SearcharxivSearch

arXiv subjects

Vanessa Teague

Publications and source records attributed to Vanessa Teague.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Advances in STV Margin Computation

Single transferable vote (STV) is a multi-winner preferential proportional electoral system. The margin is the smallest number of ballots that need to be manipulated to alter the set of winners. If we can compute the margin of an STV election, or a reasonable lower bound on the margin, we can use recent advances in auditing research to conduct a risk-limiting audit of the election's winners. Knowledge of the margin also provides insight into whether uncovered mistakes, or a known error rate in ballot interpretation, could have influenced the outcome. This paper presents substantial improvements on an existing algorithm for computing lower bounds on the margin of an STV election. These improvements allow us to compute higher lower bounds for real STV elections, making mismatch-based risk-limiting audits more practical.

cs.GT

To whom did my vote go?

Single Transferable Vote (STV) counting, used in several jurisdictions in Australia, is a system for choosing multiple election winners given voters' preferences among candidates. The system is complex and it is not always obvious how an individual's vote contributes to candidates' tallies across rounds of tabulation. This short paper presents a demonstration system that allows voters to enter an example vote in a past Australian STV election, and see: (i)~how that vote would have been transferred between candidates; and (ii)~how much that vote would have contributed to the tallies of relevant candidates, across rounds of tabulation.

cs.CY

Security Analysis of Chain-FS service

We examine the security of a cloud storage service that makes very strong claims about the ``trustless'' nature of its security. We find that, although stored files are end-to-end encrypted, the encryption method allows for effective dictionary attacks by a malicious server when passwords only just meet the minimum length required. Furthermore, the file sharing function simply sends the decryption passwords to the server with no protection other than TLS.

cs.CR

MERGE: Matching Electronic Results with Genuine Evidence for verifiable voting in person at remote locations

Overseas military personnel often face significant challenges in participating in elections due to the slow pace of traditional mail systems, which can result in ballots missing crucial deadlines. While internet-based voting offers a faster alternative, it introduces serious risks to the integrity and privacy of the voting process. We introduce the MERGE protocol to address these issues by combining the speed of electronic ballot delivery with the reliability of paper returns. This protocol allows voters to submit an electronic record of their vote quickly while simultaneously mailing a paper ballot for verification. The electronic record can be used for preliminary results, but the paper ballot is used in a Risk Limiting Audit (RLA) if received in time, ensuring the integrity of the election. This approach extends the time window for ballot arrival without undermining the security and accuracy of the vote count.

cs.CR

Efficient Lower Bounding of Single Transferable Vote Election Margins

The single transferable vote (STV) is a system of preferential proportional voting employed in multi-seat elections. Each ballot cast by a voter is a (potentially partial) ranking over a set of candidates. The margin of victory, or simply 'margin', is the smallest number of ballots that need to be manipulated to alter the set of winners. Knowledge of the margin of an election gives greater insight into both how much time and money should be spent on auditing the election, and whether uncovered mistakes throw the election result into doubt -- requiring a costly repeat election -- or can be safely ignored without compromising the integrity of the result. Lower bounds on the margin can also be used for this purpose, in cases where exact margins are difficult to compute. There is one existing approach to computing lower bounds on the margin of STV elections, while there are multiple approaches to finding upper bounds. In this paper, we present improvements to this existing lower bound computation method for STV margins. The improvements lead to increased computational efficiency and, in many cases, to the algorithm computing tighter (higher) lower bounds.

cs.GT

3+ Seat Risk-Limiting Audits for Single Transferable Vote Elections

Constructing efficient risk-limiting audits (RLAs) for multiwinner single transferable vote (STV) elections is a challenging problem. An STV RLA is designed to statistically verify that the reported winners of an election did indeed win according to the voters' expressed preferences and not due to mistabulation or interference, while limiting the risk of accepting an incorrect outcome to a desired threshold (the risk limit). Existing methods have shown that it is possible to form RLAs for two-seat STV elections in the context where the first seat has been awarded to a candidate in the first round of tabulation. This is called the first winner criterion. We present an assertion-based approach to conducting full or partial RLAs for STV elections with three or more seats, in which the first winner criterion is satisfied. Although the chance of forming a full audit that verifies all winners drops substantially as the number of seats increases, we show that we can quite often form partial audits that verify most, and sometimes all, of the reported winners. We evaluate our method on a dataset of over 500 three- and four-seat STV elections from the 2017 and 2022 local council elections in Scotland.

cs.CY

Security analysis of the Australian Capital Territory's eVACS 2020/2024 paperless direct recording electronic voting system

This report describes the implications for eVACS of two cryptographic errors in the Ada Web Services Library that it depends on. We identified these errors in the course of examining and testing the 2024 eVACS code, which was made publicly available in March 2024. We disclosed the problems to AdaCore, and explained the implications at the time to the relevant electoral authorities.

cs.CR

RLAs for 2-Seat STV Elections: Revisited

Single Transferable Vote (STV) elections are a principled approach to electing multiple candidates in a single election. Each ballot has a starting value of 1, and a candidate is elected if they gather a total vote value more than a defined quota. Votes over the quota have their value reduced by a transfer value so as to remove the quota, and are passed to the next candidate on the ballot. Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) are a statistically sound approach to election auditing which guarantees that failure to detect an error in the result is bounded by a limit. A first approach to RLAs for 2-seat STV elections has been defined. In this paper we show how we can improve this approach by reasoning about lower bounds on transfer values, and how we can extend the approach to partially audit an election, if the method does not support a full audit.

cs.GT

Risk-Limiting Audits for Condorcet Elections

Elections where electors rank the candidates (or a subset of the candidates) in order of preference allow the collection of more information about the electors' intent. The most widely used election of this type is Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV), where candidates are eliminated one by one, until a single candidate holds the majority of the remaining ballots. Condorcet elections treat the election as a set of simultaneous decisions about each pair of candidates. The Condorcet winner is the candidate who beats all others in these pairwise contests. There are various proposals to determine a winner if no Condorcet winner exists. In this paper we show how we can efficiently audit Condorcet elections for a number of variations. We also compare the audit efficiency (how many ballots we expect to sample) of IRV and Condorcet elections.

cs.CY

Ballot-Polling Audits of Instant-Runoff Voting Elections with a Dirichlet-Tree Model

Instant-runoff voting (IRV) is used in several countries around the world. It requires voters to rank candidates in order of preference, and uses a counting algorithm that is more complex than systems such as first-past-the-post or scoring rules. An even more complex system, the single transferable vote (STV), is used when multiple candidates need to be elected. The complexity of these systems has made it difficult to audit the election outcomes. There is currently no known risk-limiting audit (RLA) method for STV, other than a full manual count of the ballots. A new approach to auditing these systems was recently proposed, based on a Dirichlet-tree model. We present a detailed analysis of this approach for ballot-polling Bayesian audits of IRV elections. We compared several choices for the prior distribution, including some approaches using a Bayesian bootstrap (equivalent to an improper prior). Our findings include that the bootstrap-based approaches can be adapted to perform similarly to a full Bayesian model in practice, and that an overly informative prior can give counter-intuitive results. Via carefully chosen examples, we show why creating an RLA with this model is challenging, but we also suggest ways to overcome this. As well as providing a practical and computationally feasible implementation of a Bayesian IRV audit, our work is important in laying the foundation for an RLA for STV elections.

stat.AP

Auditing Ranked Voting Elections with Dirichlet-Tree Models: First Steps

Ranked voting systems, such as instant-runoff voting (IRV) and single transferable vote (STV), are used in many places around the world. They are more complex than plurality and scoring rules, presenting a challenge for auditing their outcomes: there is no known risk-limiting audit (RLA) method for STV other than a full hand count. We present a new approach to auditing ranked systems that uses a statistical model, a Dirichlet-tree, that can cope with high-dimensional parameters in a computationally efficient manner. We demonstrate this approach with a ballot-polling Bayesian audit for IRV elections. Although the technique is not known to be risk-limiting, we suggest some strategies that might allow it to be calibrated to limit risk.

stat.AP

Assessing the accuracy of the Australian Senate count: Key steps for a rigorous and transparent audit

This paper explains the main principles and some of the technical details for auditing the scanning and digitisation of the Australian Senate ballot papers. We give a short summary of the motivation for auditing paper ballots, explain the necessary supporting steps for a rigorous and transparent audit, and suggest some statistical methods that would be appropriate for the Australian Senate. 22 June 2022 Update: The update includes analysis of Senate preference data from the 2022 Australian election.

stat.AP

A First Approach to Risk-Limiting Audits for Single Transferable Vote Elections

Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) are an increasingly important method for checking that the reported outcome of an election is, in fact, correct. Indeed, their use is increasingly being legislated. While effective methods for RLAs have been developed for many forms of election -- for example: first-past-the-post, instant-runoff voting, and D'Hondt elections -- auditing methods for single transferable vote (STV) elections have yet to be developed. STV elections are notoriously hard to reason about since there is a complex interaction of votes that change their value throughout the process. In this paper we present the first approach to risk-limiting audits for STV elections, restricted to the case of 2-seat STV elections.

cs.CY

Towards Verifiable Remote Voting with Paper Assurance

We propose a protocol for verifiable remote voting with paper assurance. It is intended to augment existing postal voting procedures, allowing a ballot to be electronically constructed, printed on paper, then returned in the post. It allows each voter to verify that their vote has been correctly cast, recorded and tallied by the Electoral Commission. The system is not end-to-end verifiable, but does allow voters to detect manipulation by an adversary who controls either the voting device, or (the postal service and electoral commission) but not both. The protocol is not receipt-free, but if the client honestly follows the protocol (including possibly remembering everything), they cannot subsequently prove how they voted. Our proposal is the first to combine plain paper assurance with cryptographic verification in a (passively) receipt-free manner.

cs.CR

Bugs in our Pockets: The Risks of Client-Side Scanning

Our increasing reliance on digital technology for personal, economic, and government affairs has made it essential to secure the communications and devices of private citizens, businesses, and governments. This has led to pervasive use of cryptography across society. Despite its evident advantages, law enforcement and national security agencies have argued that the spread of cryptography has hindered access to evidence and intelligence. Some in industry and government now advocate a new technology to access targeted data: client-side scanning (CSS). Instead of weakening encryption or providing law enforcement with backdoor keys to decrypt communications, CSS would enable on-device analysis of data in the clear. If targeted information were detected, its existence and, potentially, its source, would be revealed to the agencies; otherwise, little or no information would leave the client device. Its proponents claim that CSS is a solution to the encryption versus public safety debate: it offers privacy -- in the sense of unimpeded end-to-end encryption -- and the ability to successfully investigate serious crime. In this report, we argue that CSS neither guarantees efficacious crime prevention nor prevents surveillance. Indeed, the effect is the opposite. CSS by its nature creates serious security and privacy risks for all society while the assistance it can provide for law enforcement is at best problematic. There are multiple ways in which client-side scanning can fail, can be evaded, and can be abused.

cs.CR

Assertion-Based Approaches to Auditing Complex Elections, with Application to Party-List Proportional Elections

Risk-limiting audits (RLAs), an ingredient in evidence-based elections, are increasingly common. They are a rigorous statistical means of ensuring that electoral results are correct, usually without having to perform an expensive full recount -- at the cost of some controlled probability of error. A recently developed approach for conducting RLAs, SHANGRLA, provides a flexible framework that can encompass a wide variety of social choice functions and audit strategies. Its flexibility comes from reducing sufficient conditions for outcomes to be correct to canonical `assertions' that have a simple mathematical form. Assertions have been developed for auditing various social choice functions including plurality, multi-winner plurality, super-majority, Hamiltonian methods, and instant runoff voting. However, there is no systematic approach to building assertions. Here, we show that assertions with linear dependence on transformations of the votes can easily be transformed to canonical form for SHANGRLA. We illustrate the approach by constructing assertions for party-list elections such as Hamiltonian free list elections and elections using the D'Hondt method, expanding the set of social choice functions to which SHANGRLA applies directly.

cs.CY

Auditing Hamiltonian Elections

Presidential primaries are a critical part of the United States Presidential electoral process, since they are used to select the candidates in the Presidential election. While methods differ by state and party, many primaries involve proportional delegate allocation using the so-called Hamilton method. In this paper we show how to conduct risk-limiting audits for delegate allocation elections using variants of the Hamilton method where the viability of candidates is determined either by a plurality vote or using instant runoff voting. Experiments on real-world elections show that we can audit primary elections to high confidence (small risk limits) usually at low cost.

cs.CY

A Unified Evaluation of Two-Candidate Ballot-Polling Election Auditing Methods

Counting votes is complex and error-prone. Several statistical methods have been developed to assess election accuracy by manually inspecting randomly selected physical ballots. Two 'principled' methods are risk-limiting audits (RLAs) and Bayesian audits (BAs). RLAs use frequentist statistical inference while BAs are based on Bayesian inference. Until recently, the two have been thought of as fundamentally different. We present results that unify and shed light upon 'ballot-polling' RLAs and BAs (which only require the ability to sample uniformly at random from all cast ballot cards) for two-candidate plurality contests, which are building blocks for auditing more complex social choice functions, including some preferential voting systems. We highlight the connections between the methods and explore their performance. First, building on a previous demonstration of the mathematical equivalence of classical and Bayesian approaches, we show that BAs, suitably calibrated, are risk-limiting. Second, we compare the efficiency of the methods across a wide range of contest sizes and margins, focusing on the distribution of sample sizes required to attain a given risk limit. Third, we outline several ways to improve performance and show how the mathematical equivalence explains the improvements.

stat.AP