arXiv subjects

Vincent Gramoli

Publications and source records attributed to Vincent Gramoli.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Blockchain Communication Vulnerabilities

Blockchains are diverse in the way they handle communications between their nodes to disseminate information, mitigate attacks, and agree on the next block. While security vulnerabilities have been identified, they rely on an attack custom-made for a specific blockchain communication protocol. To our knowledge, the vulnerabilities of multiple blockchain communication protocols to adversarial conditions have never been compared. In this paper, we compare empirically the vulnerabilities of the communication protocols of five modern in-production blockchains, Algorand, Aptos, Avalanche, Redbelly and Solana, when attacked in five different ways. We conclude that Algorand is vulnerable to packet loss attacks, Aptos is vulnerable to targeted load attacks and leader isolation attacks, Avalanche is vulnerable to transient failure attacks, Redbelly's performance is impacted by packet loss attacks and Solana is vulnerable to stopping attacks and leader isolation attacks. Our system is open source.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

MEV in Binance Builder

We study builder-driven MEV arbitrage on BNB Smart Chain (BSC). BSC's Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) adopts a leaner design: only whitelisted builders can participate, blocks are produced at shorter intervals, and private order flow bypasses the public mempool. These features have long raised community concerns over centralization, which we empirically confirm by tracing the arbitrage activities of the two dominant builders from Apr. 1, 2025 to Feb. 28, 2026 (full observable activity cycle). Within months, the two leading builders, \bd{48Club} and \bd{Blockrazor}, produced over 87\% of blocks and captured about 90\%+ of MEV profits. We find that profits concentrate in short, low-hop arbitrage routes over wrapped tokens and stablecoins, and that block construction rapidly converges toward monopoly. Beyond concentration alone, our analysis reveals a structural source of inequality: BSC's short block interval and whitelisted PBS collapse the contestable window for MEV competition, amplifying latency advantages and excluding slower builders and searchers. MEV extraction on BSC is not only more centralized than on Ethereum, but also structurally more vulnerable to censorship and fairness erosion.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

On the Bandwidth Consumption of Blockchains

With the advent of blockchain technology, the number of proposals has boomed. The network traffic imposed by these blockchain proposals increases the cost of hosting nodes. Unfortunately, as of today, we are not aware of any comparative study of the bandwidth consumption of blockchains. In this paper, we propose the first empirical comparison of blockchain bandwidth consumption. To this end, we measure the network traffic of blockchain network nodes of five blockchain protocols: Algorand, Aptos, Avalanche, Redbelly and Solana. We study the variation over time, differentiate the receiving and sending traffic and analyze how this traffic varies with the number of nodes and validators. We conclude that the transport protocol is the main factor impacting the network traffic, segregating node roles helps reduce traffic and different blockchains are differently impacted by the network size.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2024

Stabl: Blockchain Fault Tolerance

Blockchain promises to make online services more fault tolerant due to their inherent distributed nature. Their ability to execute arbitrary programs in different geo-distributed regions and on diverse operating systems make them an alternative of choice to our dependence on unique software whose recent failure affected 8.5 millions of machines. As of today, it remains, however, unclear whether blockchains can truly tolerate failures. In this paper, we assess the fault tolerance of blockchain. To this end, we inject failures in controlled deployments of five modern blockchain systems, namely Algorand, Aptos, Avalanche, Redbelly and Solana. We introduce a novel sensitivity metric, interesting in its own right, as the difference between the integrals of two cumulative distribution functions, one obtained in a baseline environment and one obtained in an adversarial environment. Our results indicate that (i) all blockchains except Redbelly are highly impacted by the failure of a small part of their network, (ii) Avalanche and Redbelly benefit from the redundant information needed for Byzantine fault tolerance while others are hampered by it, and more dramatically (iii) Avalanche and Solana cannot recover from localised transient failures.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2023

On the Relevance of Blockchain Evaluations on Bare Metal

In this paper, we present the first bare metal comparison of modern blockchains, including Algorand, Avalanche, Diem, Ethereum, Quorum and Solana. This evaluation was conducted with the recent Diablo benchmark suite, a framework to evaluate the performance of different blockchains on the same ground. By tuning network delays in our controlled environment we were able to reproduce performance trends obtained in geo-distributed settings, hence demonstrating the relevance of bare metal evaluations to better understand blockchain performance.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2023

ZLB, a Blockchain Tolerating Colluding Majorities

The problem of Byzantine consensus has been key to designing secure distributed systems. However, it is particularly difficult, mainly due to the presence of Byzantine processes that act arbitrarily and the unknown message delays in general networks. Although it is well known that both safety and liveness are at risk as soon as n/3 Byzantine processes fail, very few works attempted to characterize precisely the faults that produce safety violations from the faults that produce termination violations. In this paper, we present a new lower bound on the solvability of the consensus problem by distinguishing deceitful faults violating safety and benign faults violating termination from the more general Byzantine faults, in what we call the Byzantine-deceitful-benign fault model. We show that one cannot solve consensus if $n \leq 3t + d + 2q$ with t, d, and q are Byzantine, deceitful, and benign processes. We show that this bound is tight by presenting the Basilic class of consensus protocols that solve consensus when $n > 3t + d + 2q$. These protocols differ in the number of processes from which they wait to receive messages before progressing. Then, we build upon the Basilic class in order to present Zero-Loss Blockchain (ZLB), the first blockchain that tolerates an adversary controlling more than half of the system, with up to less than a third of them Byzantine. ZLB is an open blockchain that combines recent theoretical advances in accountable Byzantine agreement to exclude undeniably faulty processes. Interestingly, ZLB does not need a known bound on the delay of messages but progressively reduces the portion of faulty processes below 13 , and reaches consensus. Geo-distributed experiments show that ZLB outperforms HotStuff and is almost as fast as the scalable Red Belly Blockchain that cannot tolerate n/3 faults.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2022

Byzantine Consensus is Θ(n^2): The Dolev-Reischuk Bound is Tight even in Partial Synchrony! [Extended Version]

The Dolev-Reischuk bound says that any deterministic Byzantine consensus protocol has (at least) quadratic communication complexity in the worst case. While it has been shown that the bound is tight in synchronous environments, it is still unknown whether a consensus protocol with quadratic communication complexity can be obtained in partial synchrony. Until now, the most efficient known solutions for Byzantine consensus in partially synchronous settings had cubic communication complexity (e.g., HotStuff, binary DBFT). This paper closes the existing gap by introducing SQuad, a partially synchronous Byzantine consensus protocol with quadratic worst-case communication complexity. In addition, SQuad is optimally-resilient and achieves linear worst-case latency complexity. The key technical contribution underlying SQuad lies in the way we solve view synchronization, the problem of bringing all correct processes to the same view with a correct leader for sufficiently long. Concretely, we present RareSync, a view synchronization protocol with quadratic communication complexity and linear latency complexity, which we utilize in order to obtain SQuad.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2022

Smart Red Belly Blockchain: Enhanced Transaction Management for Decentralized Applications

Decentralized Applications (DApps) have seen widespread use in the recent past driving the world towards a new decentralized version of the web known as Web3.0. DApp-supported blockchains like Ethereum have largely been responsible for this drive supporting the largest eco-system of DApps. Although the low performance provided by Ethereum has been a major impediment to realizing a decentralized web, several high-performance blockchains have been introduced recently to bridge this gap. Most of these blockchains rely on consensus optimizations. Only a few enhance other parts of the blockchain protocol that involves transaction management: the validation of transactions, broadcast of transactions, encapsulation and dissemination of blocks with transactions, re-validation and execution of transactions in blocks, storage of blocks, and confirmation of transaction commits to senders upon request. In this paper, we enhance transaction management by introducing a novel transaction validation reduction and a per sub-block processing to optimize the block storage. We empirically show the performance improvements gained by our enhanced transaction management in the Smart Red Belly Blockchain (SRBB) VM we develop. Finally, we integrate our SRBB VM to an already optimized consensus from a known blockchain to develop the Smart Red Belly Blockchain. Our results show that SRBB achieves a peak throughput of 4000 TPS and an average throughput of 2000 TPS on 200 nodes spread across 5 continents. SRBB outperforms 6 other blockchains when running the exchange DApp featuring a real workload trace taken from Nasdaq.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2022

SocChain: Blockchain with Swift Proportional Governance for Bribery Mitigation

Blockchain governance is paramount to leading securely a large group of users towards the same goal without disputes about the legitimacy of a blockchain instance over another. As of today, there is no efficient way of protecting this governance against an oligarchy. This paper aims to offer a new dimension to the security of blockchains by defining the Swift Proportional Governance problem. This problem is to rapidly elect governance users that proportionally represent voters without the risk of dictatorship. We then design and implement an open permissioned blockchain called SocChain (Social Choice Blockchain) that mitigates bribery by building upon results in social choice theory. We deploy SocChain and evaluate our new multi-winner election DApp running on top of it. Our results indicate that using our DApp, 150 voters can elect a proportionally representative committee of 150 members within 5 minutes. Hence we show that SocChain can elect as many representatives as members in various global organizations.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

Holistic Verification of Blockchain Consensus

Blockchain has recently attracted the attention of the industry due, in part, to its ability to automate asset transfers. It requires distributed participants to reach a consensus on a block despite the presence of malicious (a.k.a. Byzantine) participants. Malicious participants exploit regularly weaknesses of these blockchain consensus algorithms, with sometimes devastating consequences. In fact, these weaknesses are quite common and are well illustrated by the flaws in the hand-written proofs of existing blockchain consensus protocols [63]. Paradoxically, until now, no blockchain consensus has been holistically verified using model checking. In this paper, we remedy this paradox by model checking for the first time a blockchain consensus used in industry. We propose a holistic approach to verify the consensus algorithm of the Red Belly Blockchain [20], for any number $n$ of processes and any number $f<n/3$ of Byzantine processes. We decompose directly the algorithm pseudocode in two parts -- an inner broadcast algorithm and an outer decision algorithm -- each modelled as a threshold automaton [36], and we formalize their expected properties in linear-time temporal logic. We then automatically check the inner broadcasting algorithm, under a carefully identified fairness assumption. For the verification of the outer algorithm, we simplify the model of the inner algorithm by relying on its checked properties. Doing so, we formally verify not only the safety properties of the Red Belly Blockchain consensus but also its liveness in about 70 seconds.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

Basilic: Resilient Optimal Consensus Protocols With Benign and Deceitful Faults

The problem of Byzantine consensus has been key to designing secure distributed systems. However, it is particularly difficult, mainly due to the presence of Byzantine processes that act arbitrarily and the unknown message delays in general networks. Although it is well known that both safety and liveness are at risk as soon as $n/3$ Byzantine processes fail, very few works attempted to characterize precisely the faults that produce safety violations from the faults that produce termination violations. In this paper, we present a new lower bound on the solvability of the consensus problem by distinguishing deceitful faults violating safety and benign faults violating termination from the more general Byzantine faults, in what we call the Byzantine-deceitful-benign fault model. We show that one cannot solve consensus if $n\leq 3t+d+2q$ with $t$ Byzantine processes, $d$ deceitful processes, and $q$ benign processes. In addition, we show that this bound is tight by presenting the Basilic class of consensus protocols that solve consensus when $n > 3t+d+2q$. These protocols differ in the number of processes from which they wait to receive messages before progressing. Each of these protocols is thus better suited for some applications depending on the predominance of benign or deceitful faults. Finally, we study the fault tolerance of the Basilic class of consensus protocols in the context of blockchains that need to solve the weaker problem of eventual consensus. We demonstrate that Basilic solves this problem with only $n > 2t+d+q$, hence demonstrating how it can strengthen blockchain security.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2022

CollaChain: A BFT Collaborative Middleware for Decentralized Applications

The sharing economy is centralizing services, leading to misuses of the Internet. We can list growing damages of data hacks, global outages and even the use of data to manipulate their owners. Unfortunately, there is no decentralized web where users can interact peer-to-peer in a secure way. Blockchains incentivize participants to individually validate every transaction and impose their block to the network. As a result, the validation of smart contract requests is computationally intensive while the agreement on a unique state does not make full use of the network. In this paper, we propose Collachain, a new byzantine fault tolerant blockchain compatible with the largest ecosystem of DApps that leverages collaboration. First, the pariticipants executing smart contracts collaborate to validate the transactions, hence halving the number of validations required by modern blockchains (e.g., Ethereum, Libra). Second, the participants in the consensus collaborate to combine their block proposal into a superblock, hence improving throughput as the system grows to hundreds of nodes. In addition, Collachain offers the possibility to its users to interact securely with each other without downloading the blockchain, hence allowing interactions via mobile devices. Collachain is effective at outperforming the Concord and Quorum blockchains and its throughput peaks at 4500 TPS under a Twitter DApp (Decentralized Application) workload. Finally, we demonstrate Collachain's scalability by deploying it on 200 nodes located in 10 countries over 5 continents.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2022

TRAP: The Bait of Rational Players to Solve Byzantine Consensus

It is impossible to solve the Byzantine consensus problem in an open network of $n$ participants if only $2n/3$ or less of them are correct. As blockchains need to solve consensus, one might think that blockchains need more than $2n/3$ correct participants. But it is yet unknown whether consensus can be solved when less than $2n/3$ participants are correct and $k$ participants are rational players, which misbehave if they can gain the loot. Trading correct participants for rational players may not seem helpful to solve consensus since rational players can misbehave whereas correct participants, by definition, cannot. In this paper, we show that consensus is actually solvable in this model, even with less than $2n/3$ correct participants. The key idea is a baiting strategy that lets rational players pretend to misbehave in joining a coalition but rewards them to betray this coalition before the loot gets stolen. We propose TRAP, a protocol that builds upon recent advances in the theory of accountability to solve consensus as soon as $n>\max\bigl(\frac{3}{2}k+3t,2(k+t)\bigr)$: by assuming that private keys cannot be forged, this protocol is an equilibrium where no coalition of $k$ rational players can coordinate to increase their expected utility regardless of the arbitrary behavior of up to $t$ Byzantine players. Finally, we show that a baiting strategy is necessary and sufficient to solve this, so-called rational agreement problem. First, we show that it is impossible to solve this rational agreement problem without implementing a baiting strategy. Second, the existence of TRAP demonstrates the sufficiency of the baiting strategy. Our TRAP protocol finds applications in blockchains to prevent players from disagreeing, that could otherwise lead to "double spending".

cs.DC↗

arXiv2021

Rational Agreement in the Presence of Crash Faults

Blockchain systems need to solve consensus despite the presence of rational users and failures. The notion of $(k,t)$-robustness has shown instrumental to list problems that cannot be solved if $k$ players are rational and $t$ players are Byzantine or act arbitrarily. What is less clear is whether one can solve such problems if the faults are benign. In this paper, we bridge the gap between games that are robust against Byzantine players and games that are robust against crash players. Our first result is an impossibility result: We show that no $(k,t)$-robust consensus protocol can solve consensus in the crash model if $k+2t\geq n$ unless there is a particular punishment strategy, called the $(k,t)$-baiting strategy. This reveals the need to introduce baiting as the act of rewarding a colluding node when betraying its coalition, to make blockchains more secure. Our second result is an equivalence relation between crash fault tolerant games and Byzantine fault tolerant games, which raises an interesting research question on the power of baiting to solve consensus. To this end, we show, on the one hand, that a $(k,t)$-robust consensus protocol becomes $(k+t,t)$-robust in the crash model. We show, on the other hand, that the existence of a $(k,t)$-robust consensus protocol in the crash model that does not make use of a baiting strategy implies the existence of a $(k-t,t)$-robust consensus protocol in the Byzantine model, with the help of cryptography.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

ZLB: A Blockchain to Tolerate Colluding Majorities

In the general setting, consensus cannot be solved if an adversary controls a third of the system. Yet, blockchain participants typically reach consensus "eventually" despite an adversary controlling a minority of the system. Exceeding this $\frac{1}{3}$ cap is made possible by tolerating transient disagreements, where distinct participants select distinct blocks for the same index, before eventually agreeing to select the same block. Until now, no blockchain could tolerate an attacker controlling a majority of the system. In this paper, we present Zero-Loss Blockchain (ZLB), the first blockchain that tolerates an adversary controlling more than half of the system. ZLB is an open blockchain that combines recent theoretical advances in accountable Byzantine agreement to exclude undeniably deceitful replicas. progressively reduces the portion of deceitful replicas below $\frac{1}{3}$, and reaches consensus. Geo-distributed experiments show that ZLB outperforms HotStuff and is almost as fast as the scalable Red Belly Blockchain that cannot tolerate $n/3$ faults.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2021

A Concurrency-Optimal List-Based Set

Designing an efficient concurrent data structure is an important challenge that is not easy to meet. Intuitively, efficiency of an implementation is defined, in the first place, by its ability to process applied operations in parallel, without using unnecessary synchronization. As we show in this paper, even for a data structure as simple as a linked list used to implement the set type, the most efficient algorithms known so far are not concurrency-optimal: they may reject correct concurrent schedules. We propose a new algorithm for the list-based set based on a value-aware try-lock that we show to achieve optimal concurrency: it only rejects concurrent schedules that violate correctness of the implemented set type. We show empirically that reaching optimality does not induce a significant overhead. In fact, our implementation of the concurrency-optimal algorithm outperforms both the Lazy Linked List and the Harris-Michael state-of-the-art algorithms.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2020

Federated Learning over Wireless Networks: Convergence Analysis and Resource Allocation

There is an increasing interest in a fast-growing machine learning technique called Federated Learning, in which the model training is distributed over mobile user equipments (UEs), exploiting UEs' local computation and training data. Despite its advantages in data privacy-preserving, Federated Learning (FL) still has challenges in heterogeneity across UEs' data and physical resources. We first propose a FL algorithm which can handle the heterogeneous UEs' data challenge without further assumptions except strongly convex and smooth loss functions. We provide the convergence rate characterizing the trade-off between local computation rounds of UE to update its local model and global communication rounds to update the FL global model. We then employ the proposed FL algorithm in wireless networks as a resource allocation optimization problem that captures the trade-off between the FL convergence wall clock time and energy consumption of UEs with heterogeneous computing and power resources. Even though the wireless resource allocation problem of FL is non-convex, we exploit this problem's structure to decompose it into three sub-problems and analyze their closed-form solutions as well as insights to problem design. Finally, we illustrate the theoretical analysis for the new algorithm with Tensorflow experiments and extensive numerical results for the wireless resource allocation sub-problems. The experiment results not only verify the theoretical convergence but also show that our proposed algorithm outperforms the vanilla FedAvg algorithm in terms of convergence rate and testing accuracy.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2020

Feasibility of Cross-Chain Payment with Success Guarantees

We consider the problem of cross-chain payment whereby customers of different escrows---implemented by a bank or a blockchain smart contract---successfully transfer digital assets without trusting each other. Prior to this work, cross-chain payment problems did not require this success, or any form of progress. We demonstrate that it is possible to solve this problem when assuming synchrony, in the sense that each message is guaranteed to arrive within a known amount of time, but impossible to solve without assuming synchrony. Yet, we solve a weaker variant of this problem, where success is conditional on the patience of the participants, without assuming synchrony, and in the presence of Byzantine failures. We also discuss the relation with the recently defined cross-chain deals.

cs.DC↗