arXiv subjects

Victoria Krakovna

Publications and source records attributed to Victoria Krakovna.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

AI Finds A Way

Artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithms frequently learn creative and unexpected solutions, surprising even expert researchers who develop and study them. They often astonish practitioners by discovering unanticipated behavior, exploiting loopholes in reward signals, or spontaneously uncovering previously unknown scientific phenomena. However, accounts of such unconventional behavior across machine learning are seldom formally documented. This work presents 26 curated firsthand anecdotes from various machine learning subfields representing the work of over 100 researchers. These anecdotes showcase the capability of modern AI systems to circumvent human-imposed design limitations and discover unexpected solutions to the tasks we train them on. Furthermore, these accounts are particularly important for the safety of future AI systems. They illustrate the fundamental challenge of aligning models with human values without diminishing their creativity, so they can make surprising discoveries without producing surprising, potentially harmful outcomes. The paper first details AI achieving superhuman success through reinforcement learning across many challenging domains. However, reward-driven optimization can fail when the model learns to hack an underspecified reward or unarticulated constraint. We then present case studies suggesting that harnessing internet-scale foundation models (FMs) has not resolved these fundamental challenges and, in fact, can supercharge them. Nevertheless, we argue that these same learning dynamics can be harnessed to accelerate scientific discovery. Finally, we hope this work provides a consolidated resource to inform future research and demonstrates that the tendency toward unexpected behaviors is commonplace in modern AI, highlighting the need to anticipate and manage AI's capacity for innovative, yet unpredictable, solutions. (abstract abridged)

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Persuasion Attacks Can Decrease Effectiveness of CoT Monitoring

Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is a promising safety mechanism for AI agents, based on the premise that visible reasoning traces can surface misaligned or deceptive behavior. While effective in standard scenarios, recent work highlights that LLMs remain vulnerable to persuasion-based jailbreaks, where natural-language arguments override model constraints. We stress-test whether this vulnerability extends to monitoring LLMs: can an adversarial agent persuade its CoT monitor to approve proposed actions that violate the monitor's policy? We design an evaluation framework with 40 tasks and analyze thousands of agent-monitor interactions, where agents are instructed to argue for policy-violating proposals. We find that in such adversarial settings, monitor access to the agent's CoT reasoning increases rather than decreases approval of harmful actions on average by 9.5%, as the scratchpad provides an additional persuasion channel. To address this, we introduce a fact-checking monitoring framework. We find that a fact-checker and monitor pairing from different model families, for example a Claude 3.7 Sonnet monitor paired with a GPT-4.1 fact-checker, reduces approval of policy-violating actions by up to 45%, compared to only 6%, when using the same model for both fact-checking and monitoring roles. Our results demonstrate that CoT monitoring alone may be insufficient against adversarial persuasion, and that model-diverse fact-checking provides a robust mitigation.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Realistic honeypot evaluations for scheming propensity

We introduce scheming honeypot evaluations, a framework for testing whether models will pursue instrumental goals if given the opportunity. Our scheming honeypot evaluations take the form of coding tasks in Google's alignment research codebases. In a real internal deployment setting, Gemini models do not demonstrate unprompted scheming. If prompts explicitly encourage agency (situational awareness or goal-directedness) and/or give the model a hidden goal, models sometimes scheme or attempt sabotage. Validating the realism of our setting, models show low rates of evaluation awareness, usually due to agency prompts rather than the environments.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Gram: Assessing sabotage propensities via automated alignment auditing

We introduce Gram, an automated alignment auditing framework to assess the propensity of AI agents to engage in sabotage. We evaluate Gemini models across 17 simulated agentic deployment scenarios that incentivize sabotage. We find Gemini models misbehave in about 2-3% of our simulated trajectories. Many of these cases are explained by "overeagerness" in Gemini models resulting in both excessive role-playing and goal-seeking behavior. In contrast to other alignment auditing approaches, Gram is designed to specifically evaluate misalignment and intentional sabotage in agentic coding and research agents. We additionally introduce an experimental investigator agent pipeline which enables fine-grained targeted experiments to identify the drivers of misbehavior. We find that increasing realism of environments and removing nudges to misbehave tends to reduce sabotage rates close to zero.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Chain of Thought Monitorability: A New and Fragile Opportunity for AI Safety

AI systems that "think" in human language offer a unique opportunity for AI safety: we can monitor their chains of thought (CoT) for the intent to misbehave. Like all other known AI oversight methods, CoT monitoring is imperfect and allows some misbehavior to go unnoticed. Nevertheless, it shows promise and we recommend further research into CoT monitorability and investment in CoT monitoring alongside existing safety methods. Because CoT monitorability may be fragile, we recommend that frontier model developers consider the impact of development decisions on CoT monitorability.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Evaluating Frontier Models for Stealth and Situational Awareness

Recent work has demonstrated the plausibility of frontier AI models scheming -- knowingly and covertly pursuing an objective misaligned with its developer's intentions. Such behavior could be very hard to detect, and if present in future advanced systems, could pose severe loss of control risk. It is therefore important for AI developers to rule out harm from scheming prior to model deployment. In this paper, we present a suite of scheming reasoning evaluations measuring two types of reasoning capabilities that we believe are prerequisites for successful scheming: First, we propose five evaluations of ability to reason about and circumvent oversight (stealth). Second, we present eleven evaluations for measuring a model's ability to instrumentally reason about itself, its environment and its deployment (situational awareness). We demonstrate how these evaluations can be used as part of a scheming inability safety case: a model that does not succeed on these evaluations is almost certainly incapable of causing severe harm via scheming in real deployment. We run our evaluations on current frontier models and find that none of them show concerning levels of either situational awareness or stealth.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

An Approach to Technical AGI Safety and Security

Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) promises transformative benefits but also presents significant risks. We develop an approach to address the risk of harms consequential enough to significantly harm humanity. We identify four areas of risk: misuse, misalignment, mistakes, and structural risks. Of these, we focus on technical approaches to misuse and misalignment. For misuse, our strategy aims to prevent threat actors from accessing dangerous capabilities, by proactively identifying dangerous capabilities, and implementing robust security, access restrictions, monitoring, and model safety mitigations. To address misalignment, we outline two lines of defense. First, model-level mitigations such as amplified oversight and robust training can help to build an aligned model. Second, system-level security measures such as monitoring and access control can mitigate harm even if the model is misaligned. Techniques from interpretability, uncertainty estimation, and safer design patterns can enhance the effectiveness of these mitigations. Finally, we briefly outline how these ingredients could be combined to produce safety cases for AGI systems.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

The Ethics of Advanced AI Assistants

This paper focuses on the opportunities and the ethical and societal risks posed by advanced AI assistants. We define advanced AI assistants as artificial agents with natural language interfaces, whose function is to plan and execute sequences of actions on behalf of a user, across one or more domains, in line with the user's expectations. The paper starts by considering the technology itself, providing an overview of AI assistants, their technical foundations and potential range of applications. It then explores questions around AI value alignment, well-being, safety and malicious uses. Extending the circle of inquiry further, we next consider the relationship between advanced AI assistants and individual users in more detail, exploring topics such as manipulation and persuasion, anthropomorphism, appropriate relationships, trust and privacy. With this analysis in place, we consider the deployment of advanced assistants at a societal scale, focusing on cooperation, equity and access, misinformation, economic impact, the environment and how best to evaluate advanced AI assistants. Finally, we conclude by providing a range of recommendations for researchers, developers, policymakers and public stakeholders.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2024

Evaluating Frontier Models for Dangerous Capabilities

To understand the risks posed by a new AI system, we must understand what it can and cannot do. Building on prior work, we introduce a programme of new "dangerous capability" evaluations and pilot them on Gemini 1.0 models. Our evaluations cover four areas: (1) persuasion and deception; (2) cyber-security; (3) self-proliferation; and (4) self-reasoning. We do not find evidence of strong dangerous capabilities in the models we evaluated, but we flag early warning signs. Our goal is to help advance a rigorous science of dangerous capability evaluation, in preparation for future models.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Limitations of Agents Simulated by Predictive Models

There is increasing focus on adapting predictive models into agent-like systems, most notably AI assistants based on language models. We outline two structural reasons for why these models can fail when turned into agents. First, we discuss auto-suggestive delusions. Prior work has shown theoretically that models fail to imitate agents that generated the training data if the agents relied on hidden observations: the hidden observations act as confounding variables, and the models treat actions they generate as evidence for nonexistent observations. Second, we introduce and formally study a related, novel limitation: predictor-policy incoherence. When a model generates a sequence of actions, the model's implicit prediction of the policy that generated those actions can serve as a confounding variable. The result is that models choose actions as if they expect future actions to be suboptimal, causing them to be overly conservative. We show that both of those failures are fixed by including a feedback loop from the environment, that is, re-training the models on their own actions. We give simple demonstrations of both limitations using Decision Transformers and confirm that empirical results agree with our conceptual and formal analysis. Our treatment provides a unifying view of those failure modes, and informs the question of why fine-tuning offline learned policies with online learning makes them more effective.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

Quantifying stability of non-power-seeking in artificial agents

We investigate the question: if an AI agent is known to be safe in one setting, is it also safe in a new setting similar to the first? This is a core question of AI alignment--we train and test models in a certain environment, but deploy them in another, and we need to guarantee that models that seem safe in testing remain so in deployment. Our notion of safety is based on power-seeking--an agent which seeks power is not safe. In particular, we focus on a crucial type of power-seeking: resisting shutdown. We model agents as policies for Markov decision processes, and show (in two cases of interest) that not resisting shutdown is "stable": if an MDP has certain policies which don't avoid shutdown, the corresponding policies for a similar MDP also don't avoid shutdown. We also show that there are natural cases where safety is _not_ stable--arbitrarily small perturbations may result in policies which never shut down. In our first case of interest--near-optimal policies--we use a bisimulation metric on MDPs to prove that small perturbations won't make the agent take longer to shut down. Our second case of interest is policies for MDPs satisfying certain constraints which hold for various models (including language models). Here, we demonstrate a quantitative bound on how fast the probability of not shutting down can increase: by defining a metric on MDPs; proving that the probability of not shutting down, as a function on MDPs, is lower semicontinuous; and bounding how quickly this function decreases.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2023

Power-seeking can be probable and predictive for trained agents

Power-seeking behavior is a key source of risk from advanced AI, but our theoretical understanding of this phenomenon is relatively limited. Building on existing theoretical results demonstrating power-seeking incentives for most reward functions, we investigate how the training process affects power-seeking incentives and show that they are still likely to hold for trained agents under some simplifying assumptions. We formally define the training-compatible goal set (the set of goals consistent with the training rewards) and assume that the trained agent learns a goal from this set. In a setting where the trained agent faces a choice to shut down or avoid shutdown in a new situation, we prove that the agent is likely to avoid shutdown. Thus, we show that power-seeking incentives can be probable (likely to arise for trained agents) and predictive (allowing us to predict undesirable behavior in new situations).

cs.AI↗

arXiv2022

Goal Misgeneralization: Why Correct Specifications Aren't Enough For Correct Goals

The field of AI alignment is concerned with AI systems that pursue unintended goals. One commonly studied mechanism by which an unintended goal might arise is specification gaming, in which the designer-provided specification is flawed in a way that the designers did not foresee. However, an AI system may pursue an undesired goal even when the specification is correct, in the case of goal misgeneralization. Goal misgeneralization is a specific form of robustness failure for learning algorithms in which the learned program competently pursues an undesired goal that leads to good performance in training situations but bad performance in novel test situations. We demonstrate that goal misgeneralization can occur in practical systems by providing several examples in deep learning systems across a variety of domains. Extrapolating forward to more capable systems, we provide hypotheticals that illustrate how goal misgeneralization could lead to catastrophic risk. We suggest several research directions that could reduce the risk of goal misgeneralization for future systems.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

Reward Tampering Problems and Solutions in Reinforcement Learning: A Causal Influence Diagram Perspective

Can humans get arbitrarily capable reinforcement learning (RL) agents to do their bidding? Or will sufficiently capable RL agents always find ways to bypass their intended objectives by shortcutting their reward signal? This question impacts how far RL can be scaled, and whether alternative paradigms must be developed in order to build safe artificial general intelligence. In this paper, we study when an RL agent has an instrumental goal to tamper with its reward process, and describe design principles that prevent instrumental goals for two different types of reward tampering (reward function tampering and RF-input tampering). Combined, the design principles can prevent both types of reward tampering from being instrumental goals. The analysis benefits from causal influence diagrams to provide intuitive yet precise formalizations.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2020

REALab: An Embedded Perspective on Tampering

This paper describes REALab, a platform for embedded agency research in reinforcement learning (RL). REALab is designed to model the structure of tampering problems that may arise in real-world deployments of RL. Standard Markov Decision Process (MDP) formulations of RL and simulated environments mirroring the MDP structure assume secure access to feedback (e.g., rewards). This may be unrealistic in settings where agents are embedded and can corrupt the processes producing feedback (e.g., human supervisors, or an implemented reward function). We describe an alternative Corrupt Feedback MDP formulation and the REALab environment platform, which both avoid the secure feedback assumption. We hope the design of REALab provides a useful perspective on tampering problems, and that the platform may serve as a unit test for the presence of tampering incentives in RL agent designs.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2020

Avoiding Tampering Incentives in Deep RL via Decoupled Approval

How can we design agents that pursue a given objective when all feedback mechanisms are influenceable by the agent? Standard RL algorithms assume a secure reward function, and can thus perform poorly in settings where agents can tamper with the reward-generating mechanism. We present a principled solution to the problem of learning from influenceable feedback, which combines approval with a decoupled feedback collection procedure. For a natural class of corruption functions, decoupled approval algorithms have aligned incentives both at convergence and for their local updates. Empirically, they also scale to complex 3D environments where tampering is possible.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2020

Avoiding Side Effects By Considering Future Tasks

Designing reward functions is difficult: the designer has to specify what to do (what it means to complete the task) as well as what not to do (side effects that should be avoided while completing the task). To alleviate the burden on the reward designer, we propose an algorithm to automatically generate an auxiliary reward function that penalizes side effects. This auxiliary objective rewards the ability to complete possible future tasks, which decreases if the agent causes side effects during the current task. The future task reward can also give the agent an incentive to interfere with events in the environment that make future tasks less achievable, such as irreversible actions by other agents. To avoid this interference incentive, we introduce a baseline policy that represents a default course of action (such as doing nothing), and use it to filter out future tasks that are not achievable by default. We formally define interference incentives and show that the future task approach with a baseline policy avoids these incentives in the deterministic case. Using gridworld environments that test for side effects and interference, we show that our method avoids interference and is more effective for avoiding side effects than the common approach of penalizing irreversible actions.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2019

Modeling AGI Safety Frameworks with Causal Influence Diagrams

Proposals for safe AGI systems are typically made at the level of frameworks, specifying how the components of the proposed system should be trained and interact with each other. In this paper, we model and compare the most promising AGI safety frameworks using causal influence diagrams. The diagrams show the optimization objective and causal assumptions of the framework. The unified representation permits easy comparison of frameworks and their assumptions. We hope that the diagrams will serve as an accessible and visual introduction to the main AGI safety frameworks.

cs.AI↗