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Vijay V Vazirani

Publications and source records attributed to Vijay V Vazirani.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

A Strongly Polynomial Algorithm for Arctic Auctions

Our main contribution is a strongly polynomial algorithm for computing an equilibrium for the Arctic Auction, which is the quasi-linear extension of the linear Fisher market model. We build directly on Orlin's strongly polynomial algorithm for the linear Fisher market (Orlin, 2010). The first combinatorial polynomial algorithm for the linear Fisher market was based on the primal-dual paradigm (Devanur et al., 2008). This was followed by Orlin's scaling-based algorithms. The Arctic Auction (Klemperer 2018) was developed for the Government of Iceland to allow individuals to exchange blocked offshore assets. It is a variant of the product-mix auction (Klemperer 2008, 2010, 2018) that was designed for, and used by, the Bank of England, to allocate liquidity efficiently across banks pledging heterogeneous collateral of varying quality. Our work was motivated by the fact that banks often need to run Arctic Auctions under many different settings of the parameters in order to home in on the right one, making it essential to find a time-efficient algorithm for Arctic Auction.

cs.GT↗

Two-Sided Matching Markets: Impossibility Results on Existence of Efficient and Envy Free Solutions

The Hylland-Zeckhauser gave a classic pricing-based mechanism (HZ) for a one-sided matching market; it yields allocations satisfying Pareto optimality and envy-freeness (Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979), and the mechanism is incentive compatible in the large (He et al., 2018). They also studied the exchange extension of HZ and gave an example showing that it may not even admit an equilibrium. In this paper, we consider two models of two sided matching markets: when utility functions are symmetric and when they are non-symmetric. We ask if these models always admit allocations satisfying the two basic properties of Pareto efficiency and envy freeness. Our results are negative. A corollary of the former result is a negative result for non-bipartite matching markets as well.

cs.GT↗