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Vincent Bindschaedler

Publications and source records attributed to Vincent Bindschaedler.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Characterizing Resource Sharing Practices on Underground Internet Forum Synthetic Non-Consensual Intimate Image Content Creation Communities

Many malicious actors responsible for disseminating synthetic non-consensual intimate imagery (SNCII) operate within internet forums to exchange resources, strategies, and generated content across multiple platforms. Technically-sophisticated actors gravitate toward certain communities (e.g., 4chan), while lower-sophistication end-users are more active on others (e.g., Reddit). To characterize key stakeholders in the broader ecosystem, we perform an integrated analysis of multiple communities, analyzing 282,154 4chan comments and 78,308 Reddit submissions spanning 165 days between June and November 2025 to characterize involved actors, actions, and resources. We find: (a) that users with differing levels of technical sophistication employ and share a wide range of primary resources facilitating SNCII content creation as well as numerous secondary resources facilitating dissemination; and (b) that knowledge transfer between experts and newcomers facilitates propagation of these illicit resources. Based on our empirical analysis, we identify gaps in existing SNCII regulatory infrastructure and synthesize several critical intervention points for bolstering deterrence.

cs.CY

Cluster Paths: Navigating Interpretability in Neural Networks

While modern deep neural networks achieve impressive performance in vision tasks, they remain opaque in their decision processes, risking unwarranted trust, undetected biases and unexpected failures. We propose cluster paths, a post-hoc interpretability method that clusters activations at selected layers and represents each input as its sequence of cluster IDs. To assess these cluster paths, we introduce four metrics: path complexity (cognitive load), weighted-path purity (class alignment), decision-alignment faithfulness (predictive fidelity), and path agreement (stability under perturbations). In a spurious-cue CIFAR-10 experiment, cluster paths identify color-based shortcuts and collapse when the cue is removed. On a five-class CelebA hair-color task, they achieve 90% faithfulness and maintain 96% agreement under Gaussian noise without sacrificing accuracy. Scaling to a Vision Transformer pretrained on ImageNet, we extend cluster paths to concept paths derived from prompting a large language model on minimal path divergences. Finally, we show that cluster paths can serve as an effective out-of-distribution (OOD) detector, reliably flagging anomalous samples before the model generates over-confident predictions. Cluster paths uncover visual concepts, such as color palettes, textures, or object contexts, at multiple network depths, demonstrating that cluster paths scale to large vision models while generating concise and human-readable explanations.

cs.CV

Towards Reliable and Generalizable Differentially Private Machine Learning (Extended Version)

There is a flurry of recent research papers proposing novel differentially private machine learning (DPML) techniques. These papers claim to achieve new state-of-the-art (SoTA) results and offer empirical results as validation. However, there is no consensus on which techniques are most effective or if they genuinely meet their stated claims. Complicating matters, heterogeneity in codebases, datasets, methodologies, and model architectures make direct comparisons of different approaches challenging. In this paper, we conduct a reproducibility and replicability (R+R) experiment on 11 different SoTA DPML techniques from the recent research literature. Results of our investigation are varied: while some methods stand up to scrutiny, others falter when tested outside their initial experimental conditions. We also discuss challenges unique to the reproducibility of DPML, including additional randomness due to DP noise, and how to address them. Finally, we derive insights and best practices to obtain scientifically valid and reliable results.

cs.LG

Thwart Me If You Can: An Empirical Analysis of Android Platform Armoring Against Stalkerware

Stalkerware is a serious threat to individuals' privacy that is receiving increased attention from the security and privacy research communities. Existing works have largely focused on studying leading stalkerware apps, dual-purpose apps, monetization of stalkerware, or the experience of survivors. However, there remains a need to understand potential defenses beyond the detection-and-removal approach, which may not necessarily be effective in the context of stalkerware. In this paper, we perform a systematic analysis of a large corpus of recent Android stalkerware apps. We combine multiple analysis techniques to quantify stalkerware behaviors and capabilities and how these evolved over time. Our primary goal is understanding: how (and whether) recent Android platform changes -- largely designed to improve user privacy -- have thwarted stalkerware functionality; how stalkerware may have adapted as a result; and what we may conclude about potential defenses. Our investigation reveals new insights into tactics used by stalkerware and may inspire alternative defense strategies.

cs.CR

Towards Privacy-preserving Photorealistic Self-avatars in Mixed Reality

Photorealistic 3D avatar generation has rapidly improved in recent years, and realistic avatars that match a user's true appearance are more feasible in Mixed Reality (MR) than ever before. Yet, there are known risks to sharing one's likeness online, and photorealistic MR avatars could exacerbate these risks. If user likenesses were to be shared broadly, there are risks for cyber abuse or targeted fraud based on user appearances. We propose an alternate avatar rendering scheme for broader social MR -- synthesizing realistic avatars that preserve a user's demographic identity while being distinct enough from the individual user to protect facial biometric information. We introduce a methodology for privatizing appearance by isolating identity within the feature space of identity-encoding generative models. We develop two algorithms that then obfuscate identity: \epsmethod{} provides differential privacy guarantees and \thetamethod{} provides fine-grained control for the level of identity offset. These methods are shown to successfully generate de-identified virtual avatars across multiple generative architectures in 2D and 3D. With these techniques, it is possible to protect user privacy while largely preserving attributes related to sense of self. Employing these techniques in public settings could enable the use of photorealistic avatars broadly in MR, maintaining high realism and immersion without privacy risk.

cs.HC

Inference Attacks for X-Vector Speaker Anonymization

We revisit the privacy-utility tradeoff of x-vector speaker anonymization. Existing approaches quantify privacy through training complex speaker verification or identification models that are later used as attacks. Instead, we propose a novel inference attack for de-anonymization. Our attack is simple and ML-free yet we show experimentally that it outperforms existing approaches.

cs.CR

Provably Secure Covert Messaging Using Image-based Diffusion Processes

We consider the problem of securely and robustly embedding covert messages into an image-based diffusion model's output. The sender and receiver want to exchange the maximum amount of information possible per diffusion sampled image while remaining undetected. The adversary wants to detect that such communication is taking place by identifying those diffusion samples that contain covert messages. To maximize robustness to transformations of the diffusion sample, a strategy is for the sender and the receiver to embed the message in the initial latents. We first show that prior work that attempted this is easily broken because their embedding technique alters the latents' distribution. We then propose a straightforward method to embed covert messages in the initial latent {\em without} altering the distribution. We prove that our construction achieves indistinguishability to any probabilistic polynomial time adversary. Finally, we discuss and analyze empirically the tradeoffs between embedding capacity, message recovery rates, and robustness. We find that optimizing the inversion method for error correction is crucial for reliability.

cs.CR

DP-Mix: Mixup-based Data Augmentation for Differentially Private Learning

Data augmentation techniques, such as simple image transformations and combinations, are highly effective at improving the generalization of computer vision models, especially when training data is limited. However, such techniques are fundamentally incompatible with differentially private learning approaches, due to the latter's built-in assumption that each training image's contribution to the learned model is bounded. In this paper, we investigate why naive applications of multi-sample data augmentation techniques, such as mixup, fail to achieve good performance and propose two novel data augmentation techniques specifically designed for the constraints of differentially private learning. Our first technique, DP-Mix_Self, achieves SoTA classification performance across a range of datasets and settings by performing mixup on self-augmented data. Our second technique, DP-Mix_Diff, further improves performance by incorporating synthetic data from a pre-trained diffusion model into the mixup process. We open-source the code at https://github.com/wenxuan-Bao/DP-Mix.

cs.LG

SoK: Memorization in General-Purpose Large Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs) are advancing at a remarkable pace, with myriad applications under development. Unlike most earlier machine learning models, they are no longer built for one specific application but are designed to excel in a wide range of tasks. A major part of this success is due to their huge training datasets and the unprecedented number of model parameters, which allow them to memorize large amounts of information contained in the training data. This memorization goes beyond mere language, and encompasses information only present in a few documents. This is often desirable since it is necessary for performing tasks such as question answering, and therefore an important part of learning, but also brings a whole array of issues, from privacy and security to copyright and beyond. LLMs can memorize short secrets in the training data, but can also memorize concepts like facts or writing styles that can be expressed in text in many different ways. We propose a taxonomy for memorization in LLMs that covers verbatim text, facts, ideas and algorithms, writing styles, distributional properties, and alignment goals. We describe the implications of each type of memorization - both positive and negative - for model performance, privacy, security and confidentiality, copyright, and auditing, and ways to detect and prevent memorization. We further highlight the challenges that arise from the predominant way of defining memorization with respect to model behavior instead of model weights, due to LLM-specific phenomena such as reasoning capabilities or differences between decoding algorithms. Throughout the paper, we describe potential risks and opportunities arising from memorization in LLMs that we hope will motivate new research directions.

cs.CL

On the Choice of Databases in Differential Privacy Composition

Differential privacy (DP) is a widely applied paradigm for releasing data while maintaining user privacy. Its success is to a large part due to its composition property that guarantees privacy even in the case of multiple data releases. Consequently, composition has received a lot of attention from the research community: there exist several composition theorems for adversaries with different amounts of flexibility in their choice of mechanisms. But apart from mechanisms, the adversary can also choose the databases on which these mechanisms are invoked. The classic tool for analyzing the composition of DP mechanisms, the so-called composition experiment, neither allows for incorporating constraints on databases nor for different assumptions on the adversary's prior knowledge about database membership. We therefore propose a generalized composition experiment (GCE), which has this flexibility. We show that composition theorems that hold with respect to the classic composition experiment also hold with respect to the worst case of the GCE. This implies that existing composition theorems give a privacy guarantee for more cases than are explicitly covered by the classic composition experiment. Beyond these theoretical insights, we demonstrate two practical applications of the GCE: the first application is to give better privacy bounds in the presence of restrictions on the choice of databases; the second application is to reason about how the adversary's prior knowledge influences the privacy leakage. In this context, we show a connection between adversaries with an uninformative prior and subsampling, an important primitive in DP. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to analyze the interplay between the databases in DP composition, and thereby gives both a better understanding of composition and practical tools for obtaining better composition bounds.

cs.CR

Enhanced Membership Inference Attacks against Machine Learning Models

How much does a machine learning algorithm leak about its training data, and why? Membership inference attacks are used as an auditing tool to quantify this leakage. In this paper, we present a comprehensive \textit{hypothesis testing framework} that enables us not only to formally express the prior work in a consistent way, but also to design new membership inference attacks that use reference models to achieve a significantly higher power (true positive rate) for any (false positive rate) error. More importantly, we explain \textit{why} different attacks perform differently. We present a template for indistinguishability games, and provide an interpretation of attack success rate across different instances of the game. We discuss various uncertainties of attackers that arise from the formulation of the problem, and show how our approach tries to minimize the attack uncertainty to the one bit secret about the presence or absence of a data point in the training set. We perform a \textit{differential analysis} between all types of attacks, explain the gap between them, and show what causes data points to be vulnerable to an attack (as the reasons vary due to different granularities of memorization, from overfitting to conditional memorization). Our auditing framework is openly accessible as part of the \textit{Privacy Meter} software tool.

cs.LG

On the Importance of Architecture and Feature Selection in Differentially Private Machine Learning

We study a pitfall in the typical workflow for differentially private machine learning. The use of differentially private learning algorithms in a "drop-in" fashion -- without accounting for the impact of differential privacy (DP) noise when choosing what feature engineering operations to use, what features to select, or what neural network architecture to use -- yields overly complex and poorly performing models. In other words, by anticipating the impact of DP noise, a simpler and more accurate alternative model could have been trained for the same privacy guarantee. We systematically study this phenomenon through theory and experiments. On the theory front, we provide an explanatory framework and prove that the phenomenon arises naturally from the addition of noise to satisfy differential privacy. On the experimental front, we demonstrate how the phenomenon manifests in practice using various datasets, types of models, tasks, and neural network architectures. We also analyze the factors that contribute to the problem and distill our experimental insights into concrete takeaways that practitioners can follow when training models with differential privacy. Finally, we propose privacy-aware algorithms for feature selection and neural network architecture search. We analyze their differential privacy properties and evaluate them empirically.

cs.CR

Privacy accounting $\varepsilon$conomics: Improving differential privacy composition via a posteriori bounds

Differential privacy (DP) is a widely used notion for reasoning about privacy when publishing aggregate data. In this paper, we observe that certain DP mechanisms are amenable to a posteriori privacy analysis that exploits the fact that some outputs leak less information about the input database than others. To exploit this phenomenon, we introduce output differential privacy (ODP) and a new composition experiment, and leverage these new constructs to obtain significant privacy budget savings and improved privacy-utility tradeoffs under composition. All of this comes at no cost in terms of privacy; we do not weaken the privacy guarantee. To demonstrate the applicability of our a posteriori privacy analysis techniques, we analyze two well-known mechanisms: the Sparse Vector Technique and the Propose-Test-Release framework. We then show how our techniques can be used to save privacy budget in more general contexts: when a differentially private iterative mechanism terminates before its maximal number of iterations is reached, and when the output of a DP mechanism provides unsatisfactory utility. Examples of the former include iterative optimization algorithms, whereas examples of the latter include training a machine learning model with a large generalization error. Our techniques can be applied beyond the current paper to refine the analysis of existing DP mechanisms or guide the design of future mechanisms.

cs.CR

Attacks as Defenses: Designing Robust Audio CAPTCHAs Using Attacks on Automatic Speech Recognition Systems

Audio CAPTCHAs are supposed to provide a strong defense for online resources; however, advances in speech-to-text mechanisms have rendered these defenses ineffective. Audio CAPTCHAs cannot simply be abandoned, as they are specifically named by the W3C as important enablers of accessibility. Accordingly, demonstrably more robust audio CAPTCHAs are important to the future of a secure and accessible Web. We look to recent literature on attacks on speech-to-text systems for inspiration for the construction of robust, principle-driven audio defenses. We begin by comparing 20 recent attack papers, classifying and measuring their suitability to serve as the basis of new "robust to transcription" but "easy for humans to understand" CAPTCHAs. After showing that none of these attacks alone are sufficient, we propose a new mechanism that is both comparatively intelligible (evaluated through a user study) and hard to automatically transcribe (i.e., $P({\rm transcription}) = 4 \times 10^{-5}$). Finally, we demonstrate that our audio samples have a high probability of being detected as CAPTCHAs when given to speech-to-text systems ($P({\rm evasion}) = 1.77 \times 10^{-4}$). In so doing, we not only demonstrate a CAPTCHA that is approximately four orders of magnitude more difficult to crack, but that such systems can be designed based on the insights gained from attack papers using the differences between the ways that humans and computers process audio.

cs.CR

Beyond $L_p$ clipping: Equalization-based Psychoacoustic Attacks against ASRs

Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) systems convert speech into text and can be placed into two broad categories: traditional and fully end-to-end. Both types have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial audio examples that sound benign to the human ear but force the ASR to produce malicious transcriptions. Of these attacks, only the "psychoacoustic" attacks can create examples with relatively imperceptible perturbations, as they leverage the knowledge of the human auditory system. Unfortunately, existing psychoacoustic attacks can only be applied against traditional models, and are obsolete against the newer, fully end-to-end ASRs. In this paper, we propose an equalization-based psychoacoustic attack that can exploit both traditional and fully end-to-end ASRs. We successfully demonstrate our attack against real-world ASRs that include DeepSpeech and Wav2Letter. Moreover, we employ a user study to verify that our method creates low audible distortion. Specifically, 80 of the 100 participants voted in favor of all our attack audio samples as less noisier than the existing state-of-the-art attack. Through this, we demonstrate both types of existing ASR pipelines can be exploited with minimum degradation to attack audio quality.

cs.CR

Leveraging Generative Models for Covert Messaging: Challenges and Tradeoffs for "Dead-Drop" Deployments

State of the art generative models of human-produced content are the focus of many recent papers that explore their use for steganographic communication. In particular, generative models of natural language text. Loosely, these works (invertibly) encode message-carrying bits into a sequence of samples from the model, ultimately yielding a plausible natural language covertext. By focusing on this narrow steganographic piece, prior work has largely ignored the significant algorithmic challenges, and performance-security tradeoffs, that arise when one actually tries to build a messaging pipeline around it. We make these challenges concrete, by considering the natural application of such a pipeline: namely, "dead-drop" covert messaging over large, public internet platforms (e.g. social media sites). We explicate the challenges and describe approaches to overcome them, surfacing in the process important performance and security tradeoffs that must be carefully tuned. We implement a system around this model-based format-transforming encryption pipeline, and give an empirical analysis of its performance and (heuristic) security.

cs.CR

Generative Models for Security: Attacks, Defenses, and Opportunities

Generative models learn the distribution of data from a sample dataset and can then generate new data instances. Recent advances in deep learning has brought forth improvements in generative model architectures, and some state-of-the-art models can (in some cases) produce outputs realistic enough to fool humans. We survey recent research at the intersection of security and privacy and generative models. In particular, we discuss the use of generative models in adversarial machine learning, in helping automate or enhance existing attacks, and as building blocks for defenses in contexts such as intrusion detection, biometrics spoofing, and malware obfuscation. We also describe the use of generative models in diverse applications such as fairness in machine learning, privacy-preserving data synthesis, and steganography. Finally, we discuss new threats due to generative models: the creation of synthetic media such as deepfakes that can be used for disinformation.

cs.CR

SoK: The Faults in our ASRs: An Overview of Attacks against Automatic Speech Recognition and Speaker Identification Systems

Speech and speaker recognition systems are employed in a variety of applications, from personal assistants to telephony surveillance and biometric authentication. The wide deployment of these systems has been made possible by the improved accuracy in neural networks. Like other systems based on neural networks, recent research has demonstrated that speech and speaker recognition systems are vulnerable to attacks using manipulated inputs. However, as we demonstrate in this paper, the end-to-end architecture of speech and speaker systems and the nature of their inputs make attacks and defenses against them substantially different than those in the image space. We demonstrate this first by systematizing existing research in this space and providing a taxonomy through which the community can evaluate future work. We then demonstrate experimentally that attacks against these models almost universally fail to transfer. In so doing, we argue that substantial additional work is required to provide adequate mitigations in this space.

cs.CR