horse attack that remains nearly invisible to the single-photon detectors employed in practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, such as Clavis2 from ID Quantique. We perform a detailed numerical comparison of the attack performance against Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin (SARG04) QKD protocol at 1924nm versus that at 1536nm. The attack strategy was proposed earlier but found to be unsuccessful at the latter wavelength, as reported in N.~Jain et al., New J. Phys. 16, 123030 (2014). However at 1924nm, we show experimentally that the noise response of the detectors to bright pulses is greatly reduced, and show by modeling that the same attack will succeed. The invisible nature of the attack poses a threat to the security of practical QKD if proper countermeasures are not adopted.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2017

Airborne demonstration of a quantum key distribution receiver payload

Satellite-based quantum terminals are a feasible way to extend the reach of quantum communication protocols such as quantum key distribution (QKD) to the global scale. To that end, prior demonstrations have shown QKD transmissions from airborne platforms to receivers on ground, but none have shown QKD transmissions from ground to a moving aircraft, the latter scenario having simplicity and flexibility advantages for a hypothetical satellite. Here, we demonstrate QKD from a ground transmitter to a receiver prototype mounted on an airplane in flight. We have specifically designed our receiver prototype to consist of many components that are compatible with the environment and resource constraints of a satellite. Coupled with our relocatable ground station system, optical links with distances of 3-10 km were maintained and quantum signals transmitted while traversing angular rates similar to those observed of low-Earth-orbit satellites. For some passes of the aircraft over the ground station, links were established within 10 s of position data transmission, and with link times of a few minutes and received quantum bit error rates typically 3-5%, we generated secure keys up to 868 kb in length. By successfully generating secure keys over several different pass configurations, we demonstrate the viability of technology that constitutes a quantum receiver satellite payload and provide a blueprint for future satellite missions to build upon.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2017

Laser annealing heals radiation damage in avalanche photodiodes

Avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are a practical option for space-based quantum communications requiring single-photon detection. However, radiation damage to APDs significantly increases their dark count rates and reduces their useful lifetimes in orbit. We show that high-power laser annealing of irradiated APDs of three different models (Excelitas C30902SH, Excelitas SLiK, and Laser Components SAP500S2) heals the radiation damage and substantially restores low dark count rates. Of nine samples, the maximum dark count rate reduction factor varies between 5.3 and 758 when operating at minus 80 degrees Celsius. The illumination power to reach these reduction factors ranges from 0.8 to 1.6 W. Other photon detection characteristics, such as photon detection efficiency, timing jitter, and afterpulsing probability, remain mostly unaffected. These results herald a promising method to extend the lifetime of a quantum satellite equipped with APDs.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2016

Testing random-detector-efficiency countermeasure in a commercial system reveals a breakable unrealistic assumption

In the last decade, efforts have been made to reconcile theoretical security with realistic imperfect implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD). Implementable countermeasures are proposed to patch the discovered loopholes. However, certain countermeasures are not as robust as would be expected. In this paper, we present a concrete example of ID Quantique's random-detector-efficiency countermeasure against detector blinding attacks. As a third-party tester, we have found that the first industrial implementation of this countermeasure is effective against the original blinding attack, but not immune to a modified blinding attack. Then, we implement and test a later full version of this countermeasure containing a security proof [C. C. W. Lim et al., IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Quantum Electronics, 21, 6601305 (2015)]. We find that it is still vulnerable against the modified blinding attack, because an assumption about hardware characteristics on which the proof relies fails in practice.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2016

Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage

Practical quantum communication (QC) protocols are assumed to be secure provided implemented devices are properly characterized and all known side channels are closed. We show that this is not always true. We demonstrate a laser-damage attack capable of modifying device behaviour on-demand. We test it on two practical QC systems for key distribution and coin-tossing, and show that newly created deviations lead to side channels. This reveals that laser damage is a potential security risk to existing QC systems, and necessitates their testing to guarantee security.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2016

Insecurity of detector-device-independent quantum key distribution

Detector-device-independent quantum key distribution (ddiQKD) held the promise of being robust to detector side-channels, a major security loophole in QKD implementations. In contrast to what has been claimed, however, we demonstrate that the security of ddiQKD is not based on post-selected entanglement, and we introduce various eavesdropping strategies that show that ddiQKD is in fact insecure against detector side-channel attacks as well as against other attacks that exploit device's imperfections of the receiver. Our attacks are valid even when the QKD apparatuses are built by the legitimate users of the system themselves, and thus free of malicious modifications, which is a key assumption in ddiQKD.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2015

Security loophole in free-space quantum key distribution due to spatial-mode detector-efficiency mismatch

In free-space quantum key distribution (QKD), the sensitivity of the receiver's detector channels may depend differently on the spatial mode of incoming photons. Consequently, an attacker can control the spatial mode to break security. We experimentally investigate a standard polarization QKD receiver, and identify sources of efficiency mismatch in its optical scheme. We model a practical intercept-and-resend attack and show that it would break security in most situations. We show experimentally that adding an appropriately chosen spatial filter at the receiver's entrance is an effective countermeasure.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2015

Experimental quantum key distribution with source flaws

Decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) is a standard technique in current quantum cryptographic implementations. Unfortunately, existing experiments have two important drawbacks: the state preparation is assumed to be perfect without errors and the employed security proofs do not fully consider the finite-key effects for general attacks. These two drawbacks mean that existing experiments are not guaranteed to be secure in practice. Here, we perform an experiment that for the first time shows secure QKD with imperfect state preparations over long distances and achieves rigorous finite-key security bounds for decoy-state QKD against coherent attacks in the universally composable framework. We quantify the source flaws experimentally and demonstrate a QKD implementation that is tolerant to channel loss despite the source flaws. Our implementation considers more real-world problems than most previous experiments and our theory can be applied to general QKD systems. These features constitute a step towards secure QKD with imperfect devices.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2015

Attacks exploiting deviation of mean photon number in quantum key distribution and coin tossing

The security of quantum communication using a weak coherent source requires an accurate knowledge of the source's mean photon number. Finite calibration precision or an active manipulation by an attacker may cause the actual emitted photon number to deviate from the known value. We model effects of this deviation on the security of three quantum communication protocols: the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol without decoy states, Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) QKD protocol, and a coin-tossing protocol. For QKD, we model both a strong attack using technology possible in principle, and a realistic attack bounded by today's technology. To maintain the mean photon number in two-way systems, such as plug-and-play and relativistic quantum cryptography schemes, bright pulse energy incoming from the communication channel must be monitored. Implementation of a monitoring detector has largely been ignored so far, except for ID Quantique's commercial QKD system Clavis2. We scrutinize this implementation for security problems, and show that designing a hack-proof pulse-energy-measuring detector is far from trivial. Indeed the first implementation has three serious flaws confirmed experimentally, each of which may be exploited in a cleverly constructed Trojan-horse attack. We discuss requirements for a loophole-free implementation of the monitoring detector.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2014

Risk analysis of Trojan-horse attacks on practical quantum key distribution systems

An eavesdropper Eve may probe a quantum key distribution (QKD) system by sending a bright pulse from the quantum channel into the system and analyzing the back-reflected pulses. Such Trojan-horse attacks can breach the security of the QKD system if appropriate safeguards are not installed or if they can be fooled by Eve. We present a risk analysis of such attacks based on extensive spectral measurements, such as transmittance, reflectivity, and detection sensitivity of some critical components used in typical QKD systems. Our results indicate the existence of wavelength regimes where the attacker gains considerable advantage as compared to launching an attack at 1550 nm. We also propose countermeasures to reduce the risk of such attacks.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2014

Trojan-horse attacks threaten the security of practical quantum cryptography

A quantum key distribution system may be probed by an eavesdropper Eve by sending in bright light from the quantum channel and analyzing the back-reflections. We propose and experimentally demonstrate a setup for mounting such a Trojan-horse attack. We show it in operation against the quantum cryptosystem Clavis2 from ID~Quantique, as a proof-of-principle. With just a few back-reflected photons, Eve discerns Bob's secret basis choice, and thus the raw key bit in the Scarani-Acín-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 protocol, with higher than 90% probability. This would clearly breach the security of the cryptosystem. Unfortunately in Clavis2 Eve's bright pulses have a side effect of causing high level of afterpulsing in Bob's single-photon detectors, resulting in a high quantum bit error rate that effectively protects this system from our attack. However, in a Clavis2-like system equipped with detectors with less-noisy but realistic characteristics, an attack strategy with positive leakage of the key would exist. We confirm this by a numerical simulation. Both the eavesdropping setup and strategy can be generalized to attack most of the current QKD systems, especially if they lack proper safeguards. We also propose countermeasures to prevent such attacks.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2014

Optimised quantum hacking of superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors

We explore bright-light control of superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) in the shunted configuration (a practical measure to avoid latching). In an experiment, we simulate an illumination pattern the SNSPD would receive in a typical quantum key distribution system under hacking attack. We show that it effectively blinds and controls the SNSPD. The transient blinding illumination lasts for a fraction of a microsecond and produces several deterministic fake clicks during this time. This attack does not lead to elevated timing jitter in the spoofed output pulse, and hence does not introduce significant errors. Five different SNSPD chip designs were tested. We consider possible countermeasures to this attack.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2014

Laser damage helps the eavesdropper in quantum cryptography

We propose a class of attacks on quantum key distribution (QKD) systems where an eavesdropper actively engineers new loopholes by using damaging laser illumination to permanently change properties of system components. This can turn a perfect QKD system into a completely insecure system. A proof-of-principle experiment performed on an avalanche photodiode-based detector shows that laser damage can be used to create loopholes. After about 1 W illumination, the detectors' dark count rate reduces 2 to 5 times, permanently improving single-photon counting performance. After about 1.5 W, the detectors switch permanently into the linear photodetection mode and become completely insecure for QKD applications.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2013

A universal setup for active control of a single-photon detector

The influence of bright light on a single-photon detector has been described in a number of recent publications. The impact on quantum key distribution (QKD) is important, and several hacking experiments have been tailored to fully control single-photon detectors. Special attention has been given to avoid introducing further errors into a QKD system. We describe the design and technical details of an apparatus which allows to attack a quantum-cryptographic connection. This device is capable of controlling free-space and fiber-based systems and of minimizing unwanted clicks in the system. With different control diagrams, we are able to achieve a different level of control. The control was initially targeted to the systems using BB84 protocol, with polarization encoding and basis switching using beamsplitters, but could be extended to other types of systems. We further outline how to characterize the quality of active control of single-photon detectors.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2012

Quantum teleportation using active feed-forward between two Canary Islands

Quantum teleportation [1] is a quintessential prerequisite of many quantum information processing protocols [2-4]. By using quantum teleportation, one can circumvent the no-cloning theorem [5] and faithfully transfer unknown quantum states to a party whose location is even unknown over arbitrary distances. Ever since the first experimental demonstrations of quantum teleportation of independent qubits [6] and of squeezed states [7], researchers have progressively extended the communication distance in teleportation, usually without active feed-forward of the classical Bell-state measurement result which is an essential ingredient in future applications such as communication between quantum computers. Here we report the first long-distance quantum teleportation experiment with active feed-forward in real time. The experiment employed two optical links, quantum and classical, over 143 km free space between the two Canary Islands of La Palma and Tenerife. To achieve this, the experiment had to employ novel techniques such as a frequency-uncorrelated polarization-entangled photon pair source, ultra-low-noise single-photon detectors, and entanglement-assisted clock synchronization. The average teleported state fidelity was well beyond the classical limit of 2/3. Furthermore, we confirmed the quality of the quantum teleportation procedure (without feed-forward) by complete quantum process tomography. Our experiment confirms the maturity and applicability of the involved technologies in real-world scenarios, and is a milestone towards future satellite-based quantum teleportation.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2012

Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system

Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two remote parties to grow a shared secret key. Its security is founded on the principles of quantum mechanics, but in reality it significantly relies on the physical implementation. Technological imperfections of QKD systems have been previously explored, but no attack on an established QKD connection has been realized so far. Here we show the first full-field implementation of a complete attack on a running QKD connection. An installed eavesdropper obtains the entire 'secret' key, while none of the parameters monitored by the legitimate parties indicate a security breach. This confirms that non-idealities in physical implementations of QKD can be fully practically exploitable, and must be given increased scrutiny if quantum cryptography is to become highly secure.

quant-ph↗