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Vikram Kher

Publications and source records attributed to Vikram Kher.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Prediction-Augmented Trees for Reliable Statistical Inference

The remarkable success of machine learning (ML) in predictive tasks has led scientists to incorporate ML predictions as a core component of the scientific discovery pipeline. This was exemplified by the landmark achievement of AlphaFold (Jumper et al. (2021)). In this paper, we study how ML predictions can be safely used in statistical analysis of data towards scientific discovery. In particular, we follow the framework introduced by Angelopoulos et al. (2023). In this framework, we assume access to a small set of $n$ gold-standard labeled samples, a much larger set of $N$ unlabeled samples, and a ML model that can be used to impute the labels of the unlabeled data points. We introduce two new learning-augmented estimators: (1) Prediction-Augmented Residual Tree (PART), and (2) Prediction-Augmented Quadrature (PAQ). Both estimators have significant advantages over existing estimators like PPI and PPI++ introduced by Angelopoulos et al. (2023) and Angelopoulos et al. (2024), respectively. PART is a decision-tree based estimator built using a greedy criterion. We first characterize PART's asymptotic distribution and demonstrate how to construct valid confidence intervals. Then we show that PART outperforms existing methods in real-world datasets from ecology, astronomy, and census reports, among other domains. This leads to estimators with higher confidence, which is the result of using both the gold-standard samples and the machine learning predictions. Finally, we provide a formal proof of the advantage of PART by exploring PAQ, an estimation that arises when considering the limit of PART when the depth its tree grows to infinity. Under appropriate assumptions in the input data we show that the variance of PAQ shrinks at rate of $O(N^{-1} + n^{-4})$, improving significantly on the $O(N^{-1}+n^{-1})$ rate of existing methods.

stat.ML

Proportional Representation in Metric Spaces and Low-Distortion Committee Selection

We introduce a novel definition for a small set R of k points being "representative" of a larger set in a metric space. Given a set V (e.g., documents or voters) to represent, and a set C of possible representatives, our criterion requires that for any subset S comprising a theta fraction of V, the average distance of S to their best theta*k points in R should not be more than a factor gamma compared to their average distance to the best theta*k points among all of C. This definition is a strengthening of proportional fairness and core fairness, but - different from those notions - requires that large cohesive clusters be represented proportionally to their size. Since there are instances for which - unless gamma is polynomially large - no solutions exist, we study this notion in a resource augmentation framework, implicitly stating the constraints for a set R of size k as though its size were only k/alpha, for alpha > 1. Furthermore, motivated by the application to elections, we mostly focus on the "ordinal" model, where the algorithm does not learn the actual distances; instead, it learns only for each point v in V and each candidate pairs c, c' which of c, c' is closer to v. Our main result is that the Expanding Approvals Rule (EAR) of Aziz and Lee is (alpha, gamma) representative with gamma <= 1 + 6.71 * (alpha)/(alpha-1). Our results lead to three notable byproducts. First, we show that the EAR achieves constant proportional fairness in the ordinal model, giving the first positive result on metric proportional fairness with ordinal information. Second, we show that for the core fairness objective, the EAR achieves the same asymptotic tradeoff between resource augmentation and approximation as the recent results of Li et al., which used full knowledge of the metric. Finally, our results imply a very simple single-winner voting rule with metric distortion at most 44.

cs.GT

Fine-Grained Buy-Many Mechanisms Are Not Much Better Than Bundling

Multi-item revenue-optimal mechanisms are known to be extremely complex, often offering buyers randomized lotteries of goods. In the standard buy-one model, it is known that optimal mechanisms can yield revenue infinitely higher than that of any "simple" mechanism -- the ones with size polynomial in the number of items -- even with just two items and a single buyer (Briest et al. 2015, Hart and Nisan 2017). We introduce a new parameterized class of mechanisms, buy-$k$ mechanisms, which smoothly interpolate between the classical buy-one mechanisms and the recently studied buy-many mechanisms (Chawla et al. 2019, Chawla et al. 2020, Chawla et al. 2022). Buy-$k$ mechanisms allow the buyer to buy up to $k$ many menu options. We show that restricting the seller to the class of buy-$n$ incentive-compatible mechanisms suffices to overcome the bizarre, infinite revenue properties of the buy-one model. Our main result is that the revenue gap with respect to bundling, an extremely simple mechanism, is bounded by $O(n^2)$ for any arbitrarily correlated distribution $\mathcal{D}$ over $n$ items for the case of an additive buyer. Our techniques also allow us to prove similar upper bounds for arbitrary monotone valuations, albeit with an exponential factor in the approximation. On the negative side, we show that allowing the buyer to purchase a small number of menu options does not suffice to guarantee sub-exponential approximations, even when we weaken the benchmark to the optimal buy-$k$ deterministic mechanism. If an additive buyer is only allowed to buy $k = Θ(n^{1/2-\varepsilon})$ many menu options, the gap between the revenue-optimal deterministic buy-$k$ mechanism and bundling may be exponential in $n$. In particular, this implies that no "simple" mechanism can obtain a sub-exponential approximation in this regime.

cs.GT

NP-Hardness of a 2D, a 2.5D, and a 3D Puzzle Game

In this paper, we give simple NP-hardness reductions for three popular video games. The first is Baba Is You, an award winning 2D block puzzle game with the key premise being the ability to rewrite the rules of the game. The second is Fez, a puzzle platformer whose main draw is the ability to swap between four different 2-dimensional views of the player's position. The final is Catherine, a 3-dimensional puzzle game where the player must climb a tower of rearrangeable blocks.

cs.CC