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Vamsi Shankar Simhadri

Publications and source records attributed to Vamsi Shankar Simhadri.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

AVP-Inspect: Coordinated Cyber-Physical Testing for Privacy Analysis of COTS Apple Vision Pro Applications

XR devices introduce substantial privacy concerns due to their comprehensive data collection capabilities that surpass traditional computing platforms. While existing works have demonstrated privacy concerns on Android-based XR devices such as Meta Quest series by performing network traffic analysis, little attention has been paid to the Apple Vision Pro (AVP) devices, mainly due to the closed nature and the technical challenges associated with AVP devices. In this work, we make a bold attempt to detect privacy violations of AVP applications from network traffic through automatic testing on AVP devices. Our key insight is that effective AVP application testing requires coordinated control of both cyber (software) and physical (hardware) components, which we term Coordinated Cyber-Physical Testing. Building on this insight, we design and implement AVP-Inspect, an automatic dynamic analysis framework for AVP applications, overcoming significant challenges enforced by the closed-source nature of AVP ecosystem. AVP-Inspect consists of three components: an automatic device controller by building customized hardware devices, a 3D UI explorer by designing a new exploration engine, and a privacy violation detector by constructing a unified privacy taxonomy for AVP. We first evaluated AVP-Inspect on a manually constructed ground truth dataset, then performed a large-scale analysis on 324 AVP applications downloaded from the App Store, with each app tested for 20 minutes. We found that 188 (58.0%) of apps exhibit at least one violation, and more than 60% of the network traffic flows are not properly disclosed.

cs.CR

Batch Prompting Suppresses Overthinking Reasoning Under Constraint: How Batch Prompting Suppresses Overthinking in Reasoning Models

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) achieve strong performance through explicit chain-of-thought reasoning but suffer from \textit{overthinking}: generating excessive reasoning tokens even for trivial queries. {Beyond inflating cost, overthinking can be self-defeating: models enter recursive self-doubt loops that exhaust token budgets without producing an answer, causing API timeouts that directly hurt accuracy.} We present an empirical study showing that \textbf{batch prompting}, originally introduced for throughput optimization, effectively suppresses overthinking at inference time. Across 13 diverse benchmarks with DeepSeek-R1 and OpenAI-o1, batch prompting {reduces reasoning tokens by 76\% (2{,}950$\mapsto$710), on average, while preserving or improving accuracy}. Through behavioral analysis, we find that batching induces three beneficial effects: (1) it reduces per-query reasoning effort when multiple queries share a context; (2) it enables pattern induction, where models generalize from earlier examples to solve later ones; and (3) it suppresses hedging behavior (e.g., ``\texttt{wait,}'' ``\texttt{let me double-check}'') that signals metacognitive loops. We also show that explicit prompt constraints (``\texttt{Use no more than 100 tokens in thinking.}'') fail to reduce overthinking; models either ignore them or sacrifice accuracy. These findings reframe batch prompting as more than a cost optimization: it is a practical inference-time technique that improves efficiency and reliability without model modification.

cs.CL

Virtual Reality, Real Problems: A Longitudinal Security Analysis of VR Firmware

Virtual Reality (VR) technology is rapidly growing in recent years. VR devices such as Meta Quest 3 utilize numerous sensors to collect users' data to provide an immersive experience. Due to the extensive data collection and the immersive nature, the security of VR devices is paramount. Leading VR devices often adopt and customize Android systems, which makes them susceptible to both Android-based vulnerabilities and new issues introduced by VR-specific customizations (e.g., system services to support continuous head and hand tracking). While prior work has extensively examined the security properties of the Android software stack, how these security properties hold for VR systems remains unexplored. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive security analysis of VR firmware. We collect over 300 versions of VR firmware from two major vendors, Quest and Pico, and perform a longitudinal analysis across the kernel layer, the system binary and library layer, and the application layer. We have identified several security issues in these VR firmware, including missing kernel-level security features, insufficient binary hardening, inconsistent permission enforcement, and inadequate SELinux policy enforcement. Based on our findings, we synthesize recommendations for VR vendors to improve security and trust for VR devices. This paper will act as an important security resource for VR developers, users, and vendors, and will also direct future advancements in secure VR ecosystem.

cs.CR