arXiv subjects

Vilok Taori

Publications and source records attributed to Vilok Taori.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Optimal Sequential Assignment with Capacity Constrained Verification

A principal seeks to allocate $k$ identical objects among n sequentially arriving, impatient agents. Each agent privately observes her valuation, and the principal's payoff from allocating an object depends on the recipient's valuation. The principal can perfectly verify the valuation of at most $m$ agents, where $m < k$, and commits to a mechanism before any agent arrives. We characterize the class of optimal mechanisms. Our main result establishes that, in states where the number of remaining objects exceeds the number of available verification checks, the optimal mechanism may involve probabilistic verification.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Stable Matching with Payoff Guarantees

We consider a variant of the Assignment Game of Shapley and Shubik (1971), where agents do not observe the assignment or the surplus division of other matched pairs. We propose a set-valued solution concept (Self-Stabilizing Set) and characterize the largest such set. This leads to the formulation of the Stable Payoff Guarantee (SPG) set, which assumes that agents receive at least their payoff guarantees and that this is common knowledge. Our main result is that, for generic surplus matrices, the SPG set consists only of the efficient assignment. The associated payoff vectors are given by the smallest interval that contains the worker-optimal and firm-optimal stable payoffs.

econ.TH↗