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Veeraruna Kavitha

Publications and source records attributed to Veeraruna Kavitha.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Optimal Control with $L^\infty$ and Integral Cost Functionals

Many control problems are classically formulated using integral costs that capture the cumulative performance of a system. Peak or worst-case behavior is captured via supremum or $L^\infty$-costs in another variety of control problems. When both cumulative and peak performance are important, it is natural to consider objective functions that combine the two costs. Although each criterion is well studied, their combination has not been explored extensively and we precisely work on such control problems. Towards establishing the existence, we first consider the relaxed framework, where control is considered using probability distributions. Using the well-known compactness and convexity properties of such control spaces, we establish the existence of an optimal relaxed control---we eventually establish the existence of an $ε$-optimal pure (or classical) control, for every $ε> 0.$ Despite these existence results, computing optimal policies remains challenging due to the non-smoothness introduced by the supremum term, and it is not clear whether the dynamic programming principle holds for our combined problem. To address this, we introduce a family of smooth approximations that yield standard control problems with well-defined optimal (pure) solutions. Using Maximum Theorem, we establish that the solutions of the smooth problems among pure controls form $ε$-optimal for the original problem, with $ε$ tending to zero as the smoothing parameter converges to zero. Finally using the methods proposed in this paper, we study a queueing problem to illustrate (among others) that the required trade-off between peak congestion levels and cumulative performance can be achieved.

math.OC

What should the encroaching supplier do?: A Stackelberg Game Approach

Suppliers often encroach downstream by operating in-house production-units while continuing to supply independent production-units. We study the optimal configuration, including optimal pricing, for an encroaching supplier that balances these dual roles through a Stackelberg game. The integrated supplier determines the wholesale price charged to the outsourced production unit and the retail price of its own product, while the outsourced unit responds optimally. Customer demand-response incorporates both price-based substitutions (of the two production-units) and loyalty (towards individual units). With strong customer loyalty and luxury products, at the optimal choice for the coalition, both units co-exist profitably. In contrast, when the products become essential, the optimal strategy depends upon customer-fallback rates (fraction of the exiting production-unit's market that falls-back to other). Under low fallback, the coalition either sustains co-existence at maximum prices or disciplines the out-house to operate at break-even---with high fallback it is optimal to shut-down the in-house or eliminate the out-house---we derive two factors that identify the above. We further develop a numerical procedure to identify the optimal regime for any given set of parameters. Two surprising results are---higher market potential of the out-house can become a reason for it to operate at break-even---and the coalition may find it beneficial to operate its in-house at losses, particularly for products that are neither highly essential nor in the luxury category.

econ.EM

Multi-type random game dynamics: limits at discontinuities and cyclic limits

We consider (random) strategic interactions in a large population consisting of a variety of players. A rational player chooses actions that maximise certain utility functions, while a behavioural player chooses actions based on preferences such as avoid-the-crowd or follow-the-majority. We specifically study a turn-by-turn dynamic process in which players choose their actions sequentially and once; the utilities are realised either immediately or at the end of the game. In the literature, such dynamical systems are often analysed using an appropriate approximating ordinary differential equation (ODE). However, the ODEs approximating the dynamics with pure actions are typically discontinuous. We adopt a differential inclusion (DI) based stochastic-approximation framework to derive the limiting analysis. The limits of the dynamics are characterised through the internally chain transitive (ICT) sets. We identify the presence of non-classical zeros as potential limits of the dynamics, a phenomenon not observed in classical settings involving continuous ODEs. These new limits arise precisely at the points of discontinuity of the dynamics. We further provide the conditions under which cyclic outcomes may occur at the limit. Finally, we study a queuing game with differential priority-based services and examine the impact of the proportions of avoid-the-crowd and two types of rational populations on the long-run outcomes of the strategic interactions. We identify potential point limits and establish the possibility of cyclic outcomes for certain parameter configurations.

math.OC

Balancing Morality and Economics: Population Games with Herding and Inertia

The adoption of clean technologies (CTs) plays an important role in reducing carbon dioxide (CO$_2$) emissions. We study CT adoption in a large population of consumers with heterogeneous behavioral tendencies. We model the interaction among the agents as a multi-type mean-field game in which the agents choose between clean and polluting technology based products and may either behave as rationals (trading off price and moral incentives), herding agents (just follow the majority), or lethargic agents exhibiting inertia toward adopting the new technologies. We characterize equilibrium CT adoption levels using the recently introduced notion of $\boldsymbolα$-Rational Nash Equilibrium ($\boldsymbolα$-RNE) and its multi-type extension. We then identify a stable subset using the limits of a stochastic turn-by-turn behavioral dynamics. Our results highlight the role of population composition in determining CT adoption. In particular, widespread adoption requires either a sufficiently small price disadvantage for CTs or the presence of a sufficiently large herding population that can be influenced through social awareness programs. Surprisingly, we could prove that environmental damages do not provide sufficient incentives to increase CT adoption.

math.OC

Games with Rational and Herding Players

Classical game theory is a powerful framework to analyze the strategic interactions among rational players. However, in many real-life scenarios, players choose actions based on their inherent natural tendencies rather than deliberate reasoning. In this paper, we develop an analytical framework to study large population games with an alpha-fraction of rational and (1-alpha)-fraction of herding players. We introduce a new notion of equilibrium called alpha-Rational Nash Equilibrium (in short, alpha-RNE) and discuss its interpretations. Some classical equilibria may disappear, and some new ones may emerge, but only for smaller alpha >0. Interestingly, rational players benefit from the presence of herding and may even achieve utility exceeding the socially optimum. Even more strikingly, in some cases, the herding players also benefit, attaining utility close to the social optimum. We further study the effect of the herding fraction on system performance using measures such as the Price of Anarchy (PoA). In transportation networks, a well-known paradox first studied by Pigou and later by Braess typically arises from rational decision-making: adding an extra link can reduce overall efficiency. Our analysis leads to a different conclusion. When a substantial fraction of users exhibit herding behavior, introducing a new link can increase efficiency, provided herding choices can be suitably influenced. The gains are larger when the herding fraction is higher and/or congestion is lower. By contrast, when herding decisions cannot be influenced, the added link may become detrimental. We also study a bandwidth sharing game in which herding tendencies improve system efficiency. Finally, we discuss the mechanism or influence design in the presence of herding, highlighting both opportunities and risks.

math.OC

Equilibrium Cycle: A "Dynamic" Equilibrium

In this paper, we introduce a novel equilibrium concept, called the equilibrium cycle, which seeks to capture the outcome of oscillatory game dynamics. Unlike the (pure) Nash equilibrium, which defines a fixed point of mutual best responses, an equilibrium cycle is a set-valued solution concept that can be demonstrated even in games where best responses do not exist (for example, in discontinuous games). The equilibrium cycle identifies a Cartesian product set of action profiles that satisfies three important properties: stability against external deviations, instability against internal deviations, and minimality. This set-valued equilibrium concept generalizes the classical notion of the minimal curb set to discontinuous games. In finite games, the equilibrium cycle is related to strongly connected sink components of the best response graph.

econ.TH

Strategic Pricing and Ranking in Recommendation Systems with Seller Competition

We study a recommendation system where sellers compete for visibility by strategically offering commissions to a platform that optimally curates a ranked menu of items and their respective prices for each customer. Customers interact sequentially with the menu following a cascade click model, and their purchase decisions are influenced by price sensitivity and positions of various items in the menu. We model the seller-platform interaction as a Stackelberg game with sellers as leaders and consider two different games depending on whether the prices are set by the platform or prefixed by the sellers. It is complicated to find the optimal policy of the platform in complete generality; hence, we solve the problem in an important asymptotic regime. The core contribution of this paper lies in characterizing the equilibrium structure of the limit game. We show that when sellers are of different strengths, the standard Nash equilibrium does not exist due to discontinuities in utilities. We instead establish the existence of a novel equilibrium solution, namely `$μ$-connected equilibrium cycle' ($μ$-EC), which captures oscillatory strategic responses at the equilibrium. Unlike the (pure) Nash equilibrium, which defines a fixed point of mutual best responses, this is a set-valued solution concept of connected components. This novel equilibrium concept identifies a Cartesian product set of connected action profiles in the continuous action space that satisfies four important properties: stability against external deviations, no external chains, instability against internal deviations, and minimality. We extend a recently introduced solution concept equilibrium cycle to include stability against measure-zero violations and, by avoiding topological difficulties to propose $μ$-EC.

econ.TH

Constrained Average-Reward Intermittently Observable MDPs

In Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) with intermittent state information, decision-making becomes challenging due to periods of missing observations. Linear programming (LP) methods can play a crucial role in solving MDPs, in particular, with constraints. However, the resultant belief MDPs lead to infinite dimensional LPs, even when the original MDP is with finite state and action spaces. The verification of strong duality becomes non-trivial. This paper investigates the conditions for no duality gap in average-reward finite Markov decision process with intermittent state observations. We first establish that in such MDPs, the belief MDP is unichain if the original Markov chain is recurrent. Furthermore, we establish strong duality of the problem under the same assumption. Finally, we provide a wireless channel example, where the belief state depends on the last channel state received and the age of the channel state. Our numerical results indicate interesting properties of the solution.

math.OC

Stability of Polling Systems for a Large Class of Markovian Switching Policies

We consider a polling system with two queues, where a single server is attending the queues in a cyclic order and requires non-zero switching times to switch between the queues. Our aim is to identify a fairly general and comprehensive class of Markovian switching policies that renders the system stable. Potentially a class of policies that can cover the Pareto frontier related to individual-queue-centric performance measures like the stationary expected number of waiting customers in each queue; for instance, such a class of policies is identified recently for a polling system near the fluid regime (with large arrival and departure rates), and we aim to include that class. We also aim to include a second class that facilitates switching between the queues at the instance the occupancy in the opposite queue crosses a threshold and when that in the visiting queue is below a threshold (this inclusion facilitates design of `robust' polling systems). Towards this, we consider a class of two-phase switching policies, which includes the above mentioned classes. In the maximum generality, our policies can be represented by eight parameters, while two parameters are sufficient to represent the aforementioned classes. We provide simple conditions to identify the sub-class of switching policies that ensure system stability. By numerically tuning the parameters of the proposed class, we illustrate that the proposed class can cover the Pareto frontier for the stationary expected number of customers in the two queues.

math.OC

Optimal Control with $L^{\infty}$ cost: incorporating peak minimization

Inventory and queueing systems are often designed by controlling weighted combination of some time-averaged performance metrics (like cumulative holding, shortage, server-utilization or congestion costs); but real-world constraints, like fixed storage or limited waiting space, require attention to peak levels reached during the operating period. This work formulates such control problems, which are any arbitrary weighted combination of some integral cost terms and an L-infinity(peak-level) term. The resultant control problem does not fall into standard control framework, nor does it have standard solution in terms of some partial differential equations. We introduce an auxiliary state variable to track the instantaneous peak-levels, enabling reformulation into the classical framework. We then propose a smooth approximation to handle the resultant discontinuities, and show the existence of unique value function that uniquely solves the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. We apply this framework to two key applications to obtain an optimal design that includes controlling the peak-levels. Surprisingly, the numerical results show peak inventory can be minimized with negligible revenue loss (under 6%); without considering peak-control, the peak levels were significantly higher. The peak-optimal policies for queueing-system can reduce peak-congestion by up to 27%, however, at the expense of higher cumulative-congestion costs. Thus, for inventory-control, the performance of the average-terms did not degrade much, while the same is not true for queueing-system. Hence, one would require a judiciously chosen weighted design of all the costs involved including the peak-levels for any application and such a design can now be derived numerically using the proposed framework.

math.OC

Price equilibria with positive margins in loyal-strategic markets with discrete prices

In competitive supply chains (SCs), pricing decisions are crucial, as they directly impact market share and profitability. Traditional SC models often assume continuous pricing for mathematical convenience, overlooking the practical reality of discrete price increments driven by currency constraints. Additionally, customer behavior, influenced by loyalty and strategic considerations, plays a significant role in purchasing decisions. To address these gaps, this study examines a SC model involving one supplier and two manufacturers, incorporating realistic factors such as customer demand segmentation and discrete price setting. Our analysis shows that the Nash equilibria (NE) among manufacturers are not unique, we then discuss the focal equilibrium. Our analysis also reveals that low denomination factors can lead to instability as the corresponding game does not have NE. Numerical simulations demonstrate that even small changes in price increments significantly affect the competitive dynamics and market share distribution.

q-fin.GN

Punitive policies to combat misreporting in dynamic supply chains

Wholesale price contracts are known to be associated with double marginalization effects, which prevents supply chains from achieving their true market share. In a dynamic setting under information asymmetry, these inefficiencies manifest in the form of misreporting of the market potential by the manufacturer to the supplier, again leading to the loss of market share. We pose the dynamics of interaction between the supplier and manufacturer as the Stackelberg game and develop theoretical results for optimal punitive strategies that the supplier can implement to ensure that the manufacturer truthfully reveals the market potential in the single-stage setting. Later, we validate these results through the randomly generated, Monte-Carlo simulation based numerical examples.

math.OC

Queue or lounge: strategic design for strategic customer

Considering an M/M/1 queue with an additional lounge facility (LF), the quest of this paper is to understand the instances when LF is an attractive option, from customer perspective as well as from system perspective: will the customers choose to join the queue or prefer to detour briefly to lounge? In reality, customers do not perform complex computations for such tasks, but instead choose based on some heuristics. We further assume that the customers pessimistically anticipate the future congestion while making the choice. Our analysis reveals that the customers use the LF only when the queue is too crowded, and the lounge is relatively empty; however, strikingly, the customer choice is more inclined towards rejection for the LF in systems with higher traffic (load). We also explore an optimization problem where the system determines whether to implement an LF and what capacity it should have, while accounting for customers' behavioral responses. Under low load conditions, the system benefits from designing a high-capacity lounge, and the customers also prefer to use the LF actively. Surprisingly, neither the system prefers big LF, nor the customers prefer to use the LF profusely at high load conditions; optimal for either is to use the LF sparingly. Thus, importantly, the strategic system and the bounded-rational customers are not in a tug-of-war situation.

math.OC

What should the encroaching supplier do in markets with some loyal customers? A Stackelberg Game Approach

Considering a supply chain with partial vertical integration, we attempt to seek answers to several questions related to the cooperation competition based friction, abundant in such networks. Such an SC can represent a supplier with an inhouse production unit that attempts to control an outhouse production unit via the said friction. The two production units can have different sets of loyal customer bases and the aim of the manufacturer supplier duo would be to get the best out of the two customer bases. Our analysis shows that under certain market conditions, an optimal strategy might be to allow both units to earn positive profits particularly when they hold similar market power and when customer loyalty is high. In cases of weaker customer loyalty, however, the optimal approach may involve pressurizing the outhouse unit to operate at minimal profits. Even more intriguing is the scenario where the outhouse unit has a greater market power and customer loyalty remains strong here, it may be optimal for the inhouse unit to operate at a loss just enough to dismantle the downstream monopoly.

econ.GN

On the interplay between pricing, competition and QoS in ride-hailing

We analyse a non-cooperative game between two competing ride-hailing platforms, each of which is modeled as a two-sided queueing system, where drivers (with a limited level of patience) are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process at a fixed rate, while the arrival process of (price-sensitive) passengers is split across the two platforms based on Quality of Service (QoS) considerations. As a benchmark, we also consider a monopolistic scenario, where each platform gets half the market share irrespective of its pricing strategy. The key novelty of our formulation is that the total market share is fixed across the platforms. The game thus captures the competition between the platforms over market share, with pricing being the lever used by each platform to influence its share of the market. The market share split is modeled via two different QoS metrics: (i) probability that an arriving passenger obtains a ride, and (ii) the average passenger pick-up time. The platform aims to maximize the rate of revenue generated from matching drivers and passengers. In each of the above settings, we analyse the equilibria associated with the game in certain limiting regimes. We also show that these equilibria remain relevant in the more practically meaningful 'pre-limit.' Interestingly, we show that for a certain range of system parameters, no pure Nash equilibrium exists. Instead, we demonstrate a novel solution concept called an \textit{equilibrium cycle}, which has interesting dynamic connotations. Our results highlight the interplay between competition, passenger-side price sensitivity, and passenger/driver arrival rates.

math.OC

Cooperate or Compete: Coalition Formation in Congestion Games

This paper investigates the potential benefits of cooperation in scenarios where finitely many agents compete for shared resources, leading to congestion and thereby reduced rewards. By appropriate coordination the members of the cooperating group (a.k.a., coalition) can minimize the congestion losses due to inmates, while efficiently facing the competition from outsiders (coalitions indulge in a non-cooperative congestion game). The quest in this paper is to identify the stable partition of coalitions that are not challenged by a new coalition. In contrast to the traditional cooperative games, the worth of a coalition in our game also depends upon the arrangement of the opponents. Every arrangement leads to a partition and a corresponding congestion game; the resultant Nash equilibria (NEs) dictate the `worth'. The analysis is further complicated due to the presence of multiple NEs for each such game.

cs.GT

Balancing rationality and social influence: Alpha-rational Nash equilibrium in games with herding

The classical game theory models rational players and proposes Nash equilibrium (NE) as the solution. However, real-world scenarios rarely feature rational players; instead, players make inconsistent and irrational decisions. Often, irrational players exhibit herding behaviour by simply following the majority. In this paper, we consider the mean-field game with $α$-fraction of rational players and the rest being herding-irrational players. For such a game, we introduce a novel concept of equilibrium named $α$-Rational NE (in short, $α$-RNE). The $α$-RNEs and their implications are extensively analyzed in the game with two actions. Due to herding-irrational players, new equilibria may arise, and some classical NEs may be deleted. The rational players are not harmed but benefit from the presence of irrational players. Notably, we demonstrate through examples that rational players leverage upon the herding behaviour of irrational players and may attain higher utility (under $α$-RNE) than social optimal utility (in the classical setting). Interestingly, the irrational players may also benefit by not being rational. We observe that irrational players do not lose compared to some classical NEs for participation and bandwidth sharing games. More importantly, in bandwidth sharing game, irrational players receive utility that approaches the social optimal utility. Such examples indicate that it may sometimes be `rational' to be irrational.

cs.GT

Partition-form Cooperative Games in Two-Echelon Supply Chains

Competition and cooperation are inherent features of any multi-echelon supply chain. The interactions among the agents across the same echelon and that across various echelons influence the percolation of market demand across echelons. The agents may want to collaborate with others in pursuit of attracting higher demand and thereby improving their own revenue. We consider one supplier (at a higher echelon) and two manufacturers (at a lower echelon and facing the customers) and study the collaborations that are `stable'; the main differentiator from the existing studies in supply chain literature is the consideration of the following crucial aspect -- the revenue of any collaborative unit also depends upon the way the opponents collaborate. Such competitive scenarios can be modeled using what is known as partition form games. Our study reveals that the grand coalition is not stable when the product is essential and the customers buy it from any of the manufacturers without a preference. The supplier prefers to collaborate with only one manufacturer, the one stronger in terms of market power; further, such collaboration is stable only when the stronger manufacturer is significantly stronger. Interestingly, no stable collaborative arrangements exist when the two manufacturers are nearly equal in market power.

econ.TH