Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Vincent Meisner

Publications and source records attributed to Vincent Meisner.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Menu Design Meets Market Design: Strategic Simplicity vs. Choice Complexity

Strategic simplicity removes the incentive to misreport preferences, but it does not ensure that participants can identify what they prefer. We study this distinction in a laboratory experiment on serial dictatorships, where optimal play only requires choosing one's favorite bundle of real-effort tasks. Participants make fifteen incentivized choices among bundles that vary in how many tasks they combine. They choose either from a large menu or through a series of binary choices. Having made all choices, they unexpectedly reconsider each assignment against a previously rejected alternative. We find that roughly one in six choices is reversed and almost one in five involves an objectively dominated bundle. Simplifying the choice architecture does not help. Binary decomposition even raises reversal rates among low-ability participants and further inflates their confidence about their choices.

econ.GN↗

Monetizing digital content with network effects: A mechanism-design approach

We design profit-maximizing mechanisms to sell an excludable and non-rival good with positive and/or negative network effects. Buyers have heterogeneous private values that depend on how many others also consume the good. In optimum, an endogenous number of the highest types consume the good, and we can implement this allocation in dominant strategies. We apply our insights to digital content creation, and we are able to rationalize features seen in monetization schemes in this industry such as voluntary contributions, community subsidies, and exclusivity bids.

econ.TH↗

Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms

Evidence suggests that participants in strategy-proof matching mechanisms play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal equilibria. We find that non-truthful preference submissions can be strictly optimal if and only if they are top-rank monotone. In equilibrium, inefficiency or justified envy may arise in seemingly stable or efficient mechanisms. Specifically, students who are more loss averse or less confident than their peers obtain suboptimal allocations.

econ.TH↗